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# CONTENTS.

	PAGE
Aspects of Dramatic Symbolism: Three Studies in the <i>Oresteia</i> . By ROBERT F. GOHEEN, - - - - -	113
On Some Chapters of the <i>Notitia Dignitatum</i> Relating to the De- fence of Gaul and Britain. By DENIS VAN BERCHEM, - - -	138
Antecedents of Aristotle's Psychology and Scale of Beings. By FRIEDRICH SOLMSEN, - - - - -	148
Had Horace Been Criticized? A Study of <i>Serm.</i> , I, 4. By NIALL RUDD, - - - - -	165
The Origin of the Infinitive in Greek Indirect Statement. By A. C. MOORHOUSE, - - - - -	176
Aristotle, <i>Metaphysics</i> 987 A 32-B 7. By HAROLD CHERNISS, - -	184
New Inscriptions Concerning Archilochos. By EUGENE VANDERPOOL,	186
REVIEWS: - - - - -	189
<i>D'Ors' Epigraphia jurídica de la España romana</i> (JAMES H. OLIVER).— <i>Hahn's</i> Subjunctive and Optative: Their Origin as Futures (EDWARD L. BAS- SETT).— <i>Chantraine's Grammaire Homérique</i> , Tome II: Syntaxe (W. KENDRICK PRITCHETT).— <i>Ramnaud's L'art de la déformation historique</i> dans les Commentaires de César (E. T. SALMON).— <i>Castorina's L'atticismo</i> nell' evoluzione del pensiero di Cicerone (GEORGE A. KENNEDY).— <i>Grant's</i> Miracle and Natural Law in Graeco-Roman and Early Christian Thought (MORTON S. ENSLIN).— <i>L'originalité de l'Égypte dans le monde gréco-</i> romain (J. F. GILLIAM).— <i>André's Étude sur les termes de couleur</i> dans la langue latine (GORDON M. MESSING).— <i>Grimal's Le siècle des</i> Scipions; Rome et l'hellénisme au temps des guerres puniques (RICHARD M. HAYWOOD).— <i>Latte's Hesychii Alexandrini Lexicon</i> , Vol. I, A-Δ (J. L. HELLER).— <i>Lugli's Fontes ad topographiam veteris urbis Romae perti-</i> nentes, Vols. I (Libri I-IV), II (Libri V-VII) (ERIK SJÖQVIST).— <i>Cytowska's De Dionis Chrysostomi Rhythmo Oratorio</i> (MARY G. GOG- GIN).— <i>Szelest's De Pausaniae Clausulis</i> (MARY G. GOGGIN).	
BOOKS RECEIVED, - - - - -	222

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## ASPECTS OF DRAMATIC SYMBOLISM: THREE STUDIES IN THE *ORESTEIA*.

*Opsis* or spectacle and *lexis* or diction Aristotle assessed as secondary elements of Greek tragedy to focus attention on the well knit plot motivated out of character. By and large subsequent scholarship has followed these lines set down in the *Poetics*, though several recent studies have struck out for wider perspectives and made it somewhat less exceptional to see that in Greek Tragedy, as in Shakespearean drama and in much modern literature, additional principles of organization may be at work than simply those which Aristotle conceived within his order of "probability and necessity."<sup>1</sup>

Generally speaking it is now possible, I believe, to distinguish in the extant dramas of the Greek tragic theater three main types of symbolic imagery which can be observed to operate toward the development and organization of given works. That is to say, we have imagery which is symbolic when concretes of perception, "things," are employed to represent ideas, attitudes, or qualities of thought. In poetic drama such developments are invited either in the order of language, or in the embodied action of agents, or as a matter of the setting accorded to the action. These will often interpenetrate, but at least

<sup>1</sup> Notably H. D. F. Kitto, *Greek Tragedy* (2nd ed., London, 1950); R. P. Winnington-Ingram, *Euripides and Dionysus* (Cambridge, 1948); W. B. Stanford, *Ambiguity in Greek Literature* (Oxford, 1939); E. T. Owen, *The Harmony of Aeschylus* (Toronto, 1952); R. Lattimore, *Aeschylus: Oresteia* (Chicago, 1953), pp. 15-25.

approximately they relate to distinguishable parts of the medium and form the three types—namely, verbal imagery, the imagery of action, and imagery of scene (including setting and “props”).<sup>2</sup> Theoretically it is also possible to mark off a fourth type, and perhaps term it imagery of figure, to designate the symbolic character. Type characters (as Aegisthus largely is in Sophocles’ *Electra*) and most divinities bear “given” values when they appear in the theater, but we come to perceive the symbolic cast of major characters, like Prometheus, Oedipus, and the Dionysus of the *Bacchae*, from how they act and react in dramatic situations. Therefore I suggest we include such developments in the imagery of action and let that be an extensive term.

The range of manner and degree is immense in the ways the several Attic tragedians exploit the symbolic potentialities of their medium. It varies with the particular intent in the given play so as to preclude adequate comparative illustration in the space at my disposal. Probably of the three playwrights Euripides has suffered the worst in a cross-fire where Aristotelian canons and those of “slice-of-life” dramatic realism have been ranged in to fire for effect. His sometimes unfortunate situation asks for fresh appraisal and is worth mention, even though I cannot develop the matter here. Instead, for the body of this study, I propose to stay within the *Oresteia* whose symbolic aura is frequently more patent and to examine in some detail there three instances where, it seems to me, a precise understanding of the drama must rest upon an adequate understanding of symbolic developments. While verbal imagery will be seen to be of considerable importance in helping to establish and sustain and inter-relate the insights enfigured in each of these three cases, they themselves involve the exploitation of visual resources which belong to the trilogy as an action of agents on a stage and in a setting. It is on this that I wish to focus attention by considering in turn the carpet of the *Agamemnon* (imagery of scene), the persuading of Agamemnon to walk the carpet (collateral imagery of action), and the rôle of the Nurse in the

<sup>2</sup> See Alan Downer, “The Life of Our Design,” *Hudson Review*, II (1949), pp. 242-63. I have somewhat expanded the range of each of his categories while also joining “the language of props” and the “language of setting.”



*Choephoroi* (imagery of action and type character). Singly and together these are instances where the modes of communication employed and the levels of perception involved are something more than that interest and agony which works out of plot and character and situation: i. e., the Aristotelian "action" and "soul" and "end" of tragedy.

1. The "color" of the carpet in *Agamemnon*, 908-74.

The costly carpet which is spread on the stage and on which Agamemnon is persuaded to make his fateful entry into the palace on the occasion of his home-coming is described as a *πορφύρεστροτος πόρος* (910) and thing of *πορφύρα* (957, 959). Color terms are often rather vague in Greek poetry,<sup>3</sup> but so far as I know there has been little close investigation of the actual or the metaphorical color here. Some have asserted it was crimson and hence connoted blood. I shall be arguing for this *connotation*, but for reasons which will emerge I doubt if the color words here *denote* crimson.<sup>4</sup> More generally now the color is taken to be purple ("a purple-strewn path"), and the two most recent major editions of the play allow no alternative in their treatment of this episode.<sup>5</sup> As such, we may remind ourselves, the carpet signifies "barbaric, and more particularly, Persian acts of homage."<sup>6</sup> To accept these is presumptuous and invites divine retribution (*φθόνος*, 921). This is patent and the metaphorical coloration of the scene into an occasion for pride is valid whether the rich, orientalizing carpet be purple or crimson or some color in between. But I suggest we can go further, and, if we do, we shall see that the carpet was not what

<sup>3</sup> Cf. A. E. Kober, *The Use of Color Terms in the Greek Poets* (Geneva, N. Y., 1932).

<sup>4</sup> Owen, *op. cit.*, p. 80, treats the color as "crimson" and refers, in passing, to "the obvious symbolism of the path of blood." Apparently it has not been obvious to many, and probably it was not intended to be as obvious *prima facie* as Owen takes it; cf. *infra*, p. 122.

<sup>5</sup> I. e., E. Fraenkel, *Agamemnon* (Oxford, 1950) and George Thomson, *The Oresteia of Aeschylus* (Cambridge, 1938). In the latter on *Eum.*, 1028-32 (II, p. 316) a note from Headlam recognizes that others have considered *porphyra* as a red but he apparently discounts it. Lattimore curiously translates the color "crimson," p. 62, and "purple," p. 64, each time in reference to the carpet.

<sup>6</sup> Fraenkel, *op. cit.*, II, p. 413.

we usually regard as purple or crimson. Instead it was almost certainly an ambiguous blood-color, probably the dark purplish red or deep reddish brown which blood takes on after it is exposed to the air—or when it forms stains in the dust. As a darksome thing of blood, the carpet in its magnificence still bears the *hybris*-value, but it has been imbued both with Clytemnestra's lethal intent and by the blood which is to flow and flow again before the resolution of the trilogy is reached.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, so seen, the carpet bears the closest sort of relationship to other elements of the tragedy. Its latent values are developed in terms of verbal imagery, action, characterization, and further elements of setting as the trilogy moves on.

It is in the final analysis on these internal elements of the drama that we must rest this view of the carpet as a thing darkly pooling blood and death while overtly sheening pomp and pride. And rightly so, for it is by the organized context which he has established that alone we may know which areas of signification Aeschylus intends to call up and bring to bear in the image of the carpet from out of the broad and sometimes opaque range of meanings embraced by the Greek color word *porphyreos* and its related forms.<sup>8</sup> The relevant evidence is not,

<sup>7</sup> For the performance of the *Agamemnon* at Syracuse shortly after World War I, Ettore Romagnoli as director sought the effect by having the carpet represent blood almost as literally as possible. The color was attained by dyeing material in the blood of an ox, producing a dark reddish brown. Instead of running the carpet straight back to the palace door, it was unrolled to form a sinuous track "like a vein running down a muscular arm." I have the information from discussions with Count M. T. Gargallo who prior to the Fascist regime was a leading force in the revival of the Greek theater at Syracuse.

<sup>8</sup> For the broad and indefinite potentialities of the term see L. M. Wilson, *The Clothing of the Ancient Romans* (Baltimore, 1938), pp. 6-13 and *Papyrus Graecus Holmiensis: Recepte für Silber, Steine und Purpur* (Uppsala, 1913), ed. Otto Lagercrantz. The tests with murex and ancient recipes for dyes which Miss Wilson reports indicate that "the term 'purple' as used by the Greeks and Romans is a most flexible one and that it was applied to distinctively different shades," including some thirty shades of green, crimson, various purples, and reddish brown. Amidst all this variety there is perhaps some specific guidance for our interest in the fact that recipes for "Tyrian purple" and "Phoenician purple," the two most famed and prized oriental *porphyrai*, were found to produce a dark reddish brown. See Plate I, No. 1 in Wilson's book.

however, entirely internal, and before proceeding into matters of structure and thence into the aspects of thought which this symbolism concretes for the play, it will be well to observe how in terms of Greek poetic usage the questioned term is equipped to bear the sanguinary implications I have assigned to it.

Three instances suffice to show that there are in Greek poetry uses of the term where it cannot signify the color we commonly denote by purple and that in significant cases the term is applied to blood, especially to blood shed fatally. Thus in the *Persians*, 314-17, Aeschylus describes the death of Matallus as follows:

Χρυσεὺς Μάταλλος μυριόνταρχος θανών,  
ἵππου μελαίνης ἡγεμὼν τρισμυρίας,  
πυρσὴν ζαπληθῇ δάσκιον γενειάδα  
ἔτεγγ', ἀμείβων χρῶτα πορφυρᾷ βαφῇ.<sup>9</sup>

Exact translation for the final phrase is difficult, but the sense is clearly one of blood and of color, and the piling up of color words is suggestive. Its original fiery color, its dense texture, the suggestion that Matallus was dark-skinned, all seem to indicate a dark coloration of the beard in the final event. So also in the *Iliad*, XVII, 361, as the Trojans fall before Ajax, αἵματι δὲ χθὼν / δέυετο πορφυρέῳ. A. T. Murray renders this, "The ground grew wet with dark blood," and "dark" is probably the best English translation: for as anyone who has seen blood in the dust of the battlefield knows, it is hardly any specific color: only its own dark, indeterminate self.<sup>10</sup> Moreover a reference of Pliny the Elder confirms this interpretation, and further testifies to the value of *porphyreos* as an accurate designation of darkened blood. The passage is *Natural History*, IX, 135:

At Tyrius pelagio primum satiatur immatura viridique cortina, mox permutatur in bucino. Laus ei summa *in colore sanguinis concreti*, nigricans aspectu idemque suspectu refulgens, unde et Homero *purpureus* dicitur *sanguis*.

For Tyrian purple the wool is initially soaked with sea-purple for a preliminary pale dressing and then it is com-

<sup>9</sup> All line references are to the Oxford texts.

<sup>10</sup> The singling out of the meaning "gushing" by the Liddell, Scott, Jones in this instance (def. I, 2) is surely forced. Other known uses, as in connection with the sea, offer no close support and we have for this specific instance the elder Pliny's quite different explanation.

pletely transformed with whelk dye. Its highest glory consists in *the color of congealed blood*, dark to a direct view, but with a latent sheen. It is for this reason that "purple" blood is spoken of by Homer.<sup>11</sup>

So far as external evidence can go, Pliny's comment seems fairly conclusive and so it is that in the *Iliad* one finds the beginnings of the literary association by which *porphyreos* comes to be linked with blood and then may itself sometimes signify things sanguinary. The latter occurs in the lines quoted from the *Persians* and the usage passes also into the Latin word *purpureus* (e. g. *Aeneid*, IX, 349). For our interest in the *Agamemnon*, we should also observe that in the Homeric phrase the reference is to blood on the ground. We find that to be its characteristic and telling location in the *Oresteia*.

Indeed this last fact constitutes one of three developed aspects of the internal, verbal-dramatic structure of the *Agamemnon* and of the trilogy which join with the obvious fact of Agamemnon's murder to indicate that the colors of blood and death lurk in the carpet and have significance there. Verbal imagery of *blood on the ground* forms a recurring motif, carefully articulated and impressively sustained. Significantly it gets its first explicit statement in the choral ode which immediately follows the carpet-scene, and from here it is carried through the trilogy to form one of the more patent lines which bind the three plays into a single whole. In the ode following the carpet-scene, the figure of a man's dark, death-marking blood on the ground is part of the agitation and fear that weigh hard upon the Chorus. Blood once shed, they see, is beyond all recall:

τὸ δ' ἐπὶ γᾶν πεσὼν ἅπαξ  
θανάσιμον πρόπαρ ἀνδρὸς  
μέλαν αἷμα, τίς ἂν  
πάλιν ἀγκαλέσαιτ' ἐπαείδων; (*Ag.*, 1018-21).

<sup>11</sup> Translation by H. Rackham (Loeb Library ed.), except for the phrases, "*nigricans . . . refulgens*," which Rackham renders "darkish at first glance but gleaming when held up to the light." Though *suspectus* literally signifies a looking upwards, I suspect Pliny's antithesis, *aspectu*—*suspectu*, is meant to include more varied conditions than Rackham's translation allows. It possibly includes any of the familiar instances in which a change in the angle of vision or variation in the play of light seems to heighten the luminosity of otherwise dark fabrics.

Fraenkel insists that we are to feel no specific implication in these lines;<sup>12</sup> I would agree only that the Chorus, as actor, is not making a specific application. For the particular image is closely in line with the carpet as a blood-symbol, and, coming where they do, the lines bear a close potential relevance to it, while also serving more generally to express uncertain fear. The Chorus is not consciously predicting Agamemnon's death.<sup>13</sup> The imagery permits wider associations, and the form of expression encourages them, building up a pervasive, general feeling of fear for the blood already spilled and for the possibility of blood to come. But within the expression of general disquiet there remain specific ominous undertones if we bear in our minds, as I think we must, the preceding carpet-scene. Probably we should say that these undertones are the poet's work rather than the Chorus', though one could perhaps say that the Chorus' collective mind has been unconsciously colored by the carpet and for this reason it finds here this particular expression of its fear in the image of dark blood on the ground.

In either case, the image of blood on the ground, reiterated and modulated like a motif in music, leads from this point on through the entire *Oresteia*.<sup>14</sup> In the *Choephoroi* it appears three times: 48, 400-2, 520-1; and in the most fully delineated of these the figure is adapted to crystallize the vengeful ethos of that play:

ἀλλὰ νόμος μὲν φονίας σταγόνας  
 χυμένας ἐς πέδον ἄλλο προσαιτεῖν  
 αἶμα (*Cho.*, 400-2).

<sup>12</sup> Fraenkel, *op. cit.*, II, p. 460 (on lines 1021 ff.).

<sup>13</sup> The Cassandra episode indicates that the Chorus does not yet fully grasp Clytemnestra's intent or realize that death is immediately in store for Agamemnon, though they have feared he must pay for Iphigenia (150 ff., 248 ff.), felt foreboding also about the other deaths he has caused (461 ff.), tried to warn him against subversion (795 ff.). Cf. section 2 below on the choral prediction of the pattern of his end in 381 ff., where also the Chorus is more than "actor."

<sup>14</sup> In addition to the instances cited in the text, observe the strikingly distorted variation of the image in *Ag.*, 1389-92 where Clytemnestra (all but?) imagines herself as mother earth receiving the rain of Agamemnon's blood. The crossing of the fecundity and the blood imagery here is a master-stroke. I treat it in section 3 below.



Blood-vengeance in this play lays claim to being a "Law" set in the ultimate nature of things; here it is part of the vitalism of blood itself and is inexorable. In the *Eumenides*, however, the earlier and countering sensitivity reemerges in terms of blood on the ground. That is to say, both of the previous general applications of the image are caught up and repeated in the third play: the irremediable finality of death and blood's demand for blood. The latter is marked early in the play through the Furies' gruesome tracking of Orestes (e.g. 246-9); the former sounds near the turning point of the plot, at 647-51. This time it serves, as George Thomson has observed, "to show that the case of Orestes cannot be decided by a simple appeal to the *lex talionis*."<sup>15</sup> It sounds just once more, in 980-6, and there, as we shall be able to observe more fully later, it figures only to be withdrawn in the promise of a new mode of life. We may say, then, that the imagery of dark blood on the ground, which I believe gets its first, visual statement in the carpet of the *Agamemnon*, helps to develop within the trilogy one of its thematic ideas—namely, since blood shed is irredeemable, bloodshed is not an adequate solution; legal process and a willingness to reach understanding offer more hope. Furthermore, the care with which Aeschylus seems to have developed this verbal imagery at critical points seems indicative of how we should take the carpet-scene. At least we know that Aeschylus had the image of blood on the ground very much in his mind during the making of the trilogy, and thus it might well have colored the carpet for its prominent rôle in the critical scene of Agamemnon's home-coming.

A second indication for so regarding the carpet may be found in the episode itself. It lies in the ambiguous quality which marks Clytemnestra's words at several points. Here I refer not so much to the magnificent, brazen irony with which she extols her own and Agamemnon's virtue, though that is also relevant.<sup>16</sup> More indicative are her words at 866-73:

καὶ τραυμάτων μὲν εἰ τόσων ἐτύγγανεν  
ἀνὴρ ὅδ', ὥς πρὸς οἶκον ὠχετεύετο

<sup>15</sup> Thomson, *op. cit.*, II, p. 293.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. 855 ff., 895 ff.



φάτις, τέτρηται δικτύου πλέω λέγειν.  
 εἰ δ' ἦν τεθνηκώς, ὡς ἐπλήθον λόγοι,  
τρισώματός τ' αὖν, Γηρῶν ὁ δεύτερος,

. . . . .

χθονὸς τρίμοιρον χλαῖναν ἐξήχει λαβεῖν,  
 ἅπαξ ἐκάστω κατθανὼν μορφώματι.

Death *netted* in a *cloak*, his body *holed* at least *thrice* (and *pouring* blood) is of course precisely the fate we find that Clytemnestra has prepared and awaiting Agamemnon, and here with a masterful touch Aeschylus shows us her mind.<sup>17</sup> Even as she protests her loyalty and sympathy for Agamemnon, she cannot but toy and exult in what she has awaiting him inside the palace. Unquestionably the sharply visual quality of Clytemnestra's mind, its imaginative range, and the sense of relentless inner drive which emerges in this and other passages combine to form one of the great accomplishments of this play, an accomplishment which is at once poetic and dramatic.<sup>18</sup> The immediate point for us here, however, is that it is entirely

<sup>17</sup> (a) The water and irrigation imagery of the first four lines, where rumor "channels" wounds and reports "course" or "brim," seems to link both forward to Clytemnestra's later speech where Agamemnon's spurting blood is the rain feeding her fecund hate (*Ag.*, 1388-92; cf. pp. 133-4 *infra*) and back to the carpet. The word *πόρος* applied to the carpet in the first instance (910) can denote not only "path" but "stream" and "flow" (e.g., *Cho.*, 366). The carpet may, then, join with its implications of fatal blood sexual implications related to the womb. The fusion prefigures *Ag.*, 1388-92. (b) So, too, when we take *porphyra* in this scene as hinting of blood, then 958-60 also bears an inner burden comparable to that of the lines quoted, and the image of the boundless sea within Clytemnestra that is thus suggested is another foretaste of that tremendous grotesque later identification of herself with elemental earth in 1388-92. (Cf. the community of terms *kēkis* and *baphas* in these lines, 954-60, with Orestes' later description of the blood-dyed robe, *Cho.*, 1012-13.) (c) In *Ag.*, 910-11, Clytemnestra's words in presenting the carpet also carry a veiled forecast; later, e.g., 1431-6, we see specifically what she means by "Justice" and "home."

<sup>18</sup> Salient steps in this portrayal are the beacon-speech, as a vividly externalized expression of her imagination—281 ff.; her description of conquered Troy, as an expression of remarkable empathy or imaginative human insight—320 ff.; her reply to the Herald, as an expression of her self-assurance in purpose, more or less regardless of immediate cause for excitement—587 ff.

consonant for this daring and deep-working mind to imbue the carpet with a fatal color, even as she imbues her words. In the order of spectacle the carpet is the potential analogue of the ambivalent images which function so effectively in the order of language. Moreover, taken together with the fact that fatal blood is designated as *melan* (dark) in 1020, the manner in which Clytemnestra's lethal intent is cast verbally may be taken as internal evidence that the blood-symbolism of the carpet was not vested in glaring crimson. By implication the carpet poses a powerful *latent* threat whose full significance only emerges in time—in the progressing course of the drama.<sup>19</sup>

The third and final of the arguments from structure which I wish to apply to the color of the carpet takes us to the final scene of the trilogy. Schematically stated the argument is this: The *Eumenides* catches up many specific elements that were initiated in the *Agamemnon*; <sup>20</sup> it is a major function of the concluding portion of the third play to convert the forces and images of blood, blight, and destruction into forces and images of physical and moral fecundity in the life of the city; <sup>21</sup> a striking development at the very close is a red-robed, torch procession, the color (*phoinix*) of whose robes relates closely to the color *porphyreos* <sup>22</sup> and, metaphorically, transmutes the earlier

<sup>19</sup> The words with which the Watchman closes his, the first, speech of the play have in part prepared us for attention to undercurrents expressed in word and symbol: "I speak out to those who understand; for those who do not, I pass them by" (38-9).

<sup>20</sup> E.g., the ideas of learning through suffering (*Ag.*, 176-8, etc.; *Eum.*, 521), of a long-range philanthropy in Zeus' rule (*Ag.*, 160-83; *Eum.*, 850 ff., etc.), of the mean (*Ag.*, 1000 ff.; *Eum.*, 530), of the punishment of the sinner through overwhelming blindness (*Ag.*, 385-7, 469-70; *Eum.*, 372-80); the verbal motif of blood on the ground we have noted, the *peithô*-motif (*Ag.*, 385-9, 1049; *Eum.*, 829 ff., 885); the near-relationship of Clytemnestra and the Furies (*Ag.*, 1468-1512; *Eum.*, 94 ff.); the imagery of the fecundity of sin (*Ag.*, 750 ff., 1565; *Eum.*, 534 and, reversed, 910-13), of trampling the altar of Justice (*Ag.*, 383-4; *Eum.*, 539-41), etc.

<sup>21</sup> Verbally this conversion is most obviously marked in the verbal imagery of fecundity and growth. I treat it in part in section 3 below.

<sup>22</sup> *Phoinix* is the "Phoenician (or Punic) color." Cf. evidence collected by L. M. Wilson and cited above, suggesting a virtual identity of this and Tyrian "purple," with which we have linked the carpet. Curiously in setting off *phoinix* as crimson and "military red," the

threat of serried bloodshed into a recognized and respected prophylactic symbol.<sup>23</sup>

The "red" robes bear also a sign of civic good will<sup>24</sup> and this in company with the reversal of the earlier imagery of blood on the ground is signalled verbally by the Furies (now, Eumenides) a mere twenty or twenty-three lines before the procession is introduced. To replace dark blood in the dust, shed in internal strife, they evoke for the city shared joys and understanding:

μηδὲ πιούσα κόνις μέλαν αἷμα πολιτῶν  
 δι' ὄργαν ποινᾶς  
 ἀντιφόνους ἄτας ἄρπαλίσαι πόλεως.  
 χάρματα δ' ἀντιδοῖεν κοινοφιλεῖ διανοία,  
 καὶ στυγεῖν μὲν φρενί (Eum., 980-6).

Thomson-Headlam edition cites two instances of garments "dyed in blood" (*Il.*, XVIII, 538; *Aen.*, VI, 555): a whitish textile dyed in blood does not produce crimson. Xenophon, *Cyr.*, VIII, 3, 3, which is often cited to demonstrate a distinction in the colors *phoinix* and *porphyreos*, in itself does no more than indicate a variety of shades of color, not necessarily different colors. Pollux, IV, 119 equates a *phoinikis* (a garment of punic color) with one which is *melamporphyros* (dark "porphyry"). But for the symbolic connection of the two within the *Oresteia*, it is really not necessary to stress their near identity. It is sufficient that they be two shades of red with recognizable sanguinary implications. With *phoinix* this is obvious; for *porphyreos* I hope the indications we have observed make it at least most probable.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. E. Wunderlich, "Die Bedeutung der Roten Farbe im Kultus der Griechen und Römer," *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten*, XX (1925), esp. pp. 16-17, 21-9, 63-9; also A. B. Cook, *J.H.S.*, XVIII (1898), pp. xliv-v.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. W. G. Headlam, *J.H.S.*, XXVI (1906), pp. 268-77 and in Thomson's edition, II, pp. 317-18, on the significance of the robes as a local, civic element of ritual: the red robes in which the resident foreigners (*metoikoi*—cf. 1111, 1118) of Athens were robed in the Panathenaic procession. The color of these festal robes is regularly termed *phoinix* in the sources cited by Headlam, and Aeschylus no doubt used the term to match local custom, though so far as the color is concerned he could apparently have as accurately again used *porphyreos*, since the terms overlap and neither is exact in itself. It is immaterial for my argument whether the Furies themselves don the red vestments or members of the escort. The text does not make it clear; in 1028 we have a simple dative of means, and I see no reason to assume a lacuna before the line.

The recurrent verbal imagery of blood on the ground does much to bridge the distance between the two terminal images of scene or props: the carpet and the robes. But there follow other indications that their relation is not fortuitous. As suggested, it is part of a general movement. The movement includes parallel rephrasings of other elements of spectacle drawn from the *Agamemnon*. Thus the final spectacle of the *Eumenides* offers us, in company with the red robes, a chanting, torch-bearing, ritual procession. The procession moves off in an aura of solemn but expansive benevolence, raising as its refrain the *ololugmos* cry of victory. In the *Agamemnon* the light bearing and ritual chant of this procession have had specific prototypes whose promise has been blasted, their effect turned to the negative. For the ending of the long destructive war torches were carried around to altars and the *ololugmos* was raised.<sup>25</sup> (It is not certain if any of that celebration was represented on stage, as background action during the Parodos, as at 83 ff. Possibly it constituted imagined rather than seen spectacle, but our attention is called to the celebration three times; so it made its effect.) Moreover, the light in word and torch which helps close the *Eumenides* had its spectacular first blaze in the beacon of the *Agamemnon*, 22-5, 281-316. The imagery of light, with its traditional connotations of liberation and of hope, is forcefully initiated there, carried verbally through the *Choephoroi*,<sup>26</sup> and brought to its final positive turn at the close of the

<sup>25</sup> *Ag.*, 28-9, 83 ff., 587-97. Note the *ololugmos* is joined in 28-9 and 595-7 with the ritual word *euphamein*, as in the final chant of *Eum.* The *ololugmos* cry has one other telling appearance in the trilogy: *Cho.*, 942-5. There together with a flaring of light imagery it marks the acme of the Chorus' hope just before that is undercut and darkened by the onset of Orestes' madness and the Furies.

<sup>26</sup> I.e., beside its literal function as a bearer of news, the beacon affords a brilliant example of the use of light as a more or less stock figure for liberation and renewed hope—here in respect to the long anxiety at home and the war abroad. This same value of light versus dark is applied in *Ag.*, 508, 522 and repeatedly in *Cho.*, particularly for the hope vested in Orestes (*e.g.*, 50 ff., 863-9, 961, and, probably, 131, 809-11). At the same time the presentation of the beacon through Clytemnestra affords, of course, an enfiguration of her imaginative power, while, as things turn out, her enthusiasm for the racing beacons is part of her exultation in coming revenge. Cf. Owen, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

*Eumenides*.<sup>27</sup> In the first play these elements (the beacon, the lighting of the altars with torch procession, the *ololugmos*) have expressed a joy in victory and prospect of liberation from long sorrow only to have that joy turn to fresh sorrow and to have us discover that the expression has been engineered as a masking prelude for an act of planned destructiveness.<sup>28</sup> In the last play these same elements are reintroduced to culminate the reverse movement from destructiveness to safety, from anguish to hope.<sup>29</sup> The connections and development are clear, and the guidance they afford seems surely to indicate a planned connection from strikingly colored carpet to strikingly colored robes. If the carpet was, as we have been led to feel, an ominous blood color, then the "red" of the robes is its inverted restatement. It represents the conversion of the (darkly) lethal carpet into a (perhaps more brightly tinted) symbol of blessing. Blood has been taken up off the ground and made an element in the sacramental life of the city.<sup>30</sup>

To consider, as we have, just some of the facets of technique and meaning rendered active in the carpet-scene inevitably makes one more than ever aware of the intricate connections of thought and image which exist from part to part of the *Oresteia*. Aeschylus seems often to think in concrete images, and as his thought unfolds, faces obstacles, works to a resolution, so do many of the images in which it has found its expression. Thus the movement of the whole impresses us as a mass move-

<sup>27</sup> *Re* the torches, note the kinetic form of Athena's injunction in *Eum.*, 1029: *καὶ τὸ φέγγος δρμάσθω πυρός* ("Let the blaze of fire flash"), reminding us perhaps of the racing beacons. For the light in word, cf. 797-9, *ἀλλ' ἐκ Διὸς γὰρ λαμπρὰ μαρτύρια παρήν* ("For from Zeus there came a shining testimony"), where we are directed to a final and no longer ambiguous source of the wisdom whereby to guide life (cf. *Sup.*, 88-90); contrast the suspicion of the truth of the light in *Ag.*, 475.

<sup>28</sup> In respect to the *ololugmos*, Cassandra makes this explicit in *Ag.*, 1236-8; cf., more generally, J. T. Sheppard, "The Prelude of the Agamemnon," *C.R.*, XXXVI (1922), pp. 5-11.

<sup>29</sup> Owen, *op. cit.*, p. 130, stresses this retrospective aspect of the final *ololugmos*.

<sup>30</sup> As a final minor sign of the relevance of details of the home-coming scene to details of the close, note *Eum.*, 996 on the fitting use of wealth (*ploutos*) as against the tempting of Agamemnon to insolence in wealth (*ploutos*) in *Ag.*, 948-9, 958-62. Cf. also *Ag.*, 381 ff. and my section 2 which follows.



ment on several inter-relating levels. Character, situation, ideas, images are all operative and all with power, but perhaps especially the last two. And as in his striking verbal imagery, so also in his imagery of scene Aeschylus forges a telling instrument. Where we can observe it still, we can see that he made it also an element of structure, working for the whole. The carpet scene and the close of the *Eumenides* both illustrate this; so, more obviously, does the whole spectacle Aeschylus contrives by bringing the Furies into its orchestra in the *Eumenides*, for it is a realization on stage of a daemonic movement which has been begun in the *Agamemnon* and which there brings the sinner to his justice.<sup>31</sup>

## 2. The persuading of Agamemnon: βιάται δ' ἃ τάλαινα Πειθώ.

If one undertakes to explain why Agamemnon ever is led to walk the fateful carpet when he knows that to do so is an act of self-incriminating presumption, one is involved by necessity in a series of levels: the characterization of the two principals within the scene; the marked preparation which has been made for our moral assessment of this "hero"; the pattern of ideas about Providence in which we have been caught up, lyrically and recurrently, in the odes prior to the home-coming scene. It is in this last, I am convinced, that the essential answer lies, and I wish to submit again what I now find Headlam has argued long before:<sup>32</sup>—namely, that the power Clytemnestra exerts over Agamemnon to lead him onto the carpet is a dramatic representation of what the Chorus has sung as the way retribution overtakes the sinner. *Peithô* (Persuasion) the agent of *Atê* (Ruin) conducts him to his doom, unable longer himself to control his destiny. Consequences of his past lie in wait in his future to reduce him perforce.

<sup>31</sup> There has been also of course the snake imagery of the *Choephoroi* (starting actually with Cassandra's words in *Ag.*, 1232-6) helping to build and carry this movement (cf. *Cho.*, 246 ff., 527 ff., 549, 928, 993-5, 1047-50). The verbal snake imagery transmutes of course into a stage image, an image of scene, when the snaky-locked Furies appear in the *Eumenides*.

<sup>32</sup> W. G. Headlam, "The Second Chorus of the *Agamemnon*," in *Cambridge Praelections*, 1906 (Cambridge, 1906), pp. 99-137. The emphases made in this excellent paper are, I feel, sufficiently different from mine to justify offering this fresh treatment.



The initial, choral statement occurs in the second ode (Stasimon I), 381-9:

οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἑπαλξίς  
 πλούτου πρὸς κόρον ἀνδρὶ  
 λακτίσαντι μέγαν Δίκας  
 βωμὸν εἰς ἀφάνειαν.  
 βιᾶται δ' ἅ τάλαινα Πειθῶ,  
 προβούλον παῖς ἄφερτος Ἄτας.  
 ἄκος δὲ πᾶν μάταιον. οὐκ ἐκρύφθη,  
 πρέπει δέ, φῶς αἰνολαμπές, σίνος.<sup>33</sup>

The specific application of this idea within the ode is, to be sure, to Paris (399 ff.), but the idea is introduced first and in emphatic terms as a general rule for understanding the meaning of human life (367-73), and about the fact that Agamemnon bears the rôle of sinner and that this part of the ode is relevant to him there can be no doubt. The preceding ode has devoted a long section to his sacrifice of Iphigenia as an act impious, desecrating, unholy (*dyssebê* . . . *anagnon*, *anieron*, 219-20; cf. 151). Then later in the same second ode the notion of supernaturally imposed delusion and destruction is applied specifically to Agamemnon. It is the fate which the Chorus fears for him as one of the *polyktonoi*: i. e., in his responsibility for the Argive dead in the war (459-70).<sup>34</sup> This whole later passage of the ode also serves to associate Agamemnon the more closely in our memory with the first strophe, for it is the thought of makers of war (373-8) which leads directly into the telling lines about the sinner succumbing to Persuasion for his ruin.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>33</sup> *Atê* includes both the notion of an infatuating power and of ruin. She is the power who leads men to their ruin through mental or moral blindness, but here part of the infatuating power is vested in her "child," Persuasion (Temptation), and the ruin which results seems carried on into the medical imagery of the last two lines.

<sup>34</sup> Note expression in terms of blindness and compulsion from without, 468-70. See, too, how the idea here is associated with *phthonos* (471), as in Agamemnon's temptation in the home-coming scene (esp. 946-7).

<sup>35</sup> It is part of the radical paradox of evil envisioned in the *Oresteia* that neither with respect to the sacrifice of Iphigenia nor in his leadership of the Greeks to war does Agamemnon appear to have had an alternative which would not also have been reprehensible (cf. 211, and on the justice of the war, 60 ff., 355 ff.). A further load of ominous responsibility is suggested in the Herald's mention of the sack of Trojan sanctuaries (524 ff.), if 527 is in place. The relevance of this line in

If we consider the characterization within the home-coming scene and the way it is handled, they can be seen to lead into the symbolic. Thus Agamemnon reveals few signs of personal depth and no indication of inward search or struggle such as might make his action significant as an issue of character. We may, and indeed should, recognize that Agamemnon prior to this appearance has been depicted as a person of unsteady judgment, prone to give way to external pressures in cases of moral issue. Such was his way in the telling case of Iphigenia (184-91, 218-23).<sup>36</sup> Knowing his more recent past we may further choose to regard him, with Fraenkel, as a thorough *pukka sahib* in whom "decorum" and war-weariness combine to forestall a "scene" with Clytemnestra. This is less certain, but despite Agamemnon's pomp and sense of proven prestige which helps to make him vulnerable to Clytemnestra (935-9), despite also his parading of Cassandra before his wife, the text offers no real grounds for denigrating his motives. He says all the right things. The striking fact is that even so and having correctly recognized the general moral issue posed by the carpet, he gives way on it in the particular event and lets himself be led more or less blindly by Clytemnestra. As a person, it is not wrong motives which Agamemnon exhibits but lack of insight and an abeyance of will.<sup>37</sup>

terms of the warning voiced in 338 ff. indicates to me that it is, and the counter arguments fail to prove that the line is an "obvious interpolation." Thus, despite Fraenkel, it would not be in place for the Herald to make more of the point; Aeschylus does not always bludgeon us with a point; to demand exact consistency of subject in the Herald's brief synopsis of destruction is no more or less than to demand that Aeschylus' metaphors be unmixed.

<sup>36</sup> Agamemnon, of course, carries with him from the *Iliad* a record of unsteady judgment even in the field of war: most markedly in his nearly catastrophic misappraisal of the morale of his own troops in *Il. II.*

<sup>37</sup> Among the indications of self-infatuation in Agamemnon which have been cited and which make some regard him as actively prideful, it is strange that more attention has not been directed at his remark about Odysseus and loyalty (838-44). On two counts the remarks suggest an almost incredible smugness: in respect to the many who we have learned have fought, suffered, and died for Agamemnon; in face of the fact that it was through Odysseus that Iphigenia was tricked away from Clytemnestra to her death.

Two things, then, are manifest in the treatment of Agamemnon on the occasion of his home-coming. First, he is depicted in broad outline, without personal depth, so that we are invited to concern ourselves with what he stands for, with the load of responsibility which he bears with him, more than with what he himself now is. Secondly, while there are some indications that he is self-infatuate, the dramatic emphasis is not cast upon these. Instead their respective speeches work to set a telling breach between his perception and Clytemnestra's intent, and the action then works to show Agamemnon subdued. More than agent he becomes a patient. Infatuation works on him forcibly and from the outside in: i. e., from Clytemnestra who is so much verbally and emotionally his superior that she can direct his mind.

In contrast to the characterization of Agamemnon, Clytemnestra's striking audacity and the driving power of her personality are all the more marked. She is in herself an imaginative creation of the highest order, but, again, her depiction serves a telling dramatic economy in which there are two major strands. As person, Clytemnestra is the more fully worked than Agamemnon because through her we are being intimately involved in a fresh burgeoning of evil and moved forward in the plot of successive acts of violence. Agamemnon's determinative acts have been in the past. Wronged (indirectly) by Paris, he has put himself in the wrong (directly) with the sacrifice of Iphigenia. Thereby he propagated a chain reaction of violence in his own house which, as the immediate subject of the drama, we are to follow to its end in the *Eumenides*. Hence the title of the play. The governing issue is sin and retribution. Agamemnon now pays for *past* hybris, exactly as Paris and Troy have paid for theirs. His wife in taking vengeance for Iphigenia breeds fresh human hybris, out of deep-set emotions and strength of will and abundant power of imagination to implement her hate, but the forces at work are not only personal ones. Such it seems to me is a second clear implication of the kind of supremacy which Clytemnestra takes over the "hero." As she wins control over Agamemnon and moves him onto the fatal carpet she is, incarnate, "terrible *Peithô*, the irresistible child (i. e., agent) of Ruin."

Rhetoric is persuasion's means, and in this scene Clytemnestra's rhetoric is of the boldest sort, successful even in voicing patent untruths. When Agamemnon hesitates, she plays on his pride (935-9) and leads him easily, almost passively, into the final symbolic act of treading the carpet. The infatuation works from without in, taking him by force (*biatai*).<sup>38</sup> Moreover her persuasive power over Agamemnon is underscored by the contrast of the scene which follows. There Clytemnestra's *peithô* fails completely on Cassandra and that failure is marked out for our attention by recurrences of the word (1049—three times; 1052). Cassandra is a guiltless sufferer and toward her Clytemnestra is no longer an *agency* of retribution; she is simply vengeful.<sup>39</sup>

The daemonic agency within Clytemnestra should not be emphasized to the exclusion of her character, for through the latter, as her motivation is revealed, we are led to glimpses of a personal tragedy largely withheld from Agamemnon, and in the trilogy the full daemonization of Clytemnestra is a gradual process. In the scene of Agamemnon's home-coming the daemonic is interior to her, and only by stages of representation as well as of act does she reach the form of daemon-ghost driving on the Furies to vengeance.<sup>40</sup> In the *Agamemnon*, one is led

<sup>38</sup> The general effect is supported by detailed touches, linking back to the second ode. Cf. 940-3: the final argument of the principles in terms of "battles" expresses the sense of force at work, while it also links the fate of Agamemnon with that of Paris and Troy. Moreover this exchange, placed at the decisive moment, ends with an emphatically placed *πιθοῦ*, "Be persuaded!" Cf. also 948-9 with 958-62: as insolence in wealth (*ploutos*) marks the sinner of 381 ff., Clytemnestra tries here to lure Agamemnon into an easy acceptance of unstinted magnificence, and even as he succumbs his words recognize the specific danger, disrespectful conduct in connection with *ploutos* (949; cf. 1383). Cf. also n. 34 above.

<sup>39</sup> If we look again at the *Eum.*, it should now be apparent that the stress there on saving *peithô*, as an instrument of reasonable agreement, has as one of its functions the replacement or conversion of the direful *peithô* of the *Ag.* Cf. *Eum.*, 794 ff., 824 ff., 881 ff., 968 ff. There, too, *Peithô* is personified (885 and 970; cf. *Ag.*, 385) and she is in the stage-form of Athena again rendered incarnate. Owen observes the general relation, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

<sup>40</sup> *E. g.*, *Ag.*, 151-5, 1228-38, 1385-92, 1432-3, 1468-1536. In *Ocho* the

to feel, the eloquent driving power of her hate rises from deep within her, while with it she is the agent of "Zeus." Or, more accurately, she is an agent both of Zeus and of darker powers.<sup>41</sup> Later we are to see these distinguished before they are brought once more together.

For Aeschylus fully to have internalized the treatment of Agamemnon or made Clytemnestra more exclusively human might have made for more interesting character study in some respects, but it would almost certainly have meant a great alteration in the scope and quality of the world he has envisioned for us in the *Oresteia*. In this world there is notable interplay between outer forces and inner conditions. Action and thought take place in a continuum extending from the inwardly human to the far-ranging cosmic, and the sense of the interplay is carried out in many ways besides the kind of action we have been observing. It penetrates indeed even into mannerisms of the verbal imagery where exterior and personal juxtapositions of the same image are a noticeable trait. (Thus in *Agamemnon*, 182 ff., the god's piloting of life's voyage shifts into the storm-born veering of Agamemnon's mind [187, 219]. Pastoral imagery used to describe a storm at sea [654 ff.] crosses over as a figure for worried thought [669]. Conversely the singing of the Furies as an expression of inward fear [991-4] becomes externalized in Cassandra's vision [1188-90], while inward whirlpools of anxiety [995-8] transmute into a generalized appraisal of the sea of life [1005 ff.]. Examples could be multiplied. Here because of its particular relevance to the way Agamemnon is led to act upon his home-coming, I would only point again to the way in which, in the *Eumenides*, the darkness of the Furies and their habitation, externalized in costume and often commented on, takes its internal form in the darkening of the sinner's mind [*Eum.*, 377-80]. There, too, it overwhelms

running serpent imagery applied to her includes, besides obvious implications of inhumanity, chthonic associations and a link with the Gorgon magic. All the implications come together in 1046-50.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. the Chorus' assessment in 1468-1536. And as was the case with Agamemnon, the relation of Clytemnestra's moral responsibility to that of the gods is a "both-and" not an "either-or."



the sinner from without.)<sup>42</sup> In the *Oresteia* the resolution of individual problems and the achievement of personal and civic justice depend on a humility before cosmic forces which are not remote from life. It is in terms of them that the good life must be gradually worked out. Not only in its broad lines of movement but in its detail the tragedy is built to keep that fact always before us.

### 3. Extensive relevance in the Nurse-scene of the *Choephoroi*.

The vividly natural portrayal of the old Nurse and the kind of immediate human complication which she introduces in her few moments on the stage are so striking that they seem to carry us into a very different dramatic world from that with which we have been concerned. Obviously here again as in the home-coming scene of the *Agamemnon* we have a striking piece of stagecraft marking a turning point of the plot; yet, the texture of the episode is radically different, and it may be that the kind of emphasis which is gained through the sudden injection of this thoroughly "down to earth" character is inordinately disruptive of the general movement and tone previously established. If so, I feel, the impression comes largely from an incomplete view of the episode, for here once more the dramatic economy is woven of several strands, and the part of the homely, affectionate Nurse is closely bound into issues of sustained import and tension for the trilogy.

With her close memories of Orestes' babyhood, the Nurse poses against Clytemnestra's claims of motherhood other claims of a more typical and acceptable kind. In this respect she is a vehicle, a sharply delineated, particularized symbol, of general human traits. Her appearance and her intimate memories serve to withdraw from Clytemnestra more or less forcibly much of her status as mother, and they do so in the moments just prior to Orestes' act of matricide; but, as it turns out, the elemental fact of Clytemnestra's maternity is not so simply dissolved, and

<sup>42</sup> *Eum.*, 377-80:

πίπτων δ' οὐκ οἶδεν τόδ' ὑπ' ἄφρονι λύμῃ·  
τοῖον ἐπὶ κνέφας ἀνδρὶ μύσους πεπότηται  
καὶ δνοφερὰν τιν' ἀχλὺν κατὰ δώματος  
αὐδᾶται πολύστονος φάτις.



Aeschylus means us to be aware of that also in the longer run. There are elements of a radical conflict here which has yet to be worked out.

Since attention to this episode has largely concentrated on the "Shakespearian" realism with which we are here met for almost the first time in the history of Greek tragedy, it will, I think, not be amiss to focus our attention exclusively upon this other side which I have just outlined. In so doing we shall not need to consider so much the local details of the episode, but the context within which the Nurse has her rôle—particularly, the issue of the relation of mother and child. When we have done so, we should see that the Nurse-scene, if a *tour de force*, yet has intimate bearing for the whole and, even, that the forced disruption of dramatic tone which it exhibits is representative of a clash of attitudes, at this point held still in conflict but finally to be resolved.

One scarcely need resurvey the trilogy to get the sense that the deeply irrational ties in the relation of mother and child concern Aeschylus deeply, and in the choice of this story he has faced almost inevitably into the problem of the natural horror which matricide invokes. When first we meet Clytemnestra in the *Agamemnon*, long before the germ of her hate is shown explicitly, the inward nature and seed of her purpose is suggested by the reiteration of the womb image, applied to the dawn, in her first ten lines (265, 279).<sup>43</sup> After the murder of her husband we get that driving motive fully exhibited: it is the loss of the fruit of her womb, Iphigenia (1415-20), and Aeschylus does not, as do Sophocles and Euripides, undermine the force of this motive by emphasis upon her possible lust for Aegisthus. Because Agamemnon has destroyed her child, Clytemnestra's fertility is now in lethal bloodshed; nor is this terrible wrenching of love into hate allowed to be written off by any simple moralism. Indeed it is depicted with fascinating insight and impressive vividness as Clytemnestra is made to stand before us and tell us how she felt as she stood over Agamemnon:

<sup>43</sup> First commented on, I believe, by W. B. Stanford. The implication may be sustained also in 275; cf. Hsch. on *κνεί* ("be pregnant with") as a synonym of *βρίχει* (more usually, "slumber"). We have had also of course the earlier symbolism of the pregnant hare, 111-38.

οὕτω τὸν αὐτοῦ θυμὸν ὀρμαίνει πεσών·  
 κάκφυνσιῶν δ' ἐξείαν αἵματος σφαγὴν  
 βάλλει μ' ἐρεμνῇ ψακάδι φοινίας δρόσον,  
 χαίρουσαν οὐδὲν ἤσσον ἢ διοςδότῳ  
 γάνει σπορητὸς κάλυκος ἐν λοχεύμασιν (*Ag.*, 1388-92).

In this exultation and distortion of all that is life-giving, all the previous imagery of blood and of the womb, of fertility and of death, converge. From here on Clytemnestra's fecundity is only in hatefulness. Instead of fresh love for her other children to replace that lost with Iphigenia, that feeling has been replaced in the *Choephoroi* with indifference and dislike. More and more she is rendered as an "unnatural" mother. To her children she seems a snake or monster (248-9, 991-6); her proper rôle as nurturer and supporter is taken by mother earth (42-6, 66, 127-8); in and through the Nurse we have impressed upon us that Orestes has none of the conventional debts of affection to pay Clytemnestra even for his earliest years. Yet the attention given to the mother-son disrelation keeps their primal relationship before us. If Orestes is child of the eagle (246 ff.), he is also child of the snake and it is out of her womb that he comes like a snake to kill her (549, 991-6).<sup>44</sup> Aeschylus has chosen not to cut the relationship simply and all at once. Orestes' scruples remain before the murder (899), and, after the murder, I suspect Conington and Verrall are right in seeing him driven by horror into a partial inward break-up as he surveys the corpse and the "net" (991-1006).<sup>45</sup> In any case there come next the outward form of horror, the Furies, to keep the primal, sub-rational claim of Clytemnestra upon Orestes' life and conscience sharply before our attention.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. ancient sources cited by Thomson, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 246-7 (on his line 999; Oxford text, 993) for this popular belief about serpents.

<sup>45</sup> A. W. Verrall, *The Choephoroi of Aeschylus* (London, 1893), notes on 988 to 1002 and p. 200. Rearrangement of lines in the speech (as by Thomson) or rejection of certain lines as later interpolations (e.g., by Fraenkel with 991-6, 1005-6) are based on an assumption that the lines should be consistent in logic and taste. If one allows that the lines may reflect frenzy, these problems disappear and the identification which emerges first between Clytemnestra and a serpentine monster and then with the net is closely of a piece with that already made by another frenzied mind—namely that of Cassandra: cf. *Ag.*, 1114-17, on Clytemnestra as net; and *Ag.*, 1231-6, Clytemnestra as monster.

We may recognize, then, that Aeschylus has taken on the task of working in and through two not easily reconciled aspects of the mother-son relationship. He must bring it to a point where Orestes can be seen to kill his mother in some measure of good conscience and with some hope of being pardoned before a rational tribunal. The introduction of the Nurse to under-cut many of the mother's possible claims shortly prior to her murder works to this end, while the common-sense human normalcy the Nurse injects into the issue moves us on toward important developments in the *Eumenides*—particularly, the (partial) resolution of the chain of murders through the instrumentality of rational process and law. But alongside this movement toward the rational, Aeschylus, as we have noted, sustains a deeper, darker insight. He has us see the horror of matricide and feel with him the more elemental, irrational forces that link life to life. And so again in the final play of the trilogy, through the ghost of Clytemnestra and the Furies he represents that aspect with striking imaginative life, even as he undertakes to project, through the formal trial, a rational resolution on grounds which deny to the mother *any* significant bond with her child.

Almost inevitably the trial, though presented as a decisive process in which divine and human wisdom agree, forms of itself an unsatisfying resolution. Aeschylus makes clear, I think, that he himself so regards it—or, that the argument from paternity is, because of all in which we have been involved, rationalistic rather than fully rational: it is not adequate for our conscious understanding. Despite the previous divestment of Clytemnestra from normal civilized claims to filial affection, through her and through the insistent imagery of fecundity we have been too closely involved in contrary, subrational realities to have them denied by the assertion that the mother is only a resting place for male seed. Aeschylus' realization of this is clear from his staging of a more deep-reaching resolution in lyric and symbolic terms after the trial. However much he guides our thought to a conception of a world directed with rational purpose and to a conception of society founded on law, Aeschylus has vision enough not to deny the irrational and its power. Instead of rejecting it, he encompasses it. Thus in the

concluding movement of the *Eumenides* it is made clear that the Furies are, as Clytemnestra too has been, agents both of fecundity and destruction.<sup>46</sup> When the verdict of the trial goes against them, this becomes a paramount issue. They will bring blight and fruitlessness to the land of Attica, to her people and to their institutions—e.g., 784 ff., 801-2, 810 ff., 830-1. It is a major part of Athena's task in this final part of the play to convert, by persuasion, this fateful blighting power into a productive fructifying power working for the good of Athens. The resolution is signalled when she says,

τῶν δ' εὖσεβούντων ἐκφορωτέρα πέλοις.  
στέργω γάρ, ἀνδρὸς φιλυποῖμενος δίκην,  
τὸ τῶν δικαίων τῶνδ' ἀπένθητον γένος  
(*Eum.*, 910-12).<sup>47</sup>

("Grant us the *fruit* of pious men for our land, for I as one who *tends a garden* delight in this, the *growth* of justly minded men; it brings no sorrow.") In their reply the Furies accept the rôle of fecundative patrons (921-9), and it is clear now, I hope, that the winning over of the Furies into patronage of fecundity and the good life for Athens is a reverse analogue and resolution to the course we have seen Clytemnestra move in (and before) the *Agamemnon*. In lyric and symbolic terms we are brought finally to where good-will grows in place of hate, a hope of fecundity flourishes where there has been only one crime giving birth to another.<sup>48</sup> In place of violent inner drives within the person (most notably in Clytemnestra) and within the family, setting it at odds, pious men are now to bear justly minded offspring under the harmonious sovereignty of mysterious Moira and a rationally purposive Zeus.

<sup>46</sup> For the intrinsic status of the chthonic powers as powers of fertility in the Greek world see E. Rohde, *Psyche* (London, 1925), pp. 159 and 183, n. 1 and 3.

<sup>47</sup> 910, δ'εὖσεβούντων (Heath and Headlam): the well-attested metaphorical sense of ἐκφέρειν and its derivatives (as, "bearing," "productive") demands alteration of MSS δυσσεβούντων.

<sup>48</sup> The story of self-perpetuating violence within the family has been paralleled verbally with imagery of generative evil and violence: e.g., *Ag.*, 151-5, 750-71, 1388-92, 1565-6; *Cho.*, 66-7, (382-5), 466, (585 ff.), 806, 837 (ἐξαπόλλυε σπόρον: Tucker); *Eum.*, 534. It is part also of the final process to reverse this specific threat: supplant it with the generation of pious men.

The Nurse-scene of the *Choephoroi* occupies only an intermediate position in this large, slow movement of conflicting forces. Concretely and emphatically, as is necessary for the impending murders which the Nurse's testimony helps to engineer, it projects a whole range of normal human experience according to which Clytemnestra is not a mother and has no rational claims on Orestes. But this point of view is not complete and the emphasis the "realistic" characterization of the Nurse provides is part of a larger dramatic struggle. In another less rational but no less real way Clytemnestra is mother and is thereby representative of fundamental inner drives and demands. Aeschylus, for his own times, sees that these subliminal aspects of life must be met and dealt with, and not by a process of violent cautery; instead by a process of psychic integration: a process such as his own art entails.

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ON SOME CHAPTERS OF THE *NOTITIA DIGNITATUM*  
RELATING TO THE DEFENCE OF GAUL  
AND BRITAIN.

In the *Notitia dignitatum*, in *partibus Occidentis*, the *Dux Mogontiacensis*, following the *Dux Britanniarum*, comes last in the enumeration of the dukes of the Western Empire.<sup>1</sup> According to chapter XLI, he commands eleven detachments stationed on the left bank of the Rhine, between Selz and Andernach; all of them are designated by the word *milites*. In the *Notitia*, *milites* is used for a legion<sup>2</sup> as well as for a cavalry *vexillatio*<sup>3</sup> or an auxiliary corps.<sup>4</sup> If the substitution of the word *milites* for the generic name of the old formations has any meaning, it implies that differences in organisation and equipment tended to disappear under the effect of vicissitudes borne in company. *Milites* is only to be found in the most recent parts of the *Notitia*.<sup>5</sup>

The epithets which distinguish these detachments are better pointers to their nature and origin. A. Alföldi has already noticed the presence of Pannonian troops on this sector of the Roman frontier.<sup>6</sup> There is no doubt about the *Acincenses* of Andernach, whose name still bears witness to their previous location; they are surely the residue of the *Legio II Adiutrix*, which an older chapter of the *Notitia*, relating to the Province Valeria, still settles in Aquincum.<sup>7</sup> We must admit the same

<sup>1</sup> *Oc.*, XLI; also I, 49; V, 143.

<sup>2</sup> See *Oc.*, XXXVII, 20 and XLI, 20; XXVIII, 14 and V, 148, etc.

<sup>3</sup> *Oc.*, XXXVII, 16, 17, 22.

<sup>4</sup> *Oc.*, XXXVII, 14 and 23.

<sup>5</sup> On the *Notitia* as authority for knowledge of the Roman army of the fourth century, see *L'armée de Dioclétien et la réforme constantinienne* (Paris, 1952; quoted as *Armée de Dioclétien*). We cited there the well-known works of A. Alföldi, E. Birley, J. B. Bury, F. Lot, H. Nesselhauf, E. C. Nischer, E. Polaschek, E. Stein, etc. To be added is C. E. Stevens, "The British Sections of the *Notitia Dignitatum*," in *Arch. Journ.*, XCVII (1940), pp. 125 ff.

<sup>6</sup> *Der Untergang der Römerherrschaft in Pannonien*, II (Berlin-Leipzig, 1926), pp. 71 ff.

<sup>7</sup> *Oc.*, XXXIII, 54; *Armée de Dioclétien*, p. 96.



origin for the *Martenses* of Altrip, since a *Legio I Martiorum* is attested in Pannonia in A. D. 371.<sup>8</sup> Finally, epigraphic evidence completing here the data of the *Notitia*,<sup>9</sup>—some stamped bricks found in the Mayence sector,—not only names the *Acincenses* and the *Martenses*, but also the *Cornacenses*, who surely come from Cornacum in Pannonia II, where the *Notitia* mentions a cavalry detachment.<sup>10</sup> The removal of these units, so long attached to the defence of the Danube, is a result of the abandonment of Pannonia, which Alföldi dates from the last decade of the fourth century. The forces, freed by this abandonment, will have been annexed temporarily to the field army, as *pseudocomitatenses*, and scattered inside the Empire, to face a constantly moving situation. Those we meet in Gaul found, on the Rhine, the same task they had on the Danube. It would be a mistake to believe that the field army, created at the expense of the frontier army,<sup>11</sup> never in return reinforced the latter or filled its gaps. The more the difference in efficiency between the two forces became obvious, the more necessary it was to make up for the weakness of the *ripenses*; lacking depth and reserves, they were unable to re-establish, by their own means, a compromised situation. The *Notitia* offers numerous examples of the collaboration which, at the end of the fourth century, had developed between *ripenses* and *comitatenses*, notwithstanding the difference of their status.

Thus, in the same chapter XLI, the *milites Pacenses* of Selz, just like the *numerus Pacensium*, which chapter XL places in Britain, evidently come from the *Legio I Flavia Pacis*, which figures in chapters V and VII, with the twin legions *II Virtutis* and *III Salutis*, together with the troops under the orders of the Count of Africa. The reason for the dispersal of these units, originating in one and the same corps, lies in the mobility of that corps; or it was engaged as a whole in sectors where the defence was on the verge of giving way, or it had to send there a detachment which was, for the time being, incorporated in

<sup>8</sup> C.I.L., III, 3653.

<sup>9</sup> C.I.L., XIII, pp. 136 ff.; E. Stein, "Die Organisation der west-röm. Grenzverteidigung im V. Jahrhundert," in *Röm.-germ. Kommission, XVIII. Bericht*, 1928, pp. 103 ff.

<sup>10</sup> Oc., XXXII, 22, 31.

<sup>11</sup> *Armée de Dioclétien*, pp. 99, 109.

the frontier army.<sup>12</sup> We will therefore recognise in the *Menapii* of Rheinzabern and in the *Armigeri* of Mayence detachments of two of the most highly reputed corps of the *comitatus* of Gaul.<sup>13</sup> We do not know if the *Legio II Flavia* of Worms, which apparently formed a pair with the *Legio I Flavia* of the Armorican duchy,<sup>14</sup> came from the field army, or if it was attached from its creation to the defence of the Rhine. On the other hand, in the *milites Bingenses*, *Bingio*, we find the old garrison of Bingen,<sup>15</sup> which, like the legionaries of Aquincum and the cavalrymen of Cornacum, adopted the name of its residence.

Consequently, the Duchy of Mayence appears to be, in its composition, a makeshift solution; some elements surviving from the former defensive system are mingled with forces borrowed from the *comitatus*. Partially overlapping the Duchy of Germania I, the Duchy of Mayence is subsequent to the dismantlement of the two Rhenan duchies, still existent in 372,<sup>16</sup> and whose survival until 393 seems attested by the restorations ordered by Arbogast in Cologne in that year.<sup>17</sup> Barring the approaches to Treves, where the Gallic *praefectura praetorio* was maintained until about 400,<sup>18</sup> it represents the last obstacle

<sup>12</sup> In the same way, the *Fortenses*, the *Nervii*, the *Ursarienses* are to be found simultaneously in the field army and in several frontier groupings.

<sup>13</sup> The identity of the former with the *Menapii seniores* of *Oc.*, V, 224 is all the more certain, as part of the bricks stamped with their name (*C.I.L.*, XIII, 12579-85) shows the reading *Men(apii) S(eniores)*, as already seen by Alföldi (*op. cit.*, II, p. 80, n. 1). The objection of E. Stein (*op. cit.*, p. 94), that bricks were stamped only for units which belonged organically to the frontier army, is not to be taken into account. The stamping of bricks was a technical convenience, which had clearly nothing to do with the status of the troops.

<sup>14</sup> *Oc.*, XXXVII, 20.

<sup>15</sup> *Milites Bingenses* are named on an inscription (no. 50) in *Ann. épigr.*, 1920, in connection with the *Legio XXII Primigenia*, still existing at the beginning of the fourth century.

<sup>16</sup> *Amm. Marc.*, XXIX, 4, 7. See H. Nesselhauf, *Die spätröm. Verwaltung der gallisch-germanischen Länder*, in *Abh. Berl. Akad.*, 1938, no. 2, p. 69.

<sup>17</sup> *C.I.L.*, XIII, 8262. See J. Carcopino, "Notes d'épigraphie rhénanes," in *Mémorial d'un voyage d'études de la Société nationale des Antiquaires de France en Rhénanie* (Paris, 1953), pp. 187 ff.

<sup>18</sup> S. Mazzarino, *Stilicone* (Rome, 1942), pp. 114 ff.

opposed to the Germans on the Rhine, after the cession of the Northern sector of the river to the Franks, and before the barbarian influx of 407, which swamped it. The Duchy of Mayence therefore appears to be the creation of Stilicho. We know he visited that frontier in 396,<sup>19</sup> in order to reorganise it at the end of the last civil war.

The *Dux tractus Armorici*, whose troops are enumerated in chapter XXXVII, groups under his command forces as heterogeneous as the *Dux Mogontiacensis*. A repetition, no doubt accidental, enables us to identify the *milites Grannonenses Grannono*, of line 23, with the *Cohors I nova Armoricana, Grannona in litore Saxonico*, of line 14; it is one of the many cases in which the geographical name prevailed, in time, over the traditional appellation inherited from the Early Empire. The *Mauri*, of Vannes and Carhaix, and the *Dalmatae*, of Avranches, are ancient cavalry *vexillationes*, which, like their numerous homonyms, date back to the wars of the third century.<sup>20</sup> The history of the *Legio I Flavia*, of Coutances, is no better known to us than that of the *II Flavia*, of Worms. On the other hand, the *Martenses*, of Alet, have doubtless the same origin as those of Altrip; with the *superventores* of Nantes and the *Ursarienses* of Rouen, they represent a draft brought over by the field army. Simultaneously with the constitution of the Duchy of Mayence, they will have been allocated to a grouping of earlier date. Measures for the defence of the coasts of Gaul against the Saxon invasions were taken as early as the time of Carausius,<sup>21</sup> but we have no indication as to the date of the creation of the *Tractus Armoricanus* itself. However, we may infer its history, by analogy, from that of the *Litus Saxonicum per Britanniam*, which faces it on the other side of the Channel.

Unlike chapters XXXVII and XLI of the *Notitia*, in which all units are indifferently styled *milites*, chapter XXVIII, enumerating the forces subordinated to the *Comes litoris Saxonici*,

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 126 ff.

<sup>20</sup> *Armée de Dioclétien*, p. 104. The degeneration of these units is illustrated by the fact that they reappear, with their geographical appellation, among the *pseudocomitatenses* legions of chapter V (266 and 268).

<sup>21</sup> F. Lot, "Les migrations saxonnes en Gaule et en Bretagne, du IIIe au Ve siècle," in *Revue historique*, CXIX (1915), p. 1.

distinguishes several types of troops. Only the *Tungrecani*, of Dover, are given as *milites*, and this singularity must induce us to consider them as the last reinforcement of the coastal defence of Britain.<sup>22</sup> The *Legio II Augusta*, transferred at an unknown date from Caerleon to Richborough, belonged to the Island garrison from its conquest. The *cohors I Baetesiorum*, of Reculver, is attested in Britain by several inscriptions of the second century.<sup>23</sup> These two units represent, in this grouping, the army of the Early Empire. The *equites Dalmatae*, of Brancaster, and *stabilesiani*, of Burgh Castle, are a characteristic element of the armies of the Tetrarchy.<sup>24</sup> Only four *numeri* remain, respectively stationed at Bradwell (*Fortenses*), Lympne (*Turnacenses*), Pevensey (*Abulci*), and Portchester (*exploratores*).<sup>25</sup> Under the Early Empire, the name of *numerus* designated a special category of auxiliary corps; from the fourth century onwards, the same word is used for no matter what body of troops.<sup>26</sup> In the *Notitia*, with one exception,<sup>27</sup> *numeri* figure only in Britain: four belong to the *Comes litoris Saxonici*, eleven to the *Dux Britanniarum*.<sup>28</sup> This induced Mommsen to

<sup>22</sup> In the *Notitia*, the *Tungrecani* figure, with the *Divitenses* and both qualified as *seniores*, among the Palatine legions of the *comitatus* of Italy (*Oc.*, V, 147-148 = VII, 5-6). The transfer of these two units to the field army dates back to Constantine (Ritterling, *R.-E.*, XII, col. 1474; *Armée de Dioclétien*, pp. 108 ff.). Split later into *seniores* and *iuniores*, they were divided between the two halves of the Empire. The *Tungrecani iuniores* are reported to be in Constantinople in 365 (*Amm. Marc.*, XXVI, 6, 12). They are missing from the *Notitia* which mentions the *Divitenses Gallicani* in the *comitatus* of Thrace (*Or.*, VIII, 43). The *seniores* remained in the West. In the same year 365, they appear at Châlons-sur-Saône, under the command of the Count Severianus (*Amm. Marc.*, XXVII, 1, 2). They supplied the *Comes litoris Saxonici* with the detachment at Dover. Another detachment was engaged, in an undetermined year, in fortification works in the Jura (*C.I.L.*, XIII, 5190; F. Stähelin, *Die Schweiz in röm. Zeit* [3rd ed., Basel, 1948], p. 311).

<sup>23</sup> *C.I.L.*, VII, 386, 390, 391, 394, 395; 1193, 1195. See Cichorius, in *R.-E.*, IV, col. 249.

<sup>24</sup> *Armée de Dioclétien*, pp. 77, 81.

<sup>25</sup> Our localisations are those of the *Map of Roman Britain* (2nd ed., Southampton, 1931). We know they are partially conjectural.

<sup>26</sup> H. T. Rowell, in *R.-E.*, XVII, col. 1329.

<sup>27</sup> *Oc.*, XXXV, 32, *numerus barcariorum* (in Raetia).

<sup>28</sup> *Oc.*, XXVIII, 13, 15, 20, 21; XL, 22-31, 47.

consider chapters XXVIII and XL as more ancient than the remaining ones in the document.<sup>29</sup> But do the *numeri* mentioned in these chapters belong to the early type? The answer will be affirmative for the *Numerus Maurorum Aurelianorum*,<sup>30</sup> which is attested, under the Early Empire, by an inscription, and for the *Numerus barcariorum*,<sup>31</sup> whose Rhetic homonym in any case dates back to the Tetrarchy. We may hesitate, at first sight, in the case of the two *numeri exploratorum*, considering the fact that detachments of *exploratores* existed under the Early Empire<sup>32</sup> as well as later.<sup>33</sup> As for the *Pacenses*, the *defensores*, the *Fortenses*, and the *Nervii*, we must answer negatively. Like the *milites Pacenses* of Selz, the *Numerus Pacensium* of "Magis" is an offshoot, as we have seen, of the *Legio comitatensis I Flavia Pacis*.<sup>34</sup> In the same way, the *Numerus defensorum*, of Kirkby Thore, like the *milites defensores* of Coblenz,<sup>35</sup> the *Numerus Nerviorum* of "Dicti," like the *milites Nervii* of Audisque,<sup>36</sup> the *Numerus Fortensium* of Bradwell, like the *milites Fortenses* of Leptis,<sup>37</sup> appear as so many detachments of

<sup>29</sup> "Die Conscriptionsordnung der röm. Kaiserzeit," in *Hermes*, XIX (1884), pp. 221, 233.

<sup>30</sup> *Oc.*, XL, 47. See H. Nesselhauf, in *Germania*, XXIII (1939), p. 34 (= *Ann. épigr.*, 1939, no. 108).

<sup>31</sup> *Oc.*, XL, 22; *Armée de Dioclétien*, p. 57, n. 6.

<sup>32</sup> In Britain, for instance; E. Birley, in *Cumb. and Westm. Antiq. Soc. Trans.*, XXXIX (1939), p. 203.

<sup>33</sup> To the *Numerus exploratorum* of Portchester (*Oc.*, XXVIII, 21) and to that of Bowes (*Oc.*, XL, 25), one may compare the *milites exploratores*, which succeeded, on the Low Danube, the legionary detachments of Constantine's time: *Armée de Dioclétien*, p. 93.

<sup>34</sup> *Oc.*, XL, 29; XLI, 15; V, 249.

<sup>35</sup> *Oc.*, XL, 27; XLI, 24; V, 227.

<sup>36</sup> *Oc.*, XL, 23; XXXVIII, 9; *Or.*, V, 46. See J. Vannérus, "Portus Aepatiaci lez Boulogne," in *Rev. ét. anc.*, XLVI (1944), p. 299.

<sup>37</sup> *Oc.*, XXVIII, 13; XXXI, 29; V, 225 or 255. Likewise, the *Numerus Solensium* (*Oc.*, XL, 28) may be connected either with the *Solenses* of *Or.*, VIII, 34 and 50, or with a homonymous legion of the Western *comitatus*, which left no trace in the *Notitia*. We have mentioned here only the troops which, in our opinion, belong to the *comitatus* beyond any doubt. We have deliberately omitted the coincidences which exist between many of the units enumerated in the chapters XXVIII, XXXVII, XL, and XLI, and the legions *pseudocomitatenses* of VII, 90-110. These may in fact result from a last regrouping of the Roman army, after the withdrawal of the frontier garrison.



the field army, whose parent stock still figures, in our *Notitia*, among the mobile legions of the Empire. This meaning of the word *numerus* is applicable, by analogy, not only to the *exploratores*, but to those of the British *numeri* we have not mentioned. We shall therefore deduce that, apart from the *Numerus barbariorum* and the *Numerus Maurorum Aurelianorum* (which belong to the series of auxiliary corps of the Roman Wall, dating back to the third century), all the *numeri* attributed by the *Notitia* respectively to the *Comes litoris Saxonici* and to the *Dux Britanniarum* are drafts, which these two commanding officers received from the field army to compensate for war losses.

The strata we find in the composition of the army of Britain will now allow us to delineate, in its chronological development, the military organisation of the Island in the late Empire. Of the three officers we know through chapters XXVIII, XXIX, and XL of the *Notitia*, the *Comes Britanniae* is considered by all historians as the most recent one.<sup>38</sup> We think that the *Dux Britanniarum* is the most ancient.<sup>39</sup> If we omit nine *numeri*, which henceforth will appear as a later reinforcement of his grouping, he commands a legion (*VI Victrix*), three squadrons of *equites*, and a large number of *alae* and *cohortes*, scattered along the Roman Wall and its coastal extensions. This grouping gives a typical picture of the ducal armies of the Tetrarchy and may be attributed to the time of Constantius Chlorus.<sup>40</sup> A few observations will put this picture in focus. The Duke is called *Dux Britanniarum*; originally, therefore, his authority extended over the whole territory of the Island,

<sup>38</sup> See the authors mentioned in note 5. The hypothesis of S. Mazzarino (*op. cit.*, p. 160, n. 1), according to which the *Comes Britanniae* dates back to the middle of the fourth century, is based on a passage of Ammianus Marcellinus, which, in our opinion, does not concern the *Comes Britanniae*, but the *Dux Britanniarum*: see hereafter, n. 47.

<sup>39</sup> The permanent institution of *duces* in the frontier provinces under the Tetrarchy may be deduced, if not from *Paneg.*, X, 3, at least from epigraphic evidence. They already bear the name of the province in which they exercise their command (*C.I.L.*, III, 764; *Ann. épigr.*, 1934, nos. 7-8). Their part in the dismissal of the soldiers is settled by the rescript of Licinius, in 311: *Ann. épigr.*, 1937, no. 232.

<sup>40</sup> *Armée de Dioclétien*, pp. 56 ff.

at that time divided into four provinces,<sup>41</sup> and, consequently, over the principal forces stationed in Britain, including the *Legio II Augusta*, the *Legio XX Victrix* (if the latter survived the usurpation of Carausius), and all the existing cavalry detachments, two of them, *equites Dalmatae* and *equites stabesiani*, still figuring in chapter XXVIII. On the other hand, the inscription of Birdoswald,<sup>42</sup> commemorating the restoration of a *praetorium* by order of the *praeses* Aurelius Arpagius, between 296 and 305, shows that the Roman Wall and its garrison of auxiliary corps, at that time, were still under the authority of the governor of the province. Thus appears to be confirmed for Britain the hypothesis which was suggested to us by the study of the Eastern frontiers,<sup>43</sup> that *alae* and *cohortes*, mostly assigned to the defence of the Empire's terrestrial frontiers, still remained subordinated to the governor of the province up to the time of Constantine, while the other forces passed under the command of dukes. The explanation of this division of military responsibilities lies in the difference of the quality of these troops: *equites* and legionaries, even if permanently established on a particular frontier, were and never ceased to be mobile forces, as is proved by the various cases in which, until the fifth century, they joined the field army;<sup>44</sup> *alae* and *cohortes*, on the contrary, were settled, at the latest under the Tetrarchy, in positions which their status of military coloni

<sup>41</sup> His power was therefore comparable to that of the Duke of Egypt, who also commanded the forces of several provinces: *ibid.*, p. 59.

<sup>42</sup> M. V. Taylor-R. G. Collingwood, in *J.R.S.*, XIX (1929), p. 214 (= *Ann. épigr.*, 1930, no. 114).

<sup>43</sup> *Armée de Dioclétien*, pp. 21 ff. This hypothesis, which has been contested (*J.R.S.*, XLIII [1953], p. 174), rests upon the evidence of the inscriptions, which ascribe to *praesides* the responsibility of constructional work on the frontier, at a time when the existence of *duces* has to be admitted (see above, note 39). Besides we have not excluded the fact that the same man could at the same time be *dux* and *praeses*; *ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>44</sup> S. Mazzarino, *Aspetti sociali del quarto secolo* (Rome, 1951), pp. 330 ff., has clearly demonstrated that the frontier army, on the whole, had not the character of a rustic home guard. In fact, such a view would never have been expressed, if one had from the beginning observed the double sense of the word *limitanei*: *Armée de Dioclétien*, p. 100.

(*limitanei*) made them unable to abandon.<sup>45</sup> In Britain, these units were found not only along the Roman Wall, where traces of their rural activity have been noticed,<sup>46</sup> but also in the forts built, at the time of Constantius, on the Eastern coast, as is to be inferred from the survival, in chapter XXVIII of the *Notitia*, of the *Cohors I Baetesiorum* at Reculver.

The appearance of the *Comes litoris Saxonici* means a re-organisation of these forces. But when did it happen? A passage in Ammianus Marcellinus, relative to the career of Gratianus, the father of the emperors Valentinianus and Valens, implies that the unity in the command of the army of Britain was maintained until about 350.<sup>47</sup> The first half of the fourth century seems to have been a period of real peace for the Island. It is after 350 that the Saxons reappeared on its shores.<sup>48</sup> The *Comes litoris Saxonici* is perhaps not much anterior to 367, at which time we hear that the officer in charge of this post was caught by the enemies he was supposed to hold back, thus losing his life, while his colleague the *Dux Britanniarum* was taken prisoner.<sup>49</sup> The comparison between chapters XXVIII and XL of the *Notitia* shows how the forces until then concentrated in the hands of the *Dux Britanniarum* were divided into two groupings. The *Dux*, who then became responsible for the defence of the Northern sector alone, retained, in addition to the *alae* and the *cohortes* of the Roman Wall, the *Legio VI Victrix*, of York, and half of the *equites*. The *Comes*, responsible, as his full name indicates, for the coastal defence,

<sup>45</sup> The last mention of an auxiliary corps in an expeditionary army is that of *P. Oxy.*, 43 (295). There is not a single example, of course, of an *ala* or a *cohort* in the Constantinian *comitatus*. The condition of the *limitanei* does not exclude their taking part in local operations like those led by the *praeses* of Mauretania (*C.I.L.*, VIII, 9041, 9324, 8924).

<sup>46</sup> E. Birley, *Roman Britain and the Roman Army* (Kendal, 1953), p. 86.

<sup>47</sup> *Amm. Marc.*, XXX, 7, 3: *post dignitatem protectoris atque tribuni, comes praefuit rei castrensi per Africam . . . , digressusque multo postea pari potestate Britannicum rexit exercitum*. The title of Count may well have been conferred on the *Dux Britanniarum*; at the same time, the duke of Egypt was *comes et dux* (*P. Lond.*, 234; see above, note 41).

<sup>48</sup> R. G. Collingwood, in Collingwood-Myres, *Roman Britain and the English Settlements* (Oxford, 1936), p. 283.

<sup>49</sup> *Amm. Marc.*, XXVII, 8.

received the *Legio II Augusta*, the remainder of the *equites*, and all the smaller units already settled on the coast. *Numeri* and *milites* represent, in both groupings, later attributions intended to reinforce the defence or to replace units eliminated by the enemy.<sup>50</sup>

It was acknowledged long ago that the picture of the Roman army, as given by the *Notitia*, was not chronologically coherent. The Pannonian chapters did not correspond any longer to reality, at the time when Stilicho created the Duchy of Mayence. But this notion of strata, which makes it possible for us to resolve apparent anachronisms by attributing different dates to juxtaposed passages of the *Notitia*, is also valid, as we have just seen, for the formations described in that document. All types of troops were not of the same age, and the structure of their groupings varied. The comparative study of the chapters of the *Notitia* permits us to reconstitute successive stages in the military organisation of the Late Empire. There is, no doubt, still much to say about the military history of the Western provinces of the Empire, during the last century of the Roman occupation. Archaeological discoveries may complete or correct on many points the evolution outlined in this paper. What we have wished to do is to underline, by means of these few considerations, the basic importance of a critical analysis of the *Notitia dignitatum*.

DENIS VAN BERCHEM.

PRESSY-SUR-VANDEUVRES (GENEVA).

<sup>50</sup> Following Collingwood, we have admitted that the *numeri* of the *Dux Britanniarum* marked the northern frontier of Britain, after the abandonment of the Roman Wall and of the auxiliary corps attached to it: *Armée de Dioclétien*, p. 58. But the date of this abandonment has not yet been settled: see J. P. C. Kent, "Coin evidence and the evacuation of Hadrian's Wall," in *Cumb. and Westm. Antiq. Soc. Trans.*, LI (1952), p. 4. Moreover, as far as their position is known, these *numeri* were scattered along the main roads from York to the eastern and to the western sectors of the Wall. This grouping was not that of troops watching a frontier line but more that of mobile forces concentrated behind the front, just like legions and *equites*.

## ANTECEDENTS OF ARISTOTLE'S PSYCHOLOGY AND SCALE OF BEINGS.

### I.

Aristotle's psychological system has a good claim to be numbered among his most original achievements. Everywhere new ground is broken, large areas are for the first time incorporated into the doctrine of soul, and Aristotle's own concepts, *δύναμις*, *ἐνέργεια*, and *ἐντελέχεια* are placed in key-positions. To be sure, the *νοῦς*, the noblest of all soul-functions and coping stone of the entire edifice, is a legacy of Plato's psychological scheme in which it occupies an analogous place;<sup>1</sup> yet even in this phase of the system new departures are so numerous and of such far reaching and striking importance that they inevitably divert our attention from the inherited points of doctrine.

As usually, Aristotle's obvious originality has stifled inquiry into sources and antecedents.<sup>2</sup> Sources in the ordinary sense of the word there are indeed none. As for antecedents, the title of this paper indicates my hope that a search will not be fruitless. However, my intention is not to examine once more the—however tenuous—link with Plato which is represented by the *νοῦς*, but to study the two soul functions which come next to the *νοῦς* in order of importance and which hitherto seem to have passed for philosophical creations *e nihilo*. If in their case too it proves possible to establish connections between Aristotle and earlier thinkers, the reasons that account for Aristotle's interest in, and choice of, these two functions will no longer elude us.

<sup>1</sup> See e. g. Werner Jaeger, *Aristoteles* (Berlin, 1923), p. 355; Heinrich Cassirer, *Aristoteles' Schrift von der Seele* (Tübingen, 1932), p. 197.

<sup>2</sup> For reasons which will soon become apparent I cannot agree with R. D. Hicks' statement (*Aristotle De Anima* [Cambridge, 1907], p. xxxvi): "We find nothing in Aristotle but the development in systematic form of the Platonic heritage." In a sense it is true that "with the conscious or half-conscious materialism of his (Presocratic) predecessors Aristotle has no more sympathy than Plato" (*ibid.*), provided this does not imply that Aristotle owes nothing to the Presocratics and that his relation to them is hardly worth studying. Much valuable information and observation is to be found in J. T. Beare, *Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition from Alcmaeon to Aristotle* (Oxford, 1906).



Aristotle, as is well known, rejects Plato's division of soul into a rational, a spirited, and an appetitive part<sup>3</sup> and bases his own theory on the recognition of four faculties or functions of soul, viz., the nutritive (*θρεπτικόν*), the sensory (*αἰσθητικόν*), the locomotive (*κινητικόν*), and the mind (*νοῦς*).<sup>4</sup> Of these the former three obviously need the cooperation of the body; in fact they are understood as functions of "soul in body." However, the locomotive function, when put on a par with the others, finds itself in a somewhat anomalous position which becomes apparent as soon as we remember another aspect of Aristotle's psychology, to wit the correlation of the three other soul-functions with the scale of living beings: plants have only the nutritive function, animals the nutritive and the sensory, and man in addition to these two also the mind.<sup>5</sup> Between the *κινητικόν* and the scale no such relation exists. As in looking for the antecedents of the soul-functions we hope to find some light on the origins of the scale it is obvious that we have to concentrate on the nutritive and the sensory functions.

Occasionally Aristotle recognizes a further faculty of soul, the "desiring" or "striving" (*ὀρεκτικόν*).<sup>6</sup> Its place in the scale is determined by the observation that its presence is tied to that of the *αἰσθητικόν*. Among its manifestations Aristotle includes *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία*. This then is the place which Plato's two lower soul-functions are given in Aristotle's scheme and Aristotle in fact criticizes Plato for having "torn asunder" the various forms of desire that ought to be comprehended under one and the same faculty.<sup>7</sup>

Now if from the *De Anima* we turn to Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Politics* we find a rather different situation. In the former Aristotle actually dismisses one of his soul functions, the nutri-

<sup>3</sup> Implicitly by setting up an alternative division, explicitly esp. *De Anima*, III, 9, 432 a 24; 10, 433 b 4.

<sup>4</sup> See e.g. *De An.*, II, 2, 413 a 21 ff., esp. b 12. II, 4 deals with the *θρεπτικόν*, II, 5-12 with the *αἰσθητικόν*, III, 3-7 with the *νοῦς*, and III, 8-11 with the *κινητικόν* in the context to which *ὄρεξις* plays a role of considerable importance.

<sup>5</sup> See esp. *De An.*, I, 5, 411 b 27 ff., II, 2, 413 a 21 ff., b 2; II, 3, 414 b 28-415 a 12. On *νοῦς* as peculiar to man (*καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερόν ἐστι ἢ καὶ τιμώτερον*) see esp. II, 3, 414 b 18; cf. III, 3, 427 b 7 ff.

<sup>6</sup> *De An.*, II, 3, 414 a 31, b 1; cf. III, 9, 432 b 3.

<sup>7</sup> II, 3, 414 b 1-16; III, 9, 432 b 3-7.

tive, as being useless for the specific purposes of his *Ethics*; and without so much as mentioning the other, i. e., the sensory function, he proceeds to build up his system of intellectual and ethical excellences on a Platonic distinction between the λόγος and another soul part which while ἄλογον in itself can yet obey the λόγος (at 1102 b 30 he calls it τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ ὅλως ὀρεκτικόν).<sup>8</sup> Another and not quite so fundamental section of the *Ethics* which deals with the loss of self-control (ἀκρασία) takes θυμός as well as ἐπιθυμία into account and considers their relation to the λόγος.<sup>9</sup> So much for the *Ethics*. In the *Politics* Aristotle without qualms relies on the cooperation between the διανοητικόν and the ἐπιθυμητικόν of the citizens in his ideal state. In these contexts the Platonic terms are clearly useful.<sup>10</sup> Plato had after all adopted them to deal with modes of human behavior that the ethicist and the political planner must take into account, and it would be very hard to imagine that in discussing similar problems Aristotle should have received help from his biological soul functions.

Now if in his *Politics* and *Ethics* Aristotle makes more use of Plato's psychological concepts than of his own, one may ask whether Plato conversely when entering the field of biology makes some concessions to a physiological soul concept. So smoothly and symmetrically, however, matters do not work out. The *Timaeus* shows that far from making any such concession

<sup>8</sup> Cf. on the whole *Eth. Nic.*, I, 13, 1102 a 26 ff., b 13 ff. (see also *De An.*, III, 9, 432 a 26 with Hicks' reference to *M. M.*, I, 1, 1182 a 23). F. Nuyens, *L'évolution de la psychologie d'Aristote* (Louvain, 1948), p. 189, infers from the lack of agreement between *Eth. Nic.* and *De An.* that even the last version of Aristotle's *Ethics* had been completed before the characteristic doctrines of *De Anima* took shape. Yet in arguing his case Nuyens ignores those passages in which Aristotle brings in the concepts of his psychology—and discards them as offering no help towards an ethical theory. In particular τὸ θρεπτικόν, while in itself a valid concept, cannot serve as basis of an ἀνθρωπίνη ἀρετή (*Eth. Nic.*, I, 13, 1102 a 32–b 12; cf. also I, 6, 1097 b 33–1098 a 3, VI, 13, 1144 a 9 f. and *Eth. Eud.*, II, 1, 1219 b 20–4, 36 ff.). And indeed how could he—or anyone before the days of evolutionary thinking—establish a system of human conduct upon the foundation of biological soul-functions?

<sup>9</sup> *Eth. Nic.*, VII, 7, 1149 a 24 ff.

<sup>10</sup> See esp. *Pol.*, VII, 7. On Plato's source for the term θυμοειδής (*Rep.*, IV, 435 E and *passim*) see Jaeger, *Eranos*, XLIV (1946), pp. 123 ff.

Plato clings to his own psychology to the extent of localizing the different parts of soul in appropriate regions of the body, namely the rational in the head, the spirited in the chest, and the appetitive (to which we shall presently return) between navel and midriff.<sup>11</sup> Clearly our question was too crude; it will take a certain amount of preliminary exploration before we can turn again to the *Timaeus* and approach it with a more carefully worded question.

In fact if we look for antecedents of Aristotle's nutritive and sensory soul-function it would be unwise to start our inquiry with the *Timaeus* and to forget the much more generous and unprejudiced attitude which Presocratic thinkers of the 5th century had taken towards them. Unlike Plato these thinkers do not concern themselves with the physiological manifestations of the *θυμός* nor do they know of the channels and devices by which reason exercises control over the passions.<sup>12</sup> For them the main physiological operations which they studied with the greatest ingenuity and for which they offered many ingenious explanations were sense perception, respiration, nutrition, and reproduction. To be sure, they do not look upon them as functions of soul—probably none of them had a soul concept from which this would make sense; it remained for Aristotle to elevate biological functions to this higher status.

As we are not concerned with individual problems that Aristotle inherited from these thinkers we need not here review in detail what we know about the physiological doctrines of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, and Democritus. Aristotle's own polemics against their views may, if treated with proper caution, be an indication of historical continuity between their interests and his. In addition we have Theophrastus' treatise *De Sensu* and find in the fragments and *testimonia* of the *Vorsokratiker* ample material for the reconstruction of their theories.<sup>13</sup> What matters for us now is the paramount im-

<sup>11</sup> *Tim.*, 44 D (90 A), 69 C-70 D.

<sup>12</sup> *Tim.*, 69 E-70 D.

<sup>13</sup> Cf. Arist., *De An.*, I, 2, 404 b 8 ff.; II, 4, 415 b 28, 416 a 29 ff.; *De Sens.*, 2, 437 b 10 ff., 3, 440 a 15 ff.; Theophr., *De Sensu*; Plut., *De Plac.*, 4, 8 ff., 22; 5, 3 ff. (both to be found in *Doxographi Graeci*, ed. H. Diels) and H. Diels—W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (6th ed., Berlin, 1951), 31 (Empedocles), A 70. 74. 77. B 90, 95, 100-9; 59 (An-

portance which the functions discussed by these men acquire in Aristotle's psychology and biology. For it is they which provide the basis not only for his psychological system but also for his scale of living beings. The former makes nutrition coextensive with the *ζῶντα*—a concept which includes plants and animals—and regards *αἴσθησις* as the essential characteristic of all animals. The latter avails itself also of the reproductive function and by its help establishes a hierarchy within the animal kingdom: the more fully developed the offspring of a given species is at the moment of birth, the more vital heat does this species possess and the closer to the top is its place in the scale of beings.<sup>14</sup>

Thus of the four basic functions that the Presocratics had studied respiration alone has been left without place in Aristotle's scheme. The reason is not far to seek. Respiration is no longer considered a basic need and process but merely a particular form of such a need and process. The basic need is now "cooling." This reorientation seems to have been effected in Aristotle's own days. And as cooling takes different forms in different classes of beings it offers no small help toward establishing the scale.<sup>15</sup>

The Presocratics had paid attention to the nutrition not only

axagoras), A 45 f., 107 ff., 115 (cf. F. M. Cornford, *C. Q.*, XXIV [1930], pp. 19 ff.; G. Vlastos, *Philos. Rev.*, LIX [1950], pp. 35 ff.); 64 (Diogenes), A 19 ff.; 68 (Democritus), A 106 (respiration), 115-18, 125-35 (perception), 140-55a (reproduction and nutrition).

<sup>14</sup> See esp. *De Gen. Anim.*, II, 1, 732 a 25-733 b 16. On the *scala naturae* in Aristotle's biological works see, among others, E. Zeller, *Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics* (2 vols., London, 1897), I, pp. 466 ff., II, pp. 22 ff.; W. D. Ross, *Aristotle* (3rd ed., London, 1937), pp. 114 ff.; cf. also A. O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being* (Cambridge, Mass., 1937), pp. 55 ff. Some *genera*, like the ascidians and sponges, Aristotle considered transitional forms between the *θρεπτικόν* of the plants and the *θρεπτικόν* plus *αἰσθητικόν* of the animals (cf. *De Part. Anim.*, IV, 4, 681 a 10 ff.). These so-called zoophytes maintained themselves for many centuries in their Aristotelian place at the borderline of botany and zoology until they were finally dislodged by the advances of modern biology.

<sup>15</sup> See *De Respir.*, 9 f. for the differences between the cooling process in higher and lower animals. The lung, and more particularly an *ἐναίμος καὶ μαλακὸς πλεύμων*, is needed for the cooling process in animals that have a high degree of heat; this observation is used for the construction of the scale at *De Gen. Anim.*, II, 732 b 33 ff.

of man but also of animals and plants.<sup>16</sup> In regarding this function as common to all organic beings Aristotle takes his place in the tradition. His new departure lies elsewhere, to wit in his limiting of αἰσθησις to the animals. For some of the Presocratics, most notably Empedocles, had gone so far as to endow all beings with sense perceptions, with the sensation of pleasure and pain, and even with thinking (φρονεῖν). Democritus had suggested that plants have their own specific sense functions—different from ours, and Plato in a passage of the *Timaeus* in which he speaks of the gods as creating the plants ἄλλαις (scil. different from ours?) ιδέαις καὶ αἰσθήσεσιν appears to adopt a similar view. Obviously, then, Aristotle had good reasons for insisting that there are no sense functions other than our five.<sup>17</sup> For him plants have only the θρεπτικόν, animals the θρεπτικόν and αἰσθητικόν, and man in addition to these two functions also the νοῦς.

We may now turn again to the *Timaeus* and taking it that Plato is committed to his own soul-parts, may ask whether he nevertheless finds a place for the biological functions which had loomed so large in Presocratic thought and will be promoted to the status of soul functions in Aristotle's system? Indeed he does, and the degree of attention which Plato pays them shows how naturally they would recommend themselves as basis for an alternative and truly psycho-physical system of the human organism.

In Plato's account of the bodily organs κοιλία and ἔντερα are the only ones that have no connection with soul, i. e. with the Platonic soul concept; all others—heart, lungs, liver, spleen, etc.—serve the soul parts and are arranged in such fashion as to keep up the best possible cooperation between them.<sup>18</sup> The tissues too are brought into relation to soul inasmuch as Plato makes the first of them, the marrow, combine physical and

<sup>16</sup> See for Empedocles Diels-Kranz, 31, A 66, 70, 77; for Democritus *ibid.*, 68, A 153-55a.

<sup>17</sup> For Empedocles see Diels-Kranz, 31, B 103, 107, 109 (cf. also A 70). For Democritus see *ibid.*, 68, A 116. Cf. Plato, *Tim.*, 77 A 5; Arist., *De An.*, III, 1, 424 b 22 ff. (cf. Hicks' comments, *op. cit.*, 423 ff.). Present-day biology credits plants with "irritability," yet agrees with Aristotle in denying them actual sense functions.

<sup>18</sup> *Tim.*, 72 B-73 A; 69 D-72 B.



psychic ingredients.<sup>19</sup> Yet besides the account of organs and tissues we find in this physiological section of the *Timaeus* two large complexes of doctrine which might be headed "On sense perceptions" (*περὶ αἰσθήσεων*) and "On the nutritive process" (*περὶ τροφῆς*)<sup>20</sup>—though in strictness the latter should perhaps be entitled "On nutrition and respiration," since Plato has set up a very close connection between respiration and the digestive-nutritive process by making respiration the *causa motrix* of this process.<sup>21</sup> Still respiration is subsidiary to nutrition rather than on a par with nutrition and sense perception. The account of nutrition begins with the description of the food which the gods have provided for man and ends with the distribution of the digested nutriment into our tissues. Under the heading of sense perceptions a distinction is made between those belonging to the body as a whole (like warm-cold, hard-soft) and such as pertain to the individual sense organs.<sup>22</sup> Both kinds are treated from a distinctly physiological, not from an epistemological point of view.

Clearly here are two important bodies of doctrine that lie outside the range of Plato's psychology. In a comprehensive account of the body subjects so obviously relevant—and on which so much "research" had already been done—could hardly be ignored. We need not here linger over matters of detail which indicate Plato's indebtedness to his precursors (broadly speaking the chapters on perception keep close to the Presocratics whereas in the account of nutrition medical influences predominate);<sup>23</sup> what matters for us is that even though Plato has not modified or broadened his soul concept to make room for these functions—though he treats them rather like strangers at

<sup>19</sup> 73 B-C. Cf. my paper "Tissues and the Soul," *Philos. Rev.*, LIX (1950), pp. 446 ff.

<sup>20</sup> 61 C-68 D; 76 E-79 A, 80 C 8-81 E 5.

<sup>21</sup> 78 B 1-E 5, 79 A 5-E 9 are *περὶ ἀναπνοῆς*. For the connection between nutrition and respiration which Plato (himself?) here constructs and for other details see F. M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* (London, 1937), pp. 303 ff.

<sup>22</sup> See for this distinction especially 65 B 4 ff.; cf. below, note 41.

<sup>23</sup> See Cornford, *passim* (e. g., pp. 305, 307; however, Diocles, to whom Cornford here refers, can no longer be regarded as a medical precursor or associate of Plato; cf. W. Jaeger, *Diokles von Karystos* [Berlin, 1938] and my paper cited in note 19, pp. 452 ff.).



the gate than like children of the house—he yet cannot help recognizing their importance and claim to consideration. Whether the fullness and care with which they are treated in the *Timaeus* reflect Plato's or the Academy's or general contemporary interest, they are now established as major subjects of biological study. If a scientist—especially a scientist with Aristotle's aversion to μεταβάσεις εἰς ἄλλο γένος—was to take his stand on genuinely physiological ground he would abandon the soul-parts that had been imported from Ethics (or Politics) and replace them by the two functions whose paramount importance had been admitted even in a system built around an entirely different relationship of body and soul.

But is it entirely true to say that Plato allows no connection whatever between Soul and the functions of nutrition and sense perception? Let us briefly consider some points that bear on this question. Regarding the αἰσθήσεις Plato himself comments on the difficulty of separating their study from that of the body and ψυχῆς ὅσον θνητόν. If we examine details we find Plato giving much care to explaining how the αἰσθήσεις which arise on the surface of the body are communicated to the soul. In the act of seeing, for instance, the "movement" which originates partly in the eye (yet even more in the object) is passed on through the whole body until it finally reaches the soul—and it is only in this final stage that the sensation really takes place.<sup>24</sup> Yet it is one thing to establish a connection or communication between soul and the sense organs and functions and quite another to regard sensation itself as one of the principal activities or powers of soul.

The latter, as we know, is Aristotle's doctrine and I do not think that Plato approximates it even at *Timaeus* 42 A 5 where he says that αἴσθησις—the result of violent παθήματα—"becomes part of soul's nature" (σύμφυτον γίγνεσθαι). A definite statement assigning to soul an active function in the process of perception is found—not in the *Timaeus* but in the *Theaetetus*: it is "through" soul and "with the help" of eyes, ears, etc., as

<sup>24</sup> This is very clearly stated in 45 D 1-3 (see also 43 C 4-7) whereas in the section which professes to deal more specifically with the process of sight (67 C-68 D) Plato is actually preoccupied with the problem of color. See however also 64 B 5 f., 65 A 5 (pleasure and pain), 67 B 2 ff. (hearing), and 65 C ff. (taste). Cf. *Theaet.*, 186 C 1 f.

instruments (*ὄργανα*) that we perceive whatever is perceivable.<sup>25</sup> The detailed analysis of the sense processes in the *Timaeus* does not treat the organs of perception as "instruments" of soul.<sup>26</sup> In this respect it falls short of what the *Theaetetus* passage proclaims. After all it is well to bear in mind that the entire account of *αἰσθήσεις* has been placed at the threshold as it were of Plato's system of "soul in body," i.e., between this system and the account of the outer world.<sup>27</sup>

Between nutrition and the soul the *Timaeus* admits interaction, but it is interaction of the antagonistic variety and works to the detriment of soul. Food is necessary for the physical preservation of the body, yet like other things that come from the outside it disturbs *ψυχή*, interfering with her own life and task.<sup>28</sup> In his account of nutrition Plato does not even bring the lower parts of soul into play; what operates in this process is the vital heat—the fire or "the hot" (*τὸ θερμόν*)—in our body which "cuts up" the food and drink that is being consumed.<sup>29</sup> Yet this is not the whole story. In another section when speaking of the appetitive soul part and trying to specify its place in the body, Plato calls it *τὸ σίτων καὶ ποτῶν ἐπιθυμητικόν*<sup>30</sup> and asserts that it is placed between midriff and navel, the gods

<sup>25</sup> *Theaet.*, 184 D.

<sup>26</sup> It should perhaps be noted that in *Tim.*, 65 C 7 the blood-vessels of the tongue are referred to as *δοκίμια τῆς γλώττης τεταμένα ἐπὶ τὴν καρδίαν*. However, the heart in which all blood-vessels converge (70 A 7 f.) is not strictly speaking the "home" of a soul-part. Its function is to keep the *θυμός* under the control of Reason (*ibid.*). If Plato had wished to indicate a connection between the tongue and *ψυχή* he would probably have done so plainly and not left us to our guesses.

<sup>27</sup> See *Tim.*, 61 C-D (the account of the human organism begins at 69 C).

<sup>28</sup> For *τροφή* as a disturbance—though a less severe one, it would seem, than the *αἰσθήσεις*—see 43 B 5 ff., 44 B 1 ff. Playing on the different meanings of the word Plato at 44 B 8 contrasts with the physical *τροφή* an *ὀρθή τροφή παιδεύσεως*.

<sup>29</sup> 78 C ff., 80 D ff. Needless to say, this *θερμόν*—also called *πῦρ*—is entirely outside the Platonic soul-scheme. In Aristotle it becomes the seat of the nutritive soul and operates in its service (*De Part. Anim.*, II, 7, 652 b 8 ff.).

<sup>30</sup> 70 D 7 (I ignore the immediately following clause which in somewhat obscure language refers to further objects of desire; the problems which it poses do not affect our interpretation).

constructing this entire region as it were a manger (φάτνη) for the body's nourishment (τροφή). In the next sentence the appetitive part is spoken of as a wild "creature" (θρέμμα) "necessary to be fed" (τρέφειν) if the mortal race is at all to exist. And once more in this section Plato refers to this soul-part in similar language, saying that it "feeds at the manger."<sup>31</sup>

At first glance the notion that the appetites should be "fed" seems as un-Platonic as that they should be allowed to grow.<sup>32</sup> Actually, however, Plato elsewhere too speaks of "feeding" the necessary appetites in the sense of satisfying them or giving them what they really need.<sup>33</sup> In our passage the situation is different; this time the feeding of the appetitive part coincides with the feeding of the body. For it is hardly possible to deny that Plato speaks of the actual process of taking nourishment and of the region of the body where it is consumed. Moreover, the comparison between the stomach and a manger recurs in Aristotle's account of the organs concerned with nutrition.<sup>34</sup> Thus Plato here for once in this physiological context recognizes an Aristotelian soul-function.<sup>35</sup> We may say that he is taking a pretty large step in the direction of making his soul parts biological. Aristotle will go all the way.

<sup>31</sup> *Tim.*, 70 E 6.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. the discussion *Gorg.*, 491 E ff., 494 C ff.

<sup>33</sup> *Rep.*, IX, 589 B 2 (in this passage too the ἐπιθυμητικόν is likened to a wild θρέμμα; cf. 588 C).

<sup>34</sup> *De Part. Anim.*, II, 3, 650 a 19. One may suspect that the comparison had its established place in this context. So probably had another comparison which is inspired by a similar idea (that human τέχνη parallels φύσις) and likewise common to Plato and Aristotle: the blood-vessel system which distributes the food in the body is said to correspond to the water courses of an irrigation scheme (*Tim.*, 77 C 7 ff., E 7 ff.; *Arist., De Part. Anim.*, III, 5, 668 a 13 ff.).

<sup>35</sup> Without a word of apology or explanation Galen when identifying the liver as ἀρχή ("principle") τῆς θρεπτικῆς φύσεως (*De Usu Part.*, IV, 13, 308 Kühn) applies Plato's description of the ἐπιθυμητικόν in *Tim.*, 70 E 4-5 (θρέμμα ἄγριον τρέφειν δὲ συνημμένον ἀναγκαῖον) to the nutritive soul (*ibid.*, 309). More than this, he establishes between the θρεπτικόν and Plato's λογιστικόν and θυμοειδές the relation which Plato himself had set up between these two soul-parts and the ἐπιθυμητικόν (see also Gal., *De Plac. Hipp. et Plat.*, VI, 3, 521 Kühn; *In Hipp. De Victu*, III, 10, 521 Kühn).

## II.

The chapters of the *Timaeus* which treat of nutrition and sensation are invaluable evidence of the stage which scientific investigation of these subjects had reached before Aristotle. And just as these chapters represent Plato's response to a large phase of Presocratic thought so Aristotle's Second Book of *De Anima* is his response to the same body of doctrines (though to get the full measure of his response one would have to add a good deal from his other biological treatises).<sup>36</sup> Inasmuch as Aristotle makes these functions central for the understanding of organic beings his response is the more generous and open-minded one. This is not astonishing; after all his hands were not tied as Plato's had been.

However, it must not be supposed that Aristotle simply by a philosophical fiat stamped nutrition and sensation as functions of *ψυχή*. On the contrary, to understand them as manifestations of soul entails a new conception of their mode of operation. In particular, sense perceptions can no longer be treated along the materialistic and mechanical lines which the Presocratics had favored; all thought of particles, effluences, and in a word agents from the outside arriving and working upon the sense organs must be discarded.<sup>37</sup> Instead, sense perception is now understood as an active operation, as the actualization of one of soul's potential capacities (each of the five senses being such a potency). True, the sensory faculty cannot become operative unless an external object "moves" or "alters" it, and from this point of view Aristotle readily speaks of it as "passive" (*πάσχειν*). But movement is after all an *ἐνέργεια*; so "let us . . . proceed on the assumption that to be acted upon or moved is identical with active operation."<sup>38</sup> This may sound para-

<sup>36</sup> I refer, among other things, to the treatise *De Sensu et Sensibilibus*. Important doctrines relating to the nutritive function are put forward in *De Part. Anim.*, II, 3 and 7. Whether Aristotle composed a separate treatise *περί τροφῆς* is uncertain (that he planned to write one appears from the evidence collected by H. Bonitz, *Index Arist.*, 114 b 16).

<sup>37</sup> On this issue Plato sides definitely with the Presocratics; in his chapter on sight he actually speaks of *φερόμενα* . . . *μόρια ἐμπίπτοντα εἰς τὴν ὄψιν* (67 D 2 f.; note also *ἀπορρέουσιν*, C 7).

<sup>38</sup> *De An.*, II, 5, 417 a 14 ff. (Hicks' translation); note also the new definitions of "alteration," 417 b 14.

doxical but it works; from the vantage point of his new position Aristotle can face the passive aspects of the process with equanimity and without for a moment surrendering his conviction that soul plays an active role in the sense functions.

As an exhaustive study of Aristotle's new theories is beyond the scope of this paper, I shall content myself with pointing out one more characteristic difference between Aristotle's approach and that of earlier thinkers. Aristotle has broken with the idea—sponsored alike by Empedocles, the atomists, and Plato—that sense perceptions are the result of a contact (a touch, ἀφή) between the organ involved and the object of perception or its effluences (ἀπὸρροιαί).<sup>39</sup> According to him the perceived object never is in direct contact with the corresponding organ but through a medium like air or water exerts a stimulus (κίνησις) on the organ whereby the latter's potentiality is actualized.<sup>40</sup> Indeed we can see the pendulum swing from one extreme to the opposite. For the late Presocratics and for Plato it was impossible to appreciate touch as a sense perception in its own right, since most or even all other perceptions come about by touch.<sup>41</sup> Aristotle reestablishes touch as a perception *sui generis*. Yet he does not allow touch any more than the other

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Diels-Kranz, 31 (Empedocles), A 86, 7; 87; 92; 68 (Democritus), A 135, esp. 65 ff.; Plat., *Tim.*, 61 D ff., 65 B 3–68 D 7 (the account of the voice, 67 B 2 ff., is constructed along different lines); Arist., *De Sensu*, 3, 440 a 16 ff.; 4, 442 a 30 ff.

<sup>40</sup> See *De An.*, II, 7, 418 a 31 ff., 419 a 18 ff., a 27 ff., II, 11 *passim*, esp. 423 b 2–27.

<sup>41</sup> Cornford (*Plato's Cosmology*, p. 258) in commenting on *Tim.*, 61 D–65 B repeatedly speaks of this section as Plato's account of "touch" and "tactile qualities." This is correct enough—from the point of view of the modern reader; yet there is nothing in Plato's own wording that could justify the use of these terms. For him the sensations in question (hot, cold, rough, smooth, etc.) are τὰ κοινὰ περὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα παθήματα (64 A 2 ff., cf. 65 B 3). When not concerned with physiology Plato would naturally enough not hesitate to put touch on a par with the other sense functions (see e. g., *Rep.*, VII, 523 E, *Theaet.*, 189 A, 192 D; cf. also *Tim.*, 28 B, 31 B). As regards the atomists, Epicurus' reaction throws some interesting light on the situation which he had inherited. The Fourth Book of Lucretius which embodies the theory of sense perceptions includes no treatment of touch (though vv. 230 ff. draw a parallel between sight and touch); on the other hand, at II, 434 we find the most emphatic assertion *tactus enim, tactus*,



sense perceptions to come about by direct contact with the object. Not even *ἄφή* (touch) can arise by *ἄφή* (contact) but needs a medium which Aristotle identifies as the flesh.<sup>42</sup>

In nutrition too we can note a change of outlook which springs from the incorporation of this function into the new soul concept. Perhaps the best illustration is furnished by Aristotle's polemic against Empedocles. In the latter's view growth in plants takes place by movements of the fire and the earth in them; earth moving downwards joins the roots while fire tends upwards (where presumably it strengthens stem and branches). Of the two arguments which Aristotle advances against this theory only the second interests us here: If the elements thus move in opposite directions, what is it that holds them (and with them, the plant) together? The parts of the plant would break apart if the process of growth and nourishment were not directed and presided over by soul (i. e. the nutritive soul, the only "psychic" function present in plants). Soul is *τὸ σὺνέχον*.<sup>43</sup>

### III.

Several times we have had occasion to touch on Aristotle's scale of beings and its correlation with the soul functions. In doing so we have deliberately confined ourselves to Aristotle himself; the question of antecedents or precursors has so far not come up. If we now attack it the direction in which we have to look can hardly be in doubt; of the philosophers before Aristotle Plato is after all the only one who recognizes higher and lower soul parts.

Once again the *Timaeus* provides the most definite information; as a matter of fact statements that have a direct bearing on the scale have been discovered by J. B. Skemp<sup>44</sup> in the brief section which embodies Plato's views on plants and their peculiar

*pro divum numina sancta, corporis est sensus*, which is followed by an attempt to determine the manifestations of this *sensus*. A problem for which an Epicurean sees fit to importune the gods has surely ceased to be a minor one.

<sup>42</sup> *De An.*, II, 11, 423 b 2-27.

<sup>43</sup> *De An.*, II, 415 b 28 ff., esp. 416 a 6 ff. On this point and on other new departures in connection with the *ἐνέργεια* motif cf. Beare, *op. cit.*, pp. 222 ff.

<sup>44</sup> "Plants in Plato's *Timaeus*," *C. Q.*, XLI (1947), pp. 53-60.



kind of "life." "Anything that has life," Plato says, "has every right to be called a living creature in the proper sense and the kind of which we are now speaking has the third form of soul which, we said, is seated between midriff and navel; this has nothing to do with belief or with reasoning and understanding, but only with sensation, pleasant or painful, and appetites (*ἐπιθυμίας*)."<sup>45</sup> Here we are on firm ground, and this attribution to the plants of the lowest soul-part, the *ἐπιθυμητικόν*—and the equally clear withholding of the two others—has suggested to Skemp the comment that "in the *De anima* of Aristotle we find something similar,"<sup>46</sup> to wit the limitation of plants to the lowest function of his system.

The passage creates a strong presumption that Plato too knew a scale. Can we point to further evidence? In Books II and IV of the *Republic* where Plato is anxious to set up the spirited element (*θυμός*) as an entity distinct from the two other soul parts he refers to the behavior of horses, young dogs, and more generally of other animals.<sup>47</sup> These passages as well as that just quoted from the *Timaeus* may have been in Gigon's mind when some years ago he asserted—without indicating his reasons—that the Academy had a scale.<sup>48</sup> Indeed the case begins to look strong. One difficulty however remains: it may seem a large assumption that what Plato says of some animals should apply to animals all and sundry—especially if one remembers the proverbially timid *κραδίη ἐλάφοιο* or considers how much the Peripatetics had to say about differences obtaining between animals with regards to *ἀνδρεία* and *δειλία* (does not the presence of *θυμός* entail *ἀνδρεία*?).<sup>49</sup> Thus it may be well to consider two other sections and to make two further points.

<sup>45</sup> *Tim.*, 77 B 1 ff.: μετέχει γε μὴν τοῦτο . . . τοῦ τρίτου ψυχῆς εἶδους . . . ὃ . . . μέτεστι . . . αἰσθήσεως ἡδέας καὶ ἀλγεινῆς μετὰ ἐπιθυμιῶν. The earlier passage to which Plato refers for a fuller description of the *ἐπιθυμητικόν* is 70 D 7 ff.

<sup>46</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 56, n. 6. See also Olof Gigon, *Gessnerus*, III (1946), p. 50. Zeller's pioneering observations (*op. cit.*, II, p. 23, n. 1) should not be forgotten.

<sup>47</sup> *Rep.*, II, 375 A, D f.; IV, 441 B. See also IX, 585 C ff. where the lion is a symbol of *θυμός*.

<sup>48</sup> See note 46.

<sup>49</sup> The reference at *Rep.*, IV, 441 B is to *θηρία*, not to *ζῷα*. *Rep.*, II, 375 A and *Lach.*, 196 E while obviously relevant to our subject fall short

The final section of the *Timaeus* sets forth what happens to man if he fails to make proper use of his reason. He will successively sink to the level and change into the shape of 1) woman, 2) bird, 3a) four-footed terrestrial animal, 3b) reptile, 4) fish or other aquatic animal. Having sunk he may rise again and work his way back from level to level.<sup>50</sup> This certainly is a scale, and Plato has seen to it that the transformations come about not by any external agencies but by a kind of "organic" development; specific failings lead to a definite physical atrophy so that the being in question quite "naturally" qualifies for the next lower level. Moreover special attention should perhaps be given to a passage which says that the men who change into terrestrial animals are those who instead of using their reason have been guided by the parts of soul which have their place in the chest (i. e. the *θυμός*).<sup>51</sup> This establishes a correlation between the second soul part and terrestrial animals yet hardly recommends an extension of this relationship to all animals. Did the Platonic scale perhaps fail to cover the entire field? Did the difficulties here encountered confirm Aristotle in his resolution to set up a more workable scheme?

Plato has worked a few items of biological lore into his scheme of "metamorphoses"<sup>52</sup> (this word would seem to fit his conception better than "metempsychoses," unless we allow the two for once to coincide); yet even so his scale would hardly recommend itself to a naturalist. Like the Platonic parts of soul which are germane to an ethical and political context and which only the *Timaeus* transfers to biology, this scale is ethical rather than biological in inspiration. It fell to Aristotle to "naturalize" the scale of beings as well as the doctrine of the *μόρια ψυχῆς*. On the other hand it seems worth recording that the Stoic scale, while clearly influenced by Peripatetic views, has some significant points in common with the Platonic hierarchy of animals as set forth at the end of *Timaeus*.<sup>53</sup>

of being conclusive. For the Peripatetics see esp. Arist., *Hist. An.*, I, 1, 488 b 12 ff. and IX (cf. also *De Part. Anim.*, II, 4, 650 b 27-651 a 5). Cf. O. Regenbogen's article "Theophrastus," *R.-E.*, Suppl. VII, cols. 1432 ff.

<sup>50</sup> *Tim.*, 90 E, 91 D-92 C (cf. 42 B 5 ff., 73 C 2 ff., 76 D 7 ff.).

<sup>51</sup> *Tim.*, 91 E 5.

<sup>52</sup> See e. g., 91 D 7, 92 B 2, 5.

<sup>53</sup> In the downward direction the Stoic scale, like the Platonic, is one

The author of the *Epinomis* who succeeds so notoriously well in keeping close to Plato's thought and language makes it a point to define the status of the δαίμονες.<sup>54</sup> They are between the "highest gods" and man, and while the gods are pure mind the demons know the sensations of pleasure and pain. Thus the same sensations which the *Timaeus* extends down to the plants<sup>55</sup> are here extended upwards to beings above man. As a matter of fact, this passage is a very modest prelude to a subject whose intricacies were to exercise Western minds for many centuries. For as the intermediate position of the δαίμονες corresponds to that of the angels in Christian theology the problem touched upon by our author is at bottom the same as that familiar to us from its many scholastic subquestions (whether angels have bodies, have weight, whether they eat, etc.). Our author is content to credit the demons with two capacities of the soul that are common to all mortal beings but unworthy of the gods. He is constructing a rung of the scale and though he does not refer to the μόρια ψυχῆς—Plato had connected the two sensations with the lowest μόριον<sup>56</sup>—he clearly knows that the various kinds of souls and living beings show a decrease of value in the same measure as they show an increase in complexity.

A. O. Lovejoy in his fundamental book *The Great Chain of Being*<sup>57</sup> finds Plato's main contribution toward this august tradition in the idea that the perfect goodness of the highest being manifests itself in the fecundity which creates all beings

of increasing ἀλογία (see *Stoic. Vet. Fragmenta*, ed. von Arnim [4 vols., Berlin, 1904-23], II, p. 720). Note that in both scales fishes are assumed to breathe (*Tim.*, 92 B; *St. V. F.*, II, 721) whereas Aristotle holds them not to be in need of breathing, since they are "cooled" by means of their gills (*De Respir.*, 10, 16 and *passim*).

<sup>54</sup> *Epin.*, 984 B ff.; see esp. 985 A-B. E. des Places, *Rev. ét. gr.*, I (1937), p. 322, rightly stresses the importance of the δαίμονες for the hierarchy of beings; I cannot, however, share his confidence that the demonology of the *Epinomis* is Plato's own doctrine.

<sup>55</sup> *Tim.*, 77 B 5 f.; see above p. 161 (for the gods as strangers to these πάθη see also *Phil.*, 33 B).

<sup>56</sup> *Tim.*, 77 B 5 f.; see also for the association of ἐπιθυμία with ἡδονή *Phaed.*, 68 E 6, *Phaedr.*, 237 D, *Rep.*, VIII, 559 C, with ἡδονή and λύπη *Gorg.*, 492 D-495 A, 496 C ff., *Rep.*, VI, 492 D, X, 606 D.

<sup>57</sup> See Ch. 2, esp. pp. 45-66.

of nature. This idea was in later periods brought into close connection with the hierarchy of beings. As regards Plato's contributions to the hierarchy as such Lovejoy has this to say: "There are in the Platonic dialogues occasional intimations that the Ideas, and therefore their sensible counterparts, are not all of equal metaphysical rank or excellence; but this conception not only of existences but of essences as hierarchically ordered remains in Plato only a vague tendency, not a definitely formulated doctrine."<sup>58</sup> If I understand these sentences correctly, Lovejoy is thinking primarily of the hierarchical arrangement of the Forms themselves, i. e. of the elaborate *diaereseis* performed in dialogues like the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*. Yet he wisely refers to "existences" (as well as "essences") and to "sensible counterparts" of the Ideas (as well as to the Ideas themselves). What Plato did in this realm comes closer to Aristotle's conception of a scale of beings than is generally recognized; for if the evidence here collected proves anything, Plato has made contributions to the scale as such. In fact it is to him, not to Aristotle that we should look for the origin of this concept.

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<sup>58</sup> P. 58.—I wish to thank L. Edelstein, R. Hackforth, and J. B. Skemp for being good enough to read this paper and to give me their criticism. I have derived great profit from their suggestions. For information with regard to present day biology and physiology I am indebted to Professor L. C. Petry.

## HAD HORACE BEEN CRITICIZED?

### A STUDY OF *SERM.*, I, 4.

More than fifty years have passed since Hendrickson's famous article entitled "Horace Serm. I. 4: A Protest and a Programme" appeared in this Journal.<sup>1</sup> In that article he contended that the fourth satire was a protest against the traditional conception of Satire as a *carmen maledicum ad carpenda vitia hominum archaeae comoediae caractere compositum*. This conception was based on the writings of Lucilius, and Horace was keen that it should be revised in the light of his own work. He was therefore standing out against those contemporary critics who professed themselves admirers of the older poet. In a later series of articles<sup>2</sup> Hendrickson identified those critics with the group of Neoteric poets led by Valerius Cato, and he has won wide acceptance for his reconstruction of the Roman literary scene even among scholars who reject the lines prefixed to *Serm.*, I, 10.

In his study of the fourth satire, however, Hendrickson felt obliged to assail the traditional interpretation of the poem as a reply to hostile criticism: "I do not believe Horace is here justifying himself before the harsh criticism of a public which felt aggrieved and injured by his attacks, nor do I believe that the contents of the satire and the criticism of himself which it presents are drawn from life."<sup>3</sup> There, surely, is a challenging statement. Yet how many have even discussed it? It was ignored by Wickham in his edition of 1903, and by Campbell, Sikes, Duff, and Wilkinson in their respective books.<sup>4</sup> D'Alton mentions the article with approval in a footnote, but in his text he does not seem to accept its claims.<sup>5</sup> Most Continental

<sup>1</sup> *A. J. P.*, XXI (1900).

<sup>2</sup> *C. P.*, XI (1916), and XII (1917).

<sup>3</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 124.

<sup>4</sup> A. Y. Campbell, *Horace. A New Interpretation* (London, 1924); E. Sikes, *Roman Poetry* (London, 1923); J. W. Duff, *Roman Satire* (Cambridge, 1937); L. P. Wilkinson, *Horace and his Lyric Poetry* (Cambridge, 1945 and 1951).

<sup>5</sup> J. F. D'Alton, *Roman Literary Theory and Criticism* (London, 1931), p. 358, n. 4. But p. 354 is not in agreement with Hendrickson's thesis.

scholars have also adhered to the old opinion.<sup>6</sup> Reitzenstein<sup>7</sup> and Wagenvoort<sup>8</sup> are exceptions, but they too hold views different from Hendrickson's. The theory seems to have had little success even amongst Hendrickson's own countrymen; for Morris and Ullman are straightforward traditionalists; so are Knapp, Frank, and Rand.<sup>9</sup> Others have taken up what appears to be a somewhat anomalous position. M. B. Ogle, for example, after commending "the fine analysis by Hendrickson"<sup>10</sup> seems on the next page to prefer the older explanation. Fiske too quotes the article with enthusiasm, but then goes on to say that *Serm.*, I, 2 "must have aroused some real resentment among Horace's contemporaries."<sup>11</sup> In the general introduction to Fairclough's translation we see the ghost of Hendrickson's theory appearing under the name of Fiske,<sup>12</sup> but on the same page and again later on Fairclough associates himself with the more usual interpretation. All this is hardly satisfactory. If one is not prepared to give full assent to Hendrickson's theory, one ought to say why; it is the aim of this essay to indicate the difficulties involved in it.

Now in order to provide a really convincing proof that the

<sup>6</sup> E. g. Heinze, p. 68 in his revision of Kiessling's edition (Berlin, 1921); P. Lejay on p. 96 of his edition (Paris, 1911); A. Oltramare, *Les origines de la diatribe romaine* (Lausanne, 1926), p. 130; N. Terzaghi, *Per la storia della satira* (Turin, 1932), pp. 53 and 68; U. Knoche, *Neue Jahrb.*, 1936, p. 506, n. 32 and *Die römische Satire* (Berlin, 1949), p. 54; F. Villeneuve in his edition (Paris, 1946), p. 11.

<sup>7</sup> R. Reitzenstein, *Hermes*, LIX (1924).

<sup>8</sup> H. Wagenvoort, *Don. Nat. Schrijnen* (Nijmegen, 1929).

<sup>9</sup> E. P. Morris in his edition (New York, 1909); B. L. Ullman in *T. A. P. A.*, XLVIII (1917), note on p. 124; C. Knapp in *A. J. P.*, XXXIII (1912), in a note to pp. 141-2 (this is the only reasoned critique of the theory I have seen); T. Frank, *Catullus and Horace* (Blackwell, 1928), pp. 159-60 and *Class. Stud. Presented to Capps* (Princeton, 1936), p. 159; E. K. Rand, *Horace and the Spirit of Comedy* (*Rice Inst. Pamphlet*, XXIV [1937]), p. 64.

<sup>10</sup> M. B. Ogle, *C. P.*, XI (1916), note on p. 163. On pp. 164-5 see paragraph ending "These critics of Horace therefore blame him for the same faults which he finds in Lucilius."

<sup>11</sup> G. C. Fiske, *Lucilius and Horace* (*Univ. of Wisconsin Stud.*, 1920), p. 356.

<sup>12</sup> H. R. Fairclough, Loeb Translation (1929), pp. xviii and xix, and later, p. 47.



poem is not what it appears to be—i. e. a reply to hostile criticism—we would have to establish one of the following points:

- a. That Horace had written nothing before *Serm.*, I, 4.
- b. That what he *had* written had never got beyond his own circle of friends.
- c. That what *had* got beyond his own circle of friends contained nothing capable of causing offence.

Let us take these points in order:

a. No one believes that I, 4 was Horace's first satire. Some believe that it was the first except for I, 2. Many believe it was preceded by 2, 7, and 8. Moreover Horace may have written more satires than we possess. By this I do not mean that we must postulate a mass of lost juvenilia, but it is quite likely that certain pieces were not considered worthy of preservation. And so when Hendrickson says (p. 124) "Horace had written one poem which might have given rise to some such feelings (of resentment)," we are not wholly convinced; and indeed Hendrickson himself was more cautious earlier on, when, at the top of p. 122, he referred to *Serm.*, I, 2 as "the earliest specimen of the poet's work in this field which he allowed to survive."

b. How widely known were the early satires before the publication of Book I? The two passages in the fourth satire which shed light on this question—viz. 22-3 and 70-1—both indicate when rightly interpreted that at the time of writing Horace had published none of his poems, and had, moreover, no intention of doing so. Yet it still remains possible that private copies, meant only for circulation among his friends, had found their way into other less sympathetic hands.<sup>13</sup> This was certainly what happened in the case of the fourth satire, as may be seen from the whole tenour of the tenth, and from vv. 1-4 and 50-1 in particular. If the same was true of the earlier pieces it would explain how they could have caused resentment without being published.

c. It would be a great help if we knew precisely what Horace had written before *Serm.*, I, 4. Unfortunately we cannot date the satire with any confidence. Those who stress the quotation from I, 2 (v. 92) and the absence of any reference to Maecenas place it early—*ca.* 39 B. C.; while those who discount these facts

<sup>13</sup> See Schanz-Hosius, II, p. 118.

and concentrate on its connections with I, 10 are in favour of a later date—perhaps some time in 36. Among the Epodes any of the numbers 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 15, 16, and 17 could come before it; but again, as none of these poems can be accurately dated, we are left in uncertainty. However, there is some reason for conjecturing that, say, four of the epodes mentioned, and perhaps certain others which are now lost, antedate the fourth satire. All of these with the exception of 7 and 16 could have given the reader the impression that Horace possessed an aggressive and malicious temper. Numbers 7 and 16, though not in any way malicious, are nevertheless passionately critical and reveal a writer of intense emotion and with commensurate powers of expression.

As for the Satires, apart from any specimens now lost, the only one we know to have preceded I, 4 is I, 2; but 7 and 8 may also have done so. Now there is little to take exception to in 7. It is not addressed to anyone in particular, and it contains a negligible amount of unpleasantness. On the other hand it does portray real people, and so it would strengthen the idea that when Horace mocked at Canidia, Cupiennius, and the rest, he did have specific characters in mind. This leads us to Horace's use of names in the Satires. The one certain fact is that his practice was not uniform. Some names are taken from Lucilius, others denote districts in Italy,<sup>14</sup> others were chosen for reasons of etymology,<sup>15</sup> and others again refer to members of the preceding generation perhaps no longer alive. Yet we must not conclude that the poet never mocked his contemporaries. Satire, after all, can be personal without being political. No one, for example, questions the reality of *Aufidius Luscus* (I, 5, 34). *Natta* also sounds genuine (I, 6, 124). And even if the name *Novius* (I, 6, 121) does suggest "parvenu," it nevertheless designates a particular person. This last instance reminds us that a name which is etymologically apposite may still belong to a real individual—a point overlooked by Palmer when he maintained that *Philodemus* signified merely "a man of low tastes." Ad-

<sup>14</sup> W. Becher, "Zu den Personennamen in den Satiren des Horaz," *Phil. Woch.*, 1932, pp. 155-6.

<sup>15</sup> See J. Marouzeau, "L'art du propre nom chez Horace," *L'Ant. Cl.*, IV (1953), pp. 365 ff.; also A. Palmer in his edition of the Satires (1896), Preface, pp. xvi and li.

mittedly these are cases of harmless ridicule. But what of the attacks on contemporary writers? And what of *Canidia*? The name is, of course, a fiction; but I find it hard to believe that the character herself is no more than a type devised as a literary counterpart to Archilochus' *Neobule*.<sup>16</sup> Presuming she was a creature of flesh and blood, she can hardly have derived much pleasure from the eighth satire—and that work is mild in comparison with the fifth and seventeenth Epodes. At any rate, even if *Canidia* was not a real woman, the uninitiated reader would still try to make her one on the assumption that the poem was a personal satire. One ancient attempt at identification has been preserved by the Scholiasts, and in recent times Tenney Frank<sup>17</sup> and Miss Adelaide Hahn<sup>18</sup> have shown how plausible such efforts can be.

But let us suppose that neither 7 or 8 antedates 4. We are then left with 2. This piece affords a great variety in the use of personal names. *Lynceus* is a character from legend; so, perhaps, is the blind *Hypsaea*. Of the historical personages mentioned, *Cato*, *Sulla*, and *Philodemus* occur in unexceptionable contexts, but *Tigellius*, *Sallust*, *Galba*, *Marsaeus*, *Origo*, *Villius*, *Fausta*, *Longarenus*, *Catia*, and *Fabius* are all blackened in one way or another. Some of these characters may have been alive at the time of writing, and the rest presumably had relatives who would resent the insult. Among the remaining names the most important are *Maltinus*, *Rufillus*, *Gargonius*, and *Cupiennius*. Probably these merely represent types, and Fraenkel has cogently argued that their only function is one of stylistic colouring.<sup>19</sup> Yet we know from the Scholiasts that these names were regarded as thinly-veiled references to real people,<sup>20</sup> and many folk in Horace's social class must have had an uneasy suspicion that they were "being got at"; in fact Horace tells us as much himself:

cum sibi quisque timet quamquam est intactus et odit  
(*Serm.*, II, 1, 23).

<sup>16</sup> This is the view of E. Fraenkel in "Das Reifen der Horazischen Satire," *Festschrift Reitzenstein* (1931), p. 134, n. 3.

<sup>17</sup> T. Frank, *Class. Stud. Presented to Capps*, pp. 159 ff.

<sup>18</sup> E. A. Hahn, *T. A. P. A.*, LXX (1939), pp. 213 ff.

<sup>19</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 123.

<sup>20</sup> E. g. the tradition that Maltinus was Maecenas.

To such people the very secretiveness of the poet's recitations would indicate that he had something to conceal. This kind of situation was inevitable in a restricted society like the Roman one; and when we recall that nearly all Horace's names were in current usage, and that he was consciously carrying on the tradition of τὸ ὄνομαστί κωμῳδεῖν as he found it in the Old Comedy and Lucilius, we can hardly be surprised if he was accused of having a malicious nature.

What does Horace himself say about the tone of his Epodes and Satires? In *Ep.*, I, 19, 23 ff. he tells us that he did not use the same material or the same words as Archilochus (i.e. his work was not a translation), but that he did imitate the older poet's metre and spirit. This spirit, however much we may suppose Horace to have softened it, remains essentially censorious. Then there is the famous palinode *Carm.*, I, 16 which testifies to the existence of certain *criminosi iambi*. Whether these poems are now extant or not is, of course, irrelevant to our present discussion. Finally we may mention the threat at the close of *Epode* 6.

About the Satires Horace says very little, but he does call them *Bionei sermones* (*Ep.*, II, 2, 60), adding that they were characterised by a harsh kind of wit (*sal niger*). These words refer to a long tradition of satirical writing originating with the Cynics and continued in Rome by Lucilius,<sup>21</sup> and doubtless the *sal niger* was less prominent in Horace's work than in his predecessors'; yet Horace is deliberately claiming a place for his poems in that tradition, and he could not have done so if they had been, as Page says, "free from vehemence."<sup>22</sup> Moreover, when Horace formulated his theory of Satire in *Serm.*, I, 10 he did not exclude the element of astringent criticism. Scholars are often so keen to emphasise the *saepe iocoso* of *Serm.*, I, 10, 11 that they lose sight of the *modo tristi*.

We have one other reference which includes both the Epodes and the Satires, viz. *Ep.*, II, 2, 51-2. I would agree with those who read this statement in the light of the story of the *Luculli miles* (26 ff.). Both men lose their property, both successfully

<sup>21</sup> See Oltramare, *op. cit.*, pp. 91 ff.

<sup>22</sup> T. E. Page, *Horace, Odes* (1901), *Introd.*, p. xv.

recover their fortunes, and both are in consequence lazy. So there is some reason for thinking that

. . . paupertas impulit audax  
ut versus facerem

is intended to recall

. . . post hoc vehemens lupus, et sibi et hosti  
iratus pariter, ieiunis dentibus acer,  
praesidium regale loco deiecit, etc.<sup>23</sup>

The last passage, and perhaps the previous one too, contains a liberal seasoning of irony. But this, so far from disposing of the statement's central truth, actually confirms it, because an element of truth must be present if humorous exaggeration is to have any effect. The point may be further illustrated from our knowledge of Horace's disposition. When Damasippus talks of the poet's *horrenda rabies* (*Serm.*, II, 3, 323), we do not conclude that Horace was perpetually ill-tempered, but we do infer that he was apt to be roused rather easily, and this is corroborated by *irasci celerem* in the self-portrait of *Ep.*, I, 20, 25. A re-reading of *Carm.*, I, 25, III, 15, and IV, 13 would benefit all who picture Horace solely as the gentleman of impeccable taste and imperturbable good-nature.

To sum up. There was in the early Epodes and Satires at least a degree of sharpness. This was acknowledged by Horace whenever he wished to assert his place in the tradition of Archilochus or Lucilius. Such sharpness was capable of causing offence especially when exaggerated and misinterpreted by the uninformed reader.

We must now turn to the evidence afforded by the satire itself. In 23-4 Horace says he is afraid to give public recitations because Satire is unpopular. He must be including his own work in *genus hoc*, otherwise his excuse would be invalid. And why is Satire unpopular? Because most people cannot endure the censure they deserve. This plainly implies that Horace's Satire is censorious. Then follows a list of certain vices. Ullman noticed that the passage foreshadowed the poet's description of the moral

<sup>23</sup> The words *vehemens*, *lupus*, *iratus*, *dentibus*, and *acer* are all appropriate to a virulent satirist.

training he received from his father (105 ff.).<sup>24</sup> Thus 25 looks forward to 106, 27 to 113, and 26 (avarice) to 110 (its opposite extreme, prodigality). A further point, not stressed by Ullman, is that the vices noted in these passages have mostly been handled in *Serm.*, I, 2—e. g. prodigality in 4-19, adultery in 37 ff., 64 ff., 133-4, and fornication in 30-5, 58, 80 ff. These, then, are vices with which Horatian Satire deals. All who are prone to such vices fear satirical verses and hate poets (33). Therefore fear and hatred of this kind could have been aroused by Horatian Satire.

Next comes the accusation itself; the satirist is savage (34), has no regard for dignity—either his own or his friends' (35), and he covets notoriety (37-8). At first sight the charges seem so vehement as to be scarcely applicable to Horace, and this impression is perhaps deepened by the very general form which they take, for they are not aimed directly at any one satirist, but rather at all poets who write in the abusive manner of Lucilius (*poetas* 33). Yet from the way the argument has developed we should expect Horace to be included in the charges, and in fact there is no evidence to the contrary. Some people may well have jumped to the conclusion that here was another Lucilius in the making. Moreover, on the subject of publication, the one point where a clear distinction could have been drawn between Horace and the Lucilian type of satirist, the accusations are not at all precise. Instead of a definite statement that the accused had distributed lampoons among the people, we only get the ambiguous futures *parcet* and *gestiet*. Last of all, the lines need not signify anything so universal as a public outcry. This is just Horace's way of presenting the charges which he means to rebut; and the more exaggerated they appear, the easier his task will be.

The subject of malicious attack is resumed at 64 ff. Here again *genus hoc* includes Horace's work as well as that of his predecessors; for when the poet defends Caprius and Sulcius in so far as they are harmless to the innocent, he is also defending himself. He does not dissociate himself from this pair until 70, and then only on the grounds that his own poems are not sold or recited in public. The accusation *laedere gaudes*, etc.

<sup>24</sup> Ullman, *op. cit.*, p. 126.



is plainly compatible with the "defence" theory, and so are 81-5 if they belong to Horace's adversary.<sup>25</sup> As these lines are a restatement of the charges made in 34-8, my previous remarks will also apply here.

In the concluding section Horace tells us that his father deterred him from wickedness by pointing to certain individuals in the streets of Rome. The son was, no doubt, like his father in being more concerned to rebuke the sin than to brand the sinner, yet he admits that this kind of personal allusion may appear in his work (103). It was on this account that his poems were open to criticism. Similarly Horace's habit of introspection is based on the observation of other people's behaviour—

hoc quidam non belle: numquid ego illi  
imprudens olim faciam simile? (136-7)

Consequently when he commits his thoughts to paper (139), the result—however mild in comparison with Lucilius—will still be personal Satire.

Altogether, then, we are justified in maintaining that the charges made in the poem can apply to Horace, and do not simply reflect the popular conception of Satire as derived from Lucilius.

It might still be argued that although certain of Horace's works were capable of causing offence yet they had not actually done so. There are, however, two passages which make this very unlikely. Consider 91-3. If the poem is simply a repudiation of Lucilius' spirit, it is strange that Horace should feel called on to mention and to defend a Lucilian satire of his own. Certainly the most natural inference from the lines is that some people, rightly or wrongly, considered Horace *lividus* and *mordax* on account of the previous work.<sup>26</sup>

Then there is the evidence from *Serm.*, II, 1, in whose first line we meet the explicit statement

sunt quibus in satura videar nimis acer et ultra  
legem tendere opus.

<sup>25</sup> According to Hendrickson these lines were first assigned to the adversary by Keck in 1856. This idea has been accepted by many scholars including Lejay, Ullman, Morris, and Reitzenstein.

<sup>26</sup> An additional word of defence may be seen in 102 if, with Garrod (O. C. T.), we accept Housman's punctuation and make *prius ut* = *ut prius*.

Later at v. 22 we find a repetition of *Serm.*, I, 8, 11 which proves that the remarks of Trebatius refer to things which Horace had actually written. Therefore in this context Hendrickson's theory is out of place. Now let us see what points of contact this satire has with *Serm.*, I, 4.

a. The first four lines recall the criticisms of spirit and form which Horace counters in *Serm.*, I, 4.

b. 21 and 23 recall the earlier accusations: *laedere* echoes *laedere* (4, 78), *timet* echoes *metuunt* (4, 33) and *metuas* (4, 70), *intactus* echoes 4, 67-70 (cf. also *Ep.*, II, 1, 151-2), and *odit* echoes *odere* (4, 33).

c. At 29, 34 ff., and 62 ff. Horace defends himself by appealing to the practice of Lucilius. In 36-8 it is implied that Horace and Lucilius are, like their forebears, protectors of Rome. These passages remind us of the opening lines of the fourth satire.

d. *Latronibus* (42) recalls 4, 67 and 69.

e. Lines 45-6 and 77-8 proclaim that Horace is prepared to strike back if attacked. We are reminded of the way he struck back in *Serm.*, I, 10 at those who had assailed him for his remarks in I, 4. It is not unreasonable, then, to shift the argument back a further stage, and to suggest that the blows in I, 4 were struck in self-defence.

f. The *taurus* and the *bos* of 52 and 55 recall 4, 34.

g. Line 85 suggests that Satire is justified when directed against those deserving censure. This idea harks back to 4, 3-4, 24-5, and 67-8.

h. In this piece Horace reverts to his earlier manner regarding the use of personal names.

In view of these links, I think it is reasonable to maintain that, although *Serm.*, II, 1 may reflect more widespread criticisms resulting from the publication of Book I, it nevertheless forms part of the same literary controversy as that pursued in *Serm.*, I, 4. The later piece, however light-hearted, does point to some real criticisms; and so we should expect the earlier piece to do the same. If it does, then Professor Hendrickson's view is mistaken.

I have said nothing about the question of style, partly because its position in I, 4 is much less important than that of spirit,

but chiefly because on this point the difference between Hendrickson and the traditionalists is very slight. Everyone acknowledges that the plain style of Horatian Satire seemed prosaic and insipid to the admirers of the older poets. The only problem is what prompted Horace's remarks in vv. 8-21 and 39-62 of *Serm.*, I, 4. Hendrickson believes that it was the opinions of the Neoteric poets and in particular of Valerius Cato who at that time was bringing out an edition of Lucilius. The older view is that the admirers of Lucilius had actually criticised some of what Horace had written. Clearly there is no major divergence here, and it would be quite possible to accept the results of Hendrickson's researches without abandoning the idea that Horace had been criticised. That seems to me to be the wisest course.

Hendrickson called this satire "a piece of literary theory put concretely," and many would regard this aspect of the poem as the most interesting. But the literary theory emerges from the defence and cannot be separated from it. The poet moreover chose to cast the work in this form, not just because it gave him a means of vivid presentation, but because he had been assailed by real criticism.

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## THE ORIGIN OF THE INFINITIVE IN GREEK INDIRECT STATEMENT.

What is the origin of the infinitive construction in Greek, to represent an indirect statement? It is commonly explained as a development of the accusative and infinitive used after verbs of ordering. Thus, *κελεύω σε ἰέναι* (cf. P 30 f.: ἀλλά σ' ἔγωγ' ἀναχωρήσαντα κελεύω ἐς πλῆθὺν ἰέναι) would be the starting point: in this phrase the accusative *σε* was originally the direct object of the verb *κελεύω*, and the infin. *ἰέναι* was a dative form, having here a sense of purpose. So the original sense was "I order you for the purpose of going." But this phrase was then analysed in a different way, so that the accusative and the infin. *together* were regarded as the object of *κελεύω*: and *σε* now became, in this new connection, the subject of *ἰέναι*. The next step was to extend the use of this construction so that it was governed by a verb of saying; and the result was *φημί σε ἰέναι* "I say that you are going."

This explanation is the one widely accepted in standard grammars not only of Greek, but also of Latin (for its similar construction).<sup>1</sup> The formation of the construction is generally thought to be the same in both of the classical languages: and it is a notable point that Greek and Latin are the only two IE languages which have the construction in a developed form, and use it as a normal expression for indirect statement. But Professor Adelaide Hahn<sup>2</sup> has recently called the explanation into question so far as Latin is concerned. She argues that it is difficult to bridge the gap between "I order him to go" and "I say that he goes," since in the latter not only is the accusative no longer the object of the main verb but—what is more difficult—the infin. is no longer used to express purpose. She claims that, on the analogy of *iubeo hunc abire*, we should expect *dico hunc abire* to mean "I tell him to go," as an indirect command:

<sup>1</sup> Schwyzler, *Griech. Gramm.*, II, pp. 372-3; Chantraine, *Gramm. Hom.*, II, p. 312; Wackernagel, *Vorles. über Syntax*, I, pp. 263-4; Kühner-Gerth, II, pp. 27-8. Further references are given in the article by Professor Hahn (next note).

<sup>2</sup> "Genesis of the Infinitive with Subject-Accusative," *T. A. P. A.*, 1950, pp. 117-29.

but in fact it cannot possibly mean that. She therefore looks elsewhere for the origin of the Latin indirect statement, and with the aid of Hittite parallels she finds it in phrases where an accusative object has a predicative modifier, as *dicant te benignum, faenus creditum audio*. A past participle in such a sentence is turned into an infin. by the simple addition of *esse*, and indeed such a participle form can be understood as representing an infinitive. Eventually the two constructions, *iubeo hunc abire* and *dicant te benignum*, coalesce.

Professor Hahn excludes Greek from her consideration, admitting that the development in Greek may have been quite different. And so it must have been, if her account of the Latin process is correct: for we do not find in Greek the necessary basis of a participle which is changed into the corresponding infin. by the addition of the verb *to be*. We can find many parallels in Homer to *dicant te benignum*, both with an infin. (T 95 f.: τὸν περ ἄριστον ἀνδρῶν ἡδὲ θεῶν φασ' ἔμμεναι) and without (© 153: εἰ περ γάρ σ' Ἔκτωρ γε κακόν . . . φήσει). Beside these we can set the two comparable expressions possible in oratio recta, both with and without the verb *to be* (A 169: ἐπεὶ ἦ πολὺν φέρτερόν ἐστι, B 204: οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίῃ). We might be tempted to argue that the two oratio obliqua constructions reproduce the antithesis of those in the oratio recta, and that, having thus started with the infin. of the verb *to be*, the oratio obliqua then went on to use the infin. of other verbs. But that would be to leave unexplained exactly why it was an infin. which was used: why not, for the sake of argument, a participle, which seems a far more natural expression ("they speak of him as being the best"), and which was in fact used after verbs of *knowing* and *perceiving*?

The objections raised by Professor Hahn to the supposed development from *iubeo hunc abire* to *dico hunc abire* apply with equal force to the similar explanation of the Greek construction. The transition from *κελεύω σε ἵεναι* to *φημί . . .* is not properly explained, in view of the great differences between them. Typical is the remark of Wackernagel who, after describing the use of the accusative and infin. after verbs of *ordering* and *requesting*, merely states "hievon ist im Grunde derjenige Fall nicht so sehr verschieden, wo bei einem Verbum des Sagens ein Acc. c. Inf. steht."



In addition, two other features in Greek oratio obliqua must be mentioned. First, in Greek, but not in Latin (save in poetical imitations of Greek), when the subject of the dependent infin. is the same as the subject of the main verb, it is itself regularly omitted altogether, while attributes of it are left in the nominative case. So A 397 f.: ἔφησθα . . . οἷ . . . λοιγὸν ἀμύναι, E 473 f.: φῆς . . . πόλιν ἐξέμεν . . . οἶος. If the origin of the construction was in sentences like σ' Ἐκτωρ κακὸν φήσκει, it is hard to explain first, why the subject of the infin. is omitted, and secondly (and this is more serious), why the nominative is used for the attribute. Both these features argue against that sort of origin. And they take us further, for they also argue against the derivation from the type of κελεύω σε ἵναι.<sup>3</sup>

There is a second point of difference between Greek and Latin. Professor Hahn, as we have seen, comments that, if the traditional derivation of the Latin accusative and infin. is right, we should expect *dico hunc abire* to mean "I tell him to go," whereas in fact it does not. But in Greek we do find precisely the sense that Latin does not allow. O 57 f.: εἴπησι Ποσειδάωνι ἄνακτι πανσάμενον πολέμοιο . . . ἰκέσθαι, "tell Poseidon to cease from fighting and return," θ 433 f.: μετὰ δμῶν ἔειπεν ἀμφὶ πυρὶ στήσαι τρίποδα, γ 427 f.: εἶπατε δ' εἴσω δμῶν . . . δαῖτα πένεσθαι. The connection of this construction with that used after κελεύω is clear: just as κελεύω σε ἵναι was originally "I order you for, with a view to going," so λέγω σοι ἵναι was "I speak to you for going," and the only difference lies in the case, accusative or dative according as it represents direct or indirect object. The existence of this construction with Greek verbs of *saying* does not, however, facilitate the explanation of the construction of indirect statement. Rather the reverse: for we might more easily believe in a transition from "order to do" to "say that," if a verb of *saying* is incapable of being used with the infin. for an order, as in Latin. Greek on the other hand shows us verbs of *saying* followed by the infin., but used with two very different meanings. We must surely expect to find that these came from two different sources.

<sup>3</sup> Schwyzer, *op. cit.*, pp. 373-4, finds an explanation of the nominative in quite a different source, the construction after verbs of *wishing* (Θ 40: ἐθέλω δέ τοι ἥπιος εἶναι).

This expectation is increased when it is observed that there is a distinction in the choice of the verbs of *saying* themselves, when used with the two types of dependent infin. clause. Normally an order is introduced by *εἶπον*, but a statement by *φημί*.

(a) Orders. In Homer the verb used for orders is *εἶπον*.<sup>4</sup> Later, *ἐρῶ* and *λέγω* had the same construction: Hdt., III, 89: τοῖσι . . . εἶρητο . . . ἀπαγινέειν; Soph., *O. C.*, 840: χαλᾶν λέγω σοι. As a further development, the accusative of the person ordered was used instead of the dative, as at Soph., *Phil.*, 101: λέγω σε . . . λαβεῖν; *O. T.*, 350: ἐννέπω σε . . . ἐμμένειν; clearly this construction is modelled on the analogy of that with *κελεύω*. The infin. may occur alone, without expression of the person ordered, as at Soph., *Tr.*, 480: οὐτ' εἶπε κρύπτειν. But the use of the infin. alone in this way is uncommon;<sup>5</sup> this is a further point of distinction from the construction after *φημί* with indirect statement, where the simple infin. is very frequent.

It is extremely rare for *φημί* to introduce an order. Fournier indeed (p. 24) quotes one Homeric example, Υ 365: φάτο δ' ἱμεναί ἄντ' Ἀχιλλῆος, but it is far more likely that this is a statement, "he declared that he would go." The earliest use of *φημί* with an order to be quoted by L. S. J. is from Lysias (16, 13: ἔφην τῷ Ὀρθοβούλῳ ἐξαλείψαί με).<sup>6</sup>

(b) Statements. The infin. construction is very common in Homer after *φημί*, totalling as many as 191 examples. But the examples with other verbs of *saying* in Homer are rare: only three with *εἶπον*, and one each with *αὐδάω* and *μυθέομαι*.<sup>7</sup> There are other verbs of *saying* which do not take the infin. construc-

<sup>4</sup> Twelve examples in Homer: H. Fournier, *Les verbes "dire" en grec ancien*, p. 131.

<sup>5</sup> Fournier, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

<sup>6</sup> It is found with a compound form of *φημί* in Homer, A 577: μητρὶ . . . παράφημι . . . ἐπὶ ἧρα φέρειν Διί. But the meaning of the verb is altered by the composition, and so it takes the construction appropriate to verbs of *urging*, *advising*. The nominal form is seen in Soph., *O. T.*, 474-5: ἔλαμψε φάμα . . . τὸν ἄδηλον ἄνδρα πάντ' ἰχνεύειν.

<sup>7</sup> Statistics from Fournier, *op. cit.*, p. 138. The example of *αὐδάω* is not unequivocal: K 47 f.: οὐ γάρ πω ἰδόμεν, οὐδ' ἔκλυον αὐδήσαντος, ἄνδρ' ἓνα τοσσάδε . . . μητίσασθαι. The verb *ἔκλυον* may here share in governing the accus. and infin., or even be solely responsible for it: *ἀκούω* can take the construction, as at Ω 543: σέ . . . ἀκούομεν ὄλβιον εἶναι.

tion at all in Homer, such as ἀγορεύω, \*ἐνέπω, βάζω. In the post-Homeric language we find that when εἶπον and ἀγορεύω introduce indirect statement, they adopt the ὅτι-construction.

The reason for this distinction is a difference of meaning, as has been established by Fournier and others. εἶπον with its associates is objective in sense: it means "speak, utter, tell," it stresses the physiological act of producing speech, it is concerned with external relations with other persons. φημί is basically subjective, "affirm, maintain, declare, think," it gives expression to a judgment or opinion. It is significant that φημί includes the meaning of "think, believe," which may not lead to an act of speech at all.<sup>8</sup> Hence it is understandable that εἶπον should have been used for speaking which leads to an act committed by others, i. e. for an order. On the other hand, the infin. construction after φημί is most closely paralleled by that after ὅτι, ὅτομαι "think."

To return now to the question of the origin of the infin. construction after φημί, this must be seen in the use of a simple infin. as the object of the verb φημί; and originally there was no subject expressed for the infin. The use of the infin. as an object (syntactically equivalent to an accus. noun or pronoun) is widespread and well recognized in Homer, though it cannot have been a very ancient one.<sup>9</sup> It is found after verbs denoting wish, desire, be able, understand, etc. The origin of the usage was a final-consecutive infinitive, accompanying an accusative object (noun or pronoun). So at A 112 f.: βούλομαι αὐτὴν οἶκοι ἔχειν, the pronoun was originally the object of βούλομαι, "I wish her for keeping"; but the infin. had instead clearly come to be regarded as the object of βούλομαι (and therefore as itself governing αὐτὴν), as may be seen in line 116 of the same speech of Agamemnon, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὥς ἐθέλω δόμεναι πάλιν (where to supply or understand αὐτὴν as an object of ἐθέλω, if that were possible,

<sup>8</sup> See also Buck, *Dictionary of Selected Synonyms*, pp. 1253 f. εἶπον. rt. \*wekw-, Lat. vox, Skt. vāc- "voice": the primary sense is "give vocal utterance, speak," used of the actual speech activity. The meaning "say," with emphasis on the result rather than on the action, is secondary. For φημί, the derivation is probably from the same root as in φαίνω "make clear."

<sup>9</sup> Schwyzler, *Griech. Gramm.*, II, p. 365; Chantraine, *Gramm. Hom.*, p. 304; Monro, *Hom. Gramm.*, pp. 199 f.

would produce nonsense). The two infinitives (only the first with a noun) are instructive for comparison in A 18 f.: ὑμῖν μὲν θεοὶ δοῖεν . . . ἐκπέρσαι Πριάμοιο πόλιν, εὖ δ' οἴκαδ' ἰκέσθαι. The simple infinitive (without a subject expressed) after verbs of *ordering* may also be included here: A 386: κελόμεν θεὸν ἰλάσκεσθαι. It is of course clear in all these uses that the original case sense of the infinitive, dative, locative, etc., had been lost from sight, and that the infinitive was regarded as a case-less noun.

The use of an infinitive after *φημί* is of the same kind.<sup>10</sup> We find *φημί* used with a direct object in the accusative to denote the thing spoken of, or thought about (in distinction from the words, or the thoughts, themselves). E 184: εἰ δ' ὁ γ' ἀνὴρ ὃν φημι, "if he is the man of whom I am speaking (or, thinking)," B 81: ψεῦδος κεν φαῖμεν, "we should speak of (think of) a lie." The construction is often misconceived, by understanding an omission of *εἶναι*. Similarly © 153: εἰ σε κακὸν φήσει, "speak of you as cowardly"; compare Soph., *O. T.*, 362: φονέα σε φημί; Xen., *Hell.*, III, 5, 12: Κορινθίους δὲ . . . τί φῶμεν (wrongly Underhill, "the construction requires some infinitive [e. g. γινώσκειν] to be supplied"); Eur., *Phoen.*, 312: τί φῶ σε; Pindar has some clear examples, which have no attributive adjective or noun, so that it is not possible to propose the omission of *εἶναι* or other infinitive. *O.*, 13, 103: τὰ τ' ἐσσόμενα τότ' ἂν φαίην σαφές, *N.*, 9, 42 f.: πολλὰ μὲν ἐν κονίᾳ χέρσῃ, τὰ δὲ γέγονι πόντῳ φάσομαι. Compare *N.*, 4, 91 f. The construction is similar with *ὅτω*, -ομαι: so κ 380: ἦ τινὰ πον δόλον ἄλλον ὀΐεται, N 283: κῆρας ὀϊόμενῳ.

I have analysed all the examples of infinitive in *oratio obliqua* in the first ten books of the *Iliad*, and find that after *φημί* the subject of the infin. is as often omitted as expressed: out of a total of 41 examples, there are 21 with no subject in the dependent clause. (a) Subject not expressed, 21 cases; of which (i) 15 have identity of subject in principal and subordinate clause, (ii) 6 have change of subject between the two clauses. (b) Subject expressed, 20 cases; all with change of subject. It is usual to omit the dependent subject when it is identical with

<sup>10</sup> Since I am presupposing that here too we have the infinitive treated as case-less, this will support the view that the Greek infin. *oratio obliqua* construction is a relatively late creation, and independent of the Latin.

that of the main verb; when it is expressed, it is for the special purpose of emphasis,<sup>11</sup> θ 221: ἐμέ φημι πολὺ προφερέστερον εἶναι. So with other governing verbs: H 198 f.: οὐδ' ἐμὲ νῆϊδά γ' οὕτως ἔλπομαι . . . γενέσθαι, I 682 f.: αὐτὸς δ' ἠπείλυσεν . . . νῆας . . . ἐλκέμεν (αὐτός must be taken with the infin., being pointless with the main verb). What is perhaps more surprising is the omission of the subject in as many as 6 cases with φημί in Books I-X where there is not identity, and where there might be fear of ambiguity. Δ 351: πῶς δὴ φῆς πολέμοιο μεθίμεν;, "how can you say that we avoid the fight?", I 35: φὰς ἔμεν ἀπτόλεμον καὶ ἀνάλκιδα, "(you) saying that I am . . ." Similarly E 652 ff.: σοὶ δ' ἐγὼ ἐνθάδε φημι . . . ἐμῷ δ' ὑπὸ δουρὶ δαμέντα εὖχος ἐμοὶ δώσειν (notice the lack of agreement between σοι and the following accus.); also Γ 44, 220, Δ 375. Also after other verbs, H 310: ἀελπτέοντες σόον εἶναι; compare M 66: ὅθι τρώσεσθαι οἴω, "I think that they . . ." and ο 278 διωκόμεναι γὰρ οἴω, "I . . . they."<sup>12</sup>

There is a contrast here with Latin, in which the subject of the infin. is expressed regularly, both with identity and with change of subject. A notion of the comparative scarcity of omission for early Latin may be gained from Bennett (*Syntax of Early Latin*, I, pp. 367 ff.). After *dico* he says that there are several hundred examples with subject expressed. He claims to quote the most important instances of omission (p. 383); and after *dico* 15 are given. *aio*: over 200 with subject, 14 without. *censeo*: over 100 with subject, 6 without. Examples of omission are:—(a) with same subject: Plaut., *Asin.*, 806: *si forte velle dixerit*; Ter., *Andr.*, 394: *dic patri velle*; *ibid.*, 353: *ait tibi uxorem dare hodie*; (b) with change of subject: Plaut., *Amph.*, 345: *iam faciam ut verum dicas dicere* (sc. *me*); Pacuv., 369 R.: *insanam autem esse aiunt* (sc. *fortunam*).

The contrast supports the idea that in Greek the subject of the infin. is a later addition to the construction; whereas in Latin the accusative is an integral part of the original construction,

<sup>11</sup> Chantraine, *Gramm. Hom.*, II, p. 312.

<sup>12</sup> This aspect is incorrectly treated in Schwyzler, II, pp. 373 and 376. In the first passage he says that the simple infin. is restricted to cases where there is identity of subject; in the second, that the simple infin. is indeed found with a different subject, but that it is confined to cases where the subject of the infin. is indefinite (with two examples from Xenophon). For Homer at any rate this is certainly untrue.



both according to its traditional explanation, and in Professor Hahn's version. In Latin we have an accusative and infinitive; in Greek we have in essence a simple infinitive construction, of which the accusative (and nominative) and infinitive is a development. So the first stage in Greek was a sentence such as *φῆς πολέμοιο μεθίμεν*. The next stage arose when the need for greater precision led to the expression of the subject of the infinitive; but this was normally not required when it was identical with the main subject. Verbs of *wishing* could similarly add a dependent subject in the accusative to the infinitive which followed them, when there was a change of subject: so A 117: *βούλομ' ἐγὼ λαὸν σῶν ἔμμεναι*, © 210 f.: *οὐκ ἂν ἔγωγ' ἐθέλοιμι Διὶ Κρονίῳ μάχεσθαι ἡμέας τοὺς ἄλλους*. The choice of accusative for the case of the dependent subject may be variously explained. Possibly the model for it was found in the accusative and infinitive of *κελεύω* *σε* *ἵεναι*. Wackernagel would explain it as arising from the use of the accusative to denote the person spoken about.<sup>13</sup> Or, looking further, we might compare it with the use of the accusative and infinitive after *πρίν* (*πάρος*) and *ὥστε*—all constructions of different origin, but agreeing in the possession of a dependent infinitive. We may visualise a number of constructions producing a situation in which the accusative was looked upon as the fitting case for the subject of an infinitive.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> *Vorles. über Syntax*, I, p. 264.

<sup>14</sup> A brief version of this paper was communicated to the Classical Association, at its meeting in London, April 1954.

ARISTOTLE, *METAPHYSICS* 987 A 32-B 7.

In a paper entitled "The Problem of Cratylus," which was recently published in this Journal<sup>1</sup> Mr. D. J. Allan contends that *Metaphysics* 987 A 32 ff. has been generally misinterpreted and that, contrary to what is usually asserted, Plato's acquaintance with Cratylus and the Heraclitean theories is not there said to have antedated his acceptance of Socrates' position. Mr. Allan translates the first part of the passage as follows:<sup>2</sup> "In the first place, Plato was from youth familiar with Cratylus and the Heraclitean theories that all sensible things are in continual flux and cannot be the objects of science; and so he continued afterwards to think." In support of this translation and what is implied by it he states:<sup>3</sup> "The word *πρῶτον* has been understood by all modern and some ancient readers in a *temporal* sense. It is, however, followed in the Greek not by *εἵπειτα*, but the adversative clause *Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἠθικὰ πραγματευομένου, περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐδέν*; and this indicates that it is *logical* priority which Aristotle has in mind."

This analysis of the sentence is seen to be erroneous, however, as soon as the passage is read in its entirety. The Greek text runs as follows: *ἐκ νέου τε γὰρ συνήθης γενόμενος πρῶτον Κρατύλῳ καὶ ταῖς Ἡρακλειτέοις δόξαις, ὡς ἀπάντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν αἰεὶ ῥεόντων καὶ ἐπιστήμης περὶ αὐτῶν οὐκ οὔσης, ταῦτα μὲν καὶ ὕστερον οὕτως ὑπέλαβεν. Σωκράτους δὲ περὶ μὲν τὰ ἠθικὰ πραγματευομένου περὶ δὲ τῆς ὅλης φύσεως οὐθέν, ἐν μέντοι τούτοις τὸ καθόλου ζητοῦντος καὶ περὶ ὁρισμῶν ἐπιστήσαντος πρῶτον τὴν διάνοιαν, ἐκείνον ἀποδεξάμενος διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπέλαβεν ὡς περὶ ἐτέρων τοῦτο γιγνόμενον καὶ οὐ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναι τὸν κοινὸν ὅρον τῶν αἰσθητῶν τινός, αἰεὶ γε μεταβαλλόντων.*

The clause beginning with *Σωκράτους δὲ* does not end with *οὐθέν*, as Mr. Allan's note implies, but with *ἐκείνον ἀποδεξάμενος . . . ὑπέλαβεν . . . μεταβαλλόντων*. This *δέ* is not correlative with *πρῶτον* but connects this *ὑπέλαβεν* with the preceding *ταῦτα μὲν*

<sup>1</sup> *A. J. P.*, LXXV (1954), pp. 271-87.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 275. He translates only as much as I quote here, i. e., A 32-B 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 275, n. 2.

καὶ ὕστερον οὕτως ὑπέλαβεν,<sup>4</sup> and these two verbs (ὑπέλαβεν . . . ὑπέλαβεν) are contemporaneous. The preceding participle γενόμενος by its tense alone is shown to be temporally prior to ὑπέλαβεν . . . ὑπέλαβεν, and this priority of the participial clause is still further emphasized by the καὶ ὕστερον with the first ὑπέλαβεν. Consequently, quite apart from the significance of πρῶτον, the structure of the sentence, γενόμενος . . . ταῦτα μὲν καὶ ὕστερον οὕτως ὑπέλαβεν· Σωκράτους δὲ . . . ἐκείνον ἀποδεξάμενος . . . ὑπέλαβεν, shows that the meaning must be: "after having become (been) . . . while later too he held this conception of these things, when he had accepted the doctrine of Socrates . . . he conceived . . .". As to πρῶτον itself, it cannot bear the meaning that Mr. Allan gives it. Apart from the fact that it is not, as Allan says it is, "followed . . . by . . . the adversative clause Σωκράτους δὲ . . . οὐδέν," its position alone shows that it is not "logical" governing the whole clause, ἐκ νέου . . . οὕτως ὑπέλαβεν, in which it stands (for that Aristotle would have written πρῶτον μὲν or πρῶτον μὲν οὖν at the beginning) but that it goes closely with Κρατύλῳ καὶ ταῖς Ἡρακλειτείαις δόξαις and means "having from his youth been familiar first with Cratylus and the Heraclitean theories." In short, rightly or wrongly Aristotle does in this passage assert that Plato was familiar with Cratylus and the Heraclitean doctrines before he accepted the position of Socrates.<sup>5</sup>

I am not here concerned with the main thesis of Mr. Allan's paper or with that of Mr. Kirk's (*A. J. P.*, LXXII [1951], pp. 225-53) which it combats. Mr. Allan is certainly right in maintaining against Mr. Kirk that Cratylus is depicted in Plato's dialogue, the *Cratylus*, as a convinced Heraclitean and right too, I think, in holding that the problem posed by Mr. Kirk is an "unreal one";<sup>6</sup> but he commits a grave error in trying to sup-

<sup>4</sup> It is noteworthy that neither in his translation nor in his note does Mr. Allan take any account of this μὲν.

<sup>5</sup> Of course, Allan is right in maintaining that *συνήθη* as used by Aristotle need not mean that "Plato received formal instruction in the Heraclitean philosophy from Cratylus"; but then he certainly did not receive "formal instruction" in anything from Socrates either.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. against Kirk's thesis R. Mondolfo, *Notas y Estudios de Filosofia*, IV (1953), p. 235; *Riv. di Filosofia*, XLIV (1953), p. 136; *Riv. Crit. di Storia della Filosofia*, IX (1954), pp. 221-31.

port his own case by a misconstruction of this Aristotelian passage, and I believe it important to call attention to this error lest Mr. Allan's scholarly prestige lead others to adopt and perpetuate his misreading of the Greek.

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### NEW INSCRIPTIONS CONCERNING ARCHILOCHOS.

Inscriptions relating to the poet Archilochos have been found recently on two Greek islands, Paros and Thasos. A brief note concerning them is published here in order to call them to the attention of students of Greek literature who might overlook the original publications in the archaeological journals.

The inscriptions from Paros were found in 1949 and a brief notice of their discovery appeared in *Praktika*, 1950, p. 258.<sup>1</sup> Mr. Nicholas M. Kontoleon has now published the texts with full commentary in *Arch. Eph.*, 1952, pp. 32-95 (offprints issued in 1954 in advance of publication).

The texts are inscribed on two marble orthostate slabs which were found in the small valley of the Elita river about three kilometers northeast of the town of Paros. The slabs must once have formed part of the sanctuary of Archilochos which is mentioned in the text and which was probably located in the area where the stones were found. The date of the inscriptions is about the middle of the third century B. C., to judge by the letter forms. It will be recalled that other inscriptions relating to Archilochos, somewhat later in date than the newly discovered ones, have been found in Paros<sup>2</sup> and were doubtless also once set up in the Archilocheion. The famous Parian Chronicle may have stood there too.

The principal slab (E<sub>1</sub>) originally had four columns of text. Of these one column is virtually complete and another column

<sup>1</sup> See also *B. C. H.*, LXXIV (1950), p. 310 and LXXV (1951), p. 122, and *J. H. S.*, LXXI (1951), p. 249.

<sup>2</sup> *I. G.*, XII, 5, 445; *I. G.*, XII, Suppl., p. 212. E. Diehl, *Anth. Lyr. Graeca*<sup>3</sup>, Fasc. 3 (1952), Archilochos, No. 51.

has much of its left part. On the second slab ( $E_2$ ), which apparently also had four columns of text, only the left edge of the first column is preserved. Elsewhere the surface of both stones has been eaten away by water.

The well-preserved column on slab  $E_1$  contains 57 lines of text. At the beginning (lines 1-15) we have an oracle of Apollo given to a certain Mnesiepes bidding him set up two altars in a temenos which he is making and sacrifice to the Muses, Apollo, Dionysos, and other gods; he is also to honor the poet Archilochos. Mnesiepes accordingly (lines 16-19) does as the god orders, and names the place Archilocheion.

There follows (lines 20-57) the start of a biography of Archilochos in which we are told how the poet is said to have received his inspiration. While still a young man he was sent to town by his father Telesikles to sell a cow. Arising before dawn while the moon was still shining he set out for town with the cow. On the way he met a group of women who greeted him cheerfully and asked if the cow was for sale. He replied that it was and they said they would give him a good price. Then suddenly both they and the cow disappeared and Archilochos found a lyre at his feet. He was amazed, but soon realized that the women who had appeared to him were the Muses and the lyre was their gift to him. He told his father, who also marvelled. When his father went to Delphi soon afterwards he received an oracle which said that his son would become immortal and famous. This oracle has come down to us in the literary tradition and is to be found with slight variations in the *Palatine Anthology*, XIV, 113. Kontoleon suggests that the scene on a white-ground pyxis in Boston with a cowherd, a cow, and six Muses is a representation of the above story.<sup>3</sup>

The less well preserved column on  $E_1$  seems to refer to the introduction into Paros by Archilochos of the phallic worship of Dionysos. The Parians did not accept the new worship at first and turned against Archilochos. A sickness came upon them which could not be cured. They consulted Apollo who told them they must reinstate Archilochos and worship Dionysos as the poet bade them. The recommendations of the poet are ap-

<sup>3</sup> L. D. Caskey and J. D. Beazley, *Attic Vase Paintings in the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston*, No. 37.

parently given in his own words in lines 31-35 which are in verse.

The second slab ( $E_2$ ), on which only the left part of the first column with a quarter to a third of each line is preserved, is important for it contains a long quotation of Archilochos' verse, longer than any previously known fragment (lines 15-44). Kontoleon makes no attempt to restore this column, beyond filling out an occasional word, but the general sense seems clear. The biography of Archilochos is continued, this passage dealing with the poet's services to his country in the war against Naxos. It is illustrated by a quotation from the poet's own works in which he exhorts his fellow countrymen to greater efforts to get themselves out of a difficult position.

At Thasos the French School excavated the long stoa on the southeast side of the Agora. In the eastern end of the rear half of the stoa an earlier monument was found which had been respected by the builders of the stoa and left visible inside the building. It is a rectangular monument (4.53 m.  $\times$  1.785 m.) with three steps, the top step now missing. In the lowest step, which is of poros, two marble blocks have been inserted. One is uninscribed, but the other carries a boustrophedon inscription in archaic Parian characters (end of the VII century B. C.). From this we learn that the monument was the "mnema" of Glaukos, son of Leptines, the companion of Archilochos (cf. Diehl,<sup>3</sup> No. 68), who took part in the colonization of the island by the Parians. The monument was not a tomb but a cenotaph erected to the memory of Glaukos. The text of the inscription is to be published in *B. C. H.*, 1955.

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## REVIEWS.

ALVARO D'ORS. *Epigrafía jurídica de la España romana*. Madrid, Instituto Nacional de Estudios Jurídicos, 1953. Pp. 484. Unbound. Pesetas 150. (*Publicaciones, Serie 5ª. Textos jurídicos antiguos, C.*)

The most important, doubtless, of the Latin inscriptions of Spain and Portugal are to be found among the forty-one texts which Alvaro d'Ors with careful commentary, abundant bibliography, and a generous index of eighteen pages has just published in his *Epigrafía jurídica de la España romana*, a book which to many will render many a service. Only two inscriptions, 16 and 25, are entirely unpublished, but some are relatively unknown. It is a discriminating selection, which gives the reader a survey of the most important documents of Roman Spain and of much of what has been written about them. The author elected to publish some of his own contributions first in the form of articles, which, however, are so inaccessible that the conclusions will be new to most readers. He is professor of Roman Law at Santiago de Compostela.

The book is articulated into ten chapters, each with its own special introduction to orient the student generally. The introduction to Ch. III is particularly noteworthy. In eight of the chapters most space is given to texts of inscriptions in the original with a running commentary in Spanish; the texts are arranged in chronological order within the chapter. The chapters are: I, "Disposiciones Imperiales" (five texts connected with the imperial family or emanating from an emperor); II, "Disposiciones Fiscales" (the two mining inscriptions of Vipasca); III, "Leyes Municipales" (five texts); IV, "Disposiciones de los Magistrados" (four texts); V, "Tablas de Hospitalidad y Patronato" (fourteen texts); VI, "Cofradías y Gremios" (*collegia*); VII, "Instituciones Familiares"; VIII, "Sucesiones y Fundaciones" (texts of four endowments); IX, "Liberalidades *inter vivos*" (three texts); X, "Fórmula de Mancipación Fiduciaria" (text of the Baetica formula).

Thanks to Ugo Coli, who identified one fragment, and to Alvaro d'Ors who identified another and made valuable observations, the Tabula Ilicitana has become a close parallel for the Tabula Hebana. In the *Epigrafía jurídica* d'Ors publishes as No. 2 a composite text of both documents, which he considers merely two versions of the same. The similarities are indeed striking, yet I think one could find just as striking similarities between two Athenian prytany decrees. Because of new discoveries and a deluge of pertinent publications d'Ors' treatment was outdated by the day the book at last came off the press. See his mature comments, *S. D. H. I.*, XX (1954, published in 1955), pp. 460-7, and for new texts of these two separate inscriptions see *A. J. P.*, LXXV (1954), pp. 225-49.

No. 3 is the *oratio de sumptibus gladiatorum minuendis*, which

Americans usually consult in Dessau, *I. L. S.*, 5163. After re-examining the bronze d'Ors presented photographs and a new text in *Emerita*, XVIII (dated 1950, but published 1952), pp. 311-39, where he made notable improvements and at the same time raised some new problems. The publication of a photograph constitutes a great service to students, and it is a pity that readers of *Ep. jur.* are not informed that photographs of this and other inscriptions are actually available. Theoretically the same Latin text appears in *Ep. jur.*, 3, which differs from *I. L. S.*, 5163 chiefly in the following ways.

Line 1: d'Ors capitalizes the first letter as if a sentence began here. The engraver began the line out in the margin as if he were starting a new paragraph, but it does not seem to be a new sentence.

Line 7: d'Ors confirms a conjecture of Buecheler by reading *pura* for *cura*.

Line 16: d'Ors has accidentally omitted the word *deploraverat*.

Line 22: d'Ors emends *clamante* to *clamant et*. He seems right in assuming an error. Since the next word is *ego*, others assume dittography and merely delete the *e* of *clamante*, and so achieve a linguistically irreproachable clause which satisfies the reviewer.

Line 25: d'Ors reads *illi* for *olli*.

Lines 36-9 have been greatly changed with the removal of old errors. Though problems remain, d'Ors has certainly taken a big step forward by reading *melior inter tales* for *meliori accertatis* in line 36, *promovendos* definitely for *promovendos*, *nec eam* for *negem*, and *praebendae* for *praebendas* in line 37. The removal of the word *negem*, which misled Piganiol, *Recherches sur les jeux romains*, p. 67, is particularly important. However, d'Ors makes three sentences of the passage, which the reviewer would construe in the following manner as merely one: *lanistas etiam promovendos vili studio qu(a)estus nec eam sibi copiam dimidiae partis praebendae esse ex numero gregariorum, uti sciant impositam sibi necessitatem de ceteris, quos meliores opinabuntur, transferre tantisper plendi numeri gregariorum gratia*. This sentence of indirect discourse, depending on the verb *censeo* away back in line 29, may be translated: "The *lanistae* should also be warned against a low desire to profiteer and be told they have no such chance to furnish only half of the number of *gregarii*, so that they may know that the obligation has been imposed upon them of transferring, from the group whom they rate as superior, enough men to make up the full quota of *gregarii*." But d'Ors denies that *questus* needs to be interpreted as *quaestus*. He makes a complete sentence out of the words, *Questus nec eam . . . gregariorum*, which he understands as meaning "Complaints may arise that," etc. The reviewer must disagree.

Line 39: d'Ors retains Mommsen's emendation <ne>que ullo for the extant *atque ullo*. Would it not be palaeographically better to emend *atque* <n>ullo? Some emendation will surely have to be made to achieve the right sense.

Line 40: d'Ors has inadvertently dropped the word *ibi*. He inserts <arbitrium> before *iniungendum* on the analogy of a parallel in line 43.

Line 43: In the phrase *praefectis alimentorum dandis* Mommsen and others deleted the last word, while Hirschfeld emended to *dand(or)um*. Buecheler thought it could be explained as meaning that the prefects were yet to be appointed. Now d'Ors correctly retains *dandis* but disregards what evidence we have for the title by arbitrarily emending the second word to *aliment(is)*.

Line 50: d'Ors correctly follows those who emend *curatori provinciae* to *curatori viae*. In view of *Sardis*, VII (1), 16 there can be no question.

However, he points out that *curatore* is the form actually engraved. Throughout this inscription E and I are often confused.

Line 51: d'Ors makes a big improvement by reading *vel* instead of *uti*.

Lines 51-3: In the reviewer's opinion the sentence should be edited as follows: *atque ita, rationibus decem retroversum annorum inspectis, exemplis | munerum in quaque civitate edito<rum> consideratis, consti- [t]uantur ab eo cuius arbitratus erit de tribus pretis, vel, si melius ei videbitur, | ex eo modo quem peraequ[e] fi[er]i lic<ebi>t, trifariam pretia diducantur, eaque forma etiam in posterum servetur*. The new readings, *consti[t]uantur*, *arbitratus*, and *diducantur*, will be gratefully received without question. The reviewer commends d'Ors also for preferring Buecheler's single emendation *editorum* (instead of the inscribed but impossible *edito erunt*) to Hübner's assumption of a double error. In his Latin text *paraegue* is a typographical error for *peraeque* (so d'Ors in the commentary); if so, d'Ors reads *peraequ[e] fi[er]i legit et* instead of *persequitur effici<a>t et*. This new reading of the first two words constitutes an important step forward. The disquieting *legit et*, letters formerly read as FICITET, may indicate that the engraver erroneously cut LICITET or LECITET, but surely, since we need a future, we must emend to *licebit*.

Line 54: d'Ors reads *oportere <e>t* for *oportebit*. The infinitive had already been suggested by Hübner as an emendation.

Line 56: On pp. 451-2 d'Ors rejects Piganiol's interpretation, *At Galli assede<n>t <t>rinc<o>s qui*, etc.; d'Ors considers the text *Ad Gallias sedet princeps* correct as it stands, and he places a period after *princeps*. On p. 56 he merely asserts that the phrase "denotes simply that the emperor succeeded completely in curing the trouble in the provinces of Gaul." Such an assertion without evidence to support it does not satisfy the reviewer, who finds Piganiol's argument, based on *Sardis*, VII (1), 16, more impressive. The reviewer translates, "As for the three Gauls it is all settled that *lanistae* shall not charge for *trinqu* more than 2,000 HS apiece." *Ad Gallias* (sc. *quantum pertinet*) *sedet <t>rin<quo>s*, etc.

Lines 57-8: The passage *cum maximi principes oratione sua praedixerint fore ut damnatum ad gladium | procurator eorum nisi plure quam sex aureis et nisi iuraverit, has undergone several changes, though praedixerit* (so d'Ors) seems to be a mere slip. The main change is d'Ors' reading *non plure quam sex aureis lui, sic servi[s si]t*. Then d'Ors resolves *procurator(ibus)* to accompany the supposed infinitive *lui*, which the reviewer does not understand. Now d'Ors has probably given a much better reading, even though a problem of interpretation remains. Starting from d'Ors' reading LUISICSERVI...T, can one divide *luis icserve[re]t* and interpret the words as *ludis exsolveret* (rather than *exerceret*)? The omission of one letter as in the first word is common enough, while the error of pronunciation, *ser* for *sol*, involves merely the substitution of one liquid for another and a slight change of vowel in an unaccented syllable. "Since the *maximi principes* have announced in their oration that the policy would be for a procurator of theirs to release for the games, at a charge of not more than six gold pieces, a man who was condemned to death."

Line 59: d'Ors reads *nego[t]ium e[s]t* instead of *nego[tium eri]t*.

Line 60: d'Ors reads *siplaret* or *siblalet*, hesitatingly, instead of *sibimet*, and he interprets it *si pla<c>et*. This seems to be right. *Ne quis* instead of *neque* is a valuable improvement.

Line 61: d'Ors reads more carefully *pers[olu]tum* instead of the whole word. To the reviewer this suggests the restoration *pers[crip]tum*.

The reference would be to the limitation on the price that *lanistae* are permitted to charge.

Line 62: d'Ors reports that *cretium* was cut for *pretium*, and he reads *s[i] liberatus* instead of *liberatus si*.

Line 63: d'Ors has inadvertently dropped the word *operam*.

No. 6 contains two inscriptions which should have had two numbers. They are the two mining inscriptions from Vipasca (modern Aljustrel in Portugal). Only the first of these will be found in Dessau, *I. L. S.*, 6891, while d'Ors devotes sixty-two pages to them. His survey of the literature and problems is very valuable indeed, and the reviewer is grateful for almost everything except the interpretation of the word *pittaciarium* in the following passage (Vip. I 9):

- 58 Usurpationes puteorum sive pittaciarium. Qui intra fi[nes metalli  
Vipascensis puteum locum]-  
que putei iuris retinendi causa usurpabit occupabitve e lege metallis  
dicta, b[ideo proximo quod usurpaverit occupa]-  
60 verit apud conductorem socium actoremve huiusce vectigalis  
profiteatu[r - - -

The rubric *Usurpationes puteorum sive pittaciarium* should mean *Usurpationes puteorum sive ii pittaciares* (or *pittaciaria*) *adpellantur*. For example, in the Tabula Hebana, lines 15-16, reference is made to the *nongentor(um)*] *sive custodum sortitionem*, and the meaning is clear from line 13 of the same, *nongentor(m)*, *sive ii custodes adpellantur, sortitionem*. None of the chapters of our *lex metallis dicta* has a double rubric, and it seems improper to take *pittaciarium* as a nominative singular as Mispoulet did and as d'Ors still does, who on pp. 104-6, 122, and 128 assumes that the *pittaciarium* is the name of the *vectigal*. On p. 109 d'Ors differentiates *occupatio* and *usurpatio* as follows: *Occupatio* was the material act of taking possession, while *usurpatio* was the same act considered as a manifestation of a desire to be legally in possession, as a step in the staking out of a claim. This seems convincing; but if so, the heading of the chapter ought to mean "The acts by which mining claims are staked out." Aristotle, *Const. Ath.*, 47, 2 divides the leases at Laurion into those of the ἐργάσιμα and those of the συγκεχωρημένα, as d'Ors himself remembers.

The text of Vip. II has no apparatus criticus, and it is not always clear whether a change is due to an improved reading or to inadvertence. The reviewer suspects that the omissions of *postea* (line 10), of *is* (line 32), of *denos* (line 36), the dative *dati* for *datas* in line 9, and the misspellings *propietas* (line 6) and *confiscato* (line 28) may not be improvements. The following changes are certainly improvements: *sociorumve* (line 18), [V]el ii coloni (line 19), *erogatum* (line 20), *vel noctu* (line 25), *et idoneam* (line 30), *perviae* (line 31), *intra* (line 39), and angular brackets around *a* in line 41 and around *aget* in line 42.

To the bibliography of both these inscriptions add J. J. Van Nostrand, "Roman Spain," *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, III (Baltimore, 1937), pp. 167-74.

Nos. 7-9 are the famous Spanish charters which constitute the main evidence for a study of Roman municipalities and are among the first inscriptions which come to an historian's mind when he speaks of the value of epigraphical evidence. Apart from more obvious reasons for their interest to jurists they have a special interest to students of the *Corpus Iuris Civilis* because of their bearing on current problems of interpolation, though on p. 173 d'Ors wisely says in regard to the Lex Ursonensis, "In the last analysis it is hard to determine in each case whether the imperfection is that of the Caesarian draught, the revision promulgated by Antony, or later work of interpolation." The three main charters are fully appreciated, the Lex Ursonensis in 120 pages. In fact, d'Ors considers the Lex Ursonensis the most important document in his collection, and for this inscription at least Hardy's *Three Spanish Charters*, on which all American students have been raised, will no longer do.

In connection with Urs. 67, where the number of pontiffs and augurs is fixed at three each, one should take into consideration the influence of Greek political theory, particularly the influence of the *Laws* of Plato, whose plan for a new colony called for one board of three exegetes and one board of manteis. Plato was trying to improve upon the Athenian system, which in my opinion (see *The Athenian Expounders* [Baltimore, 1950], Ch. IV, and *A.J.P.*, LXXV [1954], p. 163) consisted in two boards of two exegetes each and one board of two or three manteis. If Cicero studied the *Laws* of Plato, Caesar and others may have done so too. I do not believe, and d'Ors does not say, that Latin colonies had always had exactly three pontiffs and three augurs. Rome, of course, had more than one board of "exegetes" in her three great colleges.

On p. 223: In Urs. 95, line 20, the usual version *qui ea re colon(is) petet* seems less drastic, more acceptable, than the emendation *qui ea {re} colon(ia) petet*.

On p. 229: In Urs. 99 the phrase *IIvir, qui tum erunt, ad decuriones . . . referto* disturbs d'Ors, who comments, "*Qui tum erunt* (en contradicción con el singular *IIvir . . . referto*) debe de ser quizá una interpolación." I understand *IIvir (eorum) qui tum erunt* and find no contradiction.

On pp. 234-5: In Urs. 103, line 2 d'Ors emends *is* to *si*, which is far better palaeographically than the usual emendation *eum*.

Among the documents emanating from Roman magistrates No. 14 receives a longer treatment than its mutilated text perhaps deserves. I do not understand the conjectural restoration *lege quam vobis [a divo Traiano data] est* (on p. 360) in the commentary, but I congratulate the author on his self-control in keeping all conjectural restorations out of the text.

Nos. 16-28 are tablets of *hospitium* and tablets of *patronatus*. There are three types: (1) the familiar tablet of patronage where a city makes an influential man its patron (*patronum cooptavit*), while he receives the city *in fidem clientelamque suam suorumque*; (2) the tablet of guest friendship (*hospitium*) between two peoples; (3) the hybrid form where an individual makes a pact with a city, and the pact conflates the terminology of *hospitium* and *patronatus*.



No. 25 contains a very interesting grant of rights by Termes to a vicus of its neighbor Clunia, *ut eodem iure essent Term<ibu>s* (so I emend) *quo cives Termestini*, which d'Ors interprets as a form of guest friendship though neither *hospitium* nor *patronatus* is mentioned. This seems correct, but if so, why say "receiving into their citizenship"? Of course, guest friendship and citizenship are distinct grants but not mutually exclusive. There are native precedents for the *hospitium* among the Celts of Spain (J. M. Ramos y Loscertales, "Hospicio y clientela en la España céltica," *Emerita*, X [1942], pp. 308-37; A. Tovar, "El bronce de Luzaga y las téseras de hospitalidad latinas y celtibéricas," *Emerita*, XVI [1948], pp. 75-91), while the *patronatus*, as d'Ors says, is more clearly a Roman institution. Is it possible that behind the formula of the Celtic *tessera hospitalis* lies an influence of the Hellenic *proxenia*? For the latter see A. Wilhelm, *Attische Urkunden* V (Wien. Sitzb., CCXX, 5 [1942]), pp. 11-86.

The book contains much of value. It is perhaps ungracious to complain about little things such as the lack of precision and chronological order in the bibliography, the occasional failure to mention authors of restorations and emendations he accepts. It will be a useful tool, not just for jurists, but for all students of the Roman Empire.

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E. ADELAIDE HAHN. *Subjunctive and Optative: Their Origin as Futures*. New York, American Philological Association, 1953. Pp. xviii + 157. \$5.00. (*Philological Monographs*, No. XVI.)

Miss Hahn's book is a model of orderly presentation; the immense amount of material is carefully marshalled, and transitions are skilfully made. The work is divided into four parts: I. "Views of Scholars, with Comments Thereon"; II. "Expressions of Modality in the Parent-Speech"; III. "Early Uses of the Subjunctive and the Optative"; IV. "Summary and Conclusion." These four parts are broken up into nine chapters and 236 paragraphs, numbered consecutively, and followed by an "Index Locorum." (The *loci* listed are mainly from Greek and Latin; a few are from Hittite, Umbrian, and English. This does not mean that illustrative words or phrases, as opposed to quotations of some length, are wanting in the book from many other languages: e.g., Sanskrit, Oscan, Old Irish.)

The thesis of the volume is given by the title. A more elaborate statement of it is the following from Chapter 8 ("Summary of Previous Chapters"): "I think Indo-European had both a subjunctive and an optative, both futures, and thus often interchangeable, but with the general distinction that the subjunctive tended to be used for more vivid futurity, and the optative for more remote futurity (or potentiality)" (p. 139). The thesis is of course stated



at the outset (pp. 1-2), repeated at various points, and supported by arguments that are almost always convincing.

The subject of the book is an intricate one; but the style is clear and straightforward, with an occasional rhetorical flourish for emphasis. Note, for example, the following felicitous phrases: "fusion and confusion" (pp. 77, 147), "the difficulties and dangers" (p. 79, n. 179), "probable even if not provable" (p. 140). But the rhetoric is perhaps a bit overdone in the sentence "Child of Delbrück and godechild of Brugmann though it [the injunctive] is, let it now be laid to rest!" (p. 45).

Miss Hahn's writing is particularly vivid in the first three chapters: "The Subjunctive and the Optative in Greek," "The Subjunctive in Latin," "The 'Injunctive' and the *-ā-* Subjunctive." Her chronicle of the controversies over the "*Grundbedeutung*" of subjunctive and optative sounds like an account of a Byzantine theological dispute. One is struck by the intensity of feeling that prevailed both during the "century of metaphysical syntax" (though "the old metaphysical viewpoint seems still to linger on" [p. 5]) and under the newer "psychological" approach. The author very properly points out that the "psychological" approach (advocated especially by Hale) has its pitfalls, just as the "metaphysical" approach does; what we must do is abandon both of these approaches "and truly deal directly and exclusively with language itself" (p. 5). Note 11 is an admirable exposition of "the psychological method at its worst"—i. e., as used by Dittmar. Chapters 1 and 2 are a most useful and interesting summary of what scholars from Delbrück's day to the present have thought about the subjunctive and optative. Among those of an earlier generation whose views are given we find Brugmann, Whitney, Goodwin, Monro, Hale, and Bennett; among recent investigators, Schwyzer, Thomas, and Handford. Delbrück's "pronouncements in 1871 provided a turning-point in the attitude towards the subject. Before that time, the treatment of the moods was characterized by a metaphysical approach . . ." (pp. 3-4). "Delbrück's thesis . . . is that the original use of the subjunctive is that of will, and of the optative that of wish" (p. 6). Dissent from Delbrück took two forms: (1) more often, his positing of two moods for Indo-European (with the Latin subjunctive representing a fusion thereof) was accepted, but the "*Grundbegriff*" which he assigned to each was questioned; (2) less often—and particularly by Latinists—the assumption of two distinct moods for Indo-European was rejected (Latin would then be nearer the primitive state of things, and Sanskrit and Greek exhibit a later refinement). Morris was an outstanding opponent of the two-mood theory. As to the "injunctive," it will have been gathered that Miss Hahn considers it a will-o'-the-wisp.

The two chapters (4 and 5) of Part II form the core of the author's argument. "In Chapter 4 is discussed the probable situation in Indo-Hittite as revealed by Hittite" (Summary, p. 143). Hittite has no moods other than indicative and imperative; modal distinctions are made, however, "but by means of particles rather than verb forms" (p. 54). Miss Hahn's analysis of the Greek particles—especially *ἀν* (and *κε[ν]*)—in the light of this is extremely

well done. She states her preference (p. 57) for Monro's explanation: "the force originally in the particle independent of the mood was eventually lost by it." Of course, "when used with the past indicative" the particles "continue to make a great change in the meaning" (p. 56). But though its modal force in general disappears, *äv* occurs in Attic Greek in places where it may or may not appear in Homeric Greek. The combination of potential optative and *äv*, for example, "was a redundancy resulting from contamination of the two forms of expression, which eventually became the rule but was not yet completely established in Homer's time" (p. 55, n. 98).

"In Chapter 5 is discussed the probable situation in Indo-European as revealed by the derivative languages, mainly Greek and Latin" (Summary, p. 143). The function of the old particles is taken over by two new formations: "the so-called subjunctive" (p. 59) and "the so-called optative" (p. 65). In the first instance the present indicative is modified by the addition of *-e/o-*; in the second, by the addition of *-yē/i-*. Though called "subjunctive and optative," they are actually "a more vivid future" and "a less vivid future." But futurity is a more fluid concept than present or past; it carries "many implications of a sort often thought of as 'modal'" (Summary, pp. 143-4). So it is not surprising that "a more vivid future" is the origin of the Greek present subjunctive and of some Latin futures (e.g., *dicēs, audiēs, erō*) and "a less vivid future" of the Greek present optative and certain Latin present subjunctives (e.g., *sim, velim*, and probably *amem*). Miss Hahn admits that the *-ē-* of the Latin present subjunctive of the first conjugation may go back through *-āyē-* to *-āy- + -ē-* but is "much more inclined" to take it back through *-āyē-* to *-ā- + -yē-* (cf. pp. 59-60 and n. 113, pp. 71-4).

Part III is divided into a Greek chapter (6. "Subjunctive and Optative, also Future, in Homer") and a Latin chapter (7. "Subjunctive, also Future, in Early Latin [especially Plautus]"). These constitute the bulk of the "Materialsammlung"; and for this reason, among others, the book will have a particular appeal for classicists. One might wish, however, that more Sanskrit evidence had been cited. Vedic Sanskrit (with both subjunctive and optative and with the function of the two often hardly to be differentiated) and classical Sanskrit (with the subjunctive "almost completely replaced by the optative" [p. 76]) present all sorts of interesting parallels to the situation in Greek and Latin. Cf., for example, the author's statements "Thus I perceive very little difference between the optative and the subjunctive in [*Iliad*] 3.53-4" (p. 87) and "The subjunctive and the optative, besides being coordinated with each other, are both also found coordinated with the imperative—another proof of their similarity to each other" (p. 88); cf. also the ultimate disappearance of the optative in Greek. On the other hand, we must not forget the genesis of the book; it "began in the form of a long article which dealt mainly with Homer's use of the subjunctive and optative, considered in part in the light of evidence from Hittite" (Preface, p. vii). An excellent feature of these Greek and Latin chapters is the care with which the author studies the situation and

context of the passages adduced; see, for example, her analyses of *Iliad*, XXII, 123-4 (p. 105) and of Plaut., *Amph.*, 450-1, 703-5 (p. 128, n. 334).

The last statement of Chapter 2 (p. 33): "I agree with Kroll and Handford that there is clear though rare evidence of this ["the interchangeability of subjunctive and future"] even as late as Plautus (cf. *inf.*, §§ 165-9)" should be put somewhat differently. For instance, in sections 165-9 several Terentian passages are cited, nor can I help feeling that this old "interchangeability" may be one of the contributing factors in the confusion of future and subjunctive in later (Vulgar) Latin. In other words, the later confusion could be traced back in part to Old Latin, just as the use of *volo* plus *infin.* as a future seems to have its beginnings in Old Latin. To turn now to Chapter 5, in note 164 (p. 76) the author writes: "Cf. the Latin use of *volō* as in *Most.* 66 *ego ire* in Piraeum *volo*, and the Modern Greek use of *θά*"; the sentence is the first part of a gloss on English *will* that has become a mere sign "of simple futurity." Inevitably, there is a subjective element in deciding how much stronger the idea of plain futurity is than that of wishing or being willing in such early examples of *volo* plus *infin.* as those from Plautus and Terence. But it seems to me that Sjögren<sup>1</sup> does not make so good a case for the passage from the *Mostellaria* as he does for Terence, *Phormio*, 481: *sese velle facere*: the periphrasis in the former occurs "in einer Situation, wo sonst *ibo* (*eo*) üblich ist"; the one in the *Phormio* "entspricht dem Fut. V. 461 *frater est expectandus mihi*: *Is quod . . . dederit . . . consilium, id sequar.*" Naturally, the incidental points of a monograph cannot be treated in detail, but the simultaneous mention here of *volo* plus *infin.* and the Modern Greek future with *θά* suggests an interesting expansion: namely, a consideration of this *volo* plus *infin.* as found in later Latin, of the type of Rumanian future that derives therefrom, and of the question whether there was Greek influence in the development of this Rumanian future.<sup>2</sup>

The Bibliography is most detailed and accurate. The only point that might be criticized is that of issues. Is there any need for citing the fifth issue (1923) of the second edition of Whitney's *Sanskrit Grammar*? To the best of my knowledge, all the reprints since the second edition are unchanged. On the other hand, the fourth impression (1948) of Buck's *Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin* should have been listed; this shows a few changes from the edition of 1933 (the fifth impression of 1952 is the same as the fourth).

<sup>1</sup> H. Sjögren, "Zum Gebrauch des Futurums im Altlateinischen" (*Skrifter utgivna av Kungl. Humanistiska Vetenskaps-Samfundet i Uppsala*, IX, 5 [Uppsala, 1906], p. 223. Note that the example from the *Phormio* is the one cited by Schmalz-Hofmann in Stolz-Schmalz, *Lat. Grammatik* (5th ed., Munich, 1928), p. 557.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Schmalz-Hofmann (*op. cit.*, p. 558; at the end of their account of *volo* plus *infin.*): "Im Romanischen dient diese Umschreibung in Dacien, vielleicht unter griechischem Einfluss, als Fut.: rum. *voiū jurā* oder *jurā voiū* . . ."; É. Bourciez, *Éléments de linguistique romane* (4th ed., Paris, 1946), pp. 269, 595; L. R. Palmer, *The Latin Language* (London, 1954), pp. 164-5.

New editions of some of the works cited by Miss Hahn have of course appeared since her writing: e.g., a second edition (1953) of the *Syntaxe latine* by Ernout and Thomas and a second edition (1954) of Humbert's *Syntaxe grecque*.

The book is remarkably free from typographical errors; I have noted only the following: P. xi (Table of Contents): εἰ γάρ, introducing a wish, is written εἰ γάρ here but εἰ γάρ in discussion and examples at pp. 97, 100, 102. P. 4, n. 10: for ψύχη read ψυχῇ. P. 13: insert *are* between *problems* and *so* in "the two problems so inextricably intertwined that . . ." P. 90, n. 207: for *potentia* read *potential*. Obviously the volume was proofread with great care as it was written with great care. More than this, it is a subtle and learned work, extremely valuable for the use made of the Hittite evidence, and a most important contribution in the field of historical and comparative morphology and syntax.

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PIERRE CHANTRAINE. *Grammaire Homérique*, Tome II: *Syntaxe*. Paris, Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1953. Pp. viii + 382. 1800 fr. (*Collection de Philologie Classique*, IV.)

The completion of Chantraine's *Grammaire homérique* is an event of first importance. The last decade of the nineteenth century was unusually productive of Greek grammars of large scope, including Monro's *Homeric Grammar*, second edition, an admirable and serviceable work now rendered less useful because of many discarded theories. Since 1900, however, there has been all too little to report until recently when the year 1953 has witnessed the completion of the Schwyzler-Debrunner and of Chantraine.

No student of Greek syntax, no student of Homer, can read Professor Chantraine without interest and profit. The work is no mere collection of dry statistics. His comments are always suggestive and instructive. Even in going over ground that has been carefully worked before, he has been able to make useful additions. His mastery of phonetics, his extensive acquaintance with bibliography are apparent in every chapter. This writer would recommend to every teacher of Homer that he read Chantraine's "remarques," printed in fine type and scattered throughout the book. Chantraine is no "corner-hummer" (γωνιοβόμβυξ), as the Greek epigrammatist contemptuously termed the grammarian.

There is so much that is taken for granted in philological tradition, so many formulae afloat that need mooring or sinking, that one may render service by commenting on a few. Chantraine (pars. 392 and 458), quoting Sturm's basic treatise, states that with *πρίν* and subjunctive "la principale étant toujours négative." Monro (2nd ed., p. 269), extending his observations beyond Homer, had earlier stated that *πρίν* and subj. "can only occur after negative

principal clauses" (italics mine), and Goodwin (*Greek Grammar*, 1471) has given us a general rule to the same effect. But in the Gortynian Laws *πρίν κα* with subj. is repeatedly used after an affirmative principal clause. Theoretically one might expect that *πρίν* with subj. after positive clauses would be common. In later Greek *πρίν ἤ* with subj. is frequent enough after affirmative sentences, but it means no more than *πρίν* with the infinitive. Language settles into certain grooves of expression. In conformity with this groove, the rule might be stated (cf. Gildersleeve, *Justin Martyr*, p. 113), "When *πρίν* must be translated 'before,' it must have the infinitive. When it may be translated 'until,' it may take the finite construction of *ἕως*, 'until.'" In the Gortynian Laws, *πρίν* with subj. after positive clauses must everywhere be translated "until." On page 224, Chantraine speaks of the optative "d'exprimer la répétition," the so-called iterative optative. That there is no notion of iteration or repetition in the optative itself is quite clear. The idea of iteration arises from the combination with an iterative past tense. One might as well speak of an iterative subjunctive in combination with a universal present. "Iterative optative" is a poor expression; "optative in iterative sentences" would be safer if the term must be used at all. Again, with respect to the predicative use of the participle. The Thucydidean scholar Stahl long ago complained (*Rhein. Mus.*, LIV [1899], p. 494) that Greek grammars took no account of the predicative participle with the translation of an abstract noun. The construction goes back to Homer, but is not discussed by Chantraine in his chapter on the participle (pp. 319-29). Classen in his *Beobachtungen über den homerischen Sprachgebrauch* (Frankfurt, 1879), p. 59, cited nearly a score of examples, e. g. *Il.*, XIII, 38: *νοστήσαντα ἀνᾶκτα*. We are so used to this construction in Latin that we overlook its rarity in Greek.

Blass made a memorable comment in 1889 (*Rhein. Mus.*, XLIV, p. 7) on our ignorance of the most elementary matters in Greek syntax: "Soweit sind wir . . . im Verständniss der gewöhnlichen griechischen Prosa noch zurück, dass wir nicht einmal dies elementarste Ding, den Artikel, verstehen." Each teacher must spend much time in the study of syntax, and each teacher finds any grammar unsatisfactory at some point. Each teacher has a way of adjusting grammatical phenomena to his range of vision, just as each author has a grammar of his own, written or unwritten. Thus, Chantraine frequently comments on the paratactic character of the Homeric style (pp. 208-9, 233-4) and speaks throughout of grammatical archaisms. The present writer, on the other hand, would agree that "the correlative feeling, the hypotactic feeling is perfectly established. The welding, if ever there was a welding, belongs to a time beyond our ken, beyond the Homeric *κεν*. When we are dealing with Homer we are dealing with a highly developed, highly cultured language, and . . . <we are> not concerned about what may be called cave-dwellers' Greek" (*A. J. P.*, XXIV, p. 390). In any case, the preference for parataxis even as early as Homer is a matter of style, not a mere matter of linguistic development. This leads me to say that a complete Homeric syntax would be at the same time a theory of Homeric style. To most grammarians syntax is a study



of the theory of constructions in the narrowest sense; in matters of style little attempt is made to elicit aesthetic values. Yet, historically, grammar began with aesthetic. This value was recognized by Dionysius of Halicarnassus as the highest and most refined result of grammatical study. Nor was his criticism a matter merely of superfluous adjectives; he went into tangible details. Someday the cycle may be completed, and a grammar of Homer will include not merely sporadic remarks, but grammatical observations of wide reach including even comments on constructions which do not occur in Homer. For example, Brugmann has told us that the historical present belongs to an early stratum of language. Yet it was completely tabooed by Homer and in high lyric, and the explanation may rightly be that the historical present must have been either too vulgar or too hurried (See Gildersleeve, *Pindar*, p. cii, and *A. J. P.*, XXIII [1902], p. 245). So in Kellner's admirable work, *Historical Outlines of English Syntax*, p. 229, we are told that the historical present, frequent in Chaucer, is scarcely to be met with in Old English. Syntax can provide bold contours for Homeric style.

Chantraine states on page 297: "la syntaxe homérique ne se prête pas à des classements rigides." To this writer it has always seemed that the student must be given a clear notion of the normal usage of Attic prose before undertaking to explore the genesis. Those who approach the syntax of Homer without a fairly accurate notion of the limits of prose are sure to get lost. In my opinion, nothing is so regrettable in the present practice of teaching Greek in this country as the fashion of beginning with Homer—unless it be the practice of entirely omitting the Attic orators and the iambic trimeters of Aristophanes from the program. Greek poetry is a sealed book to many students all their lives, because they have never had any sharp consciousness of the difference between poetry and prose.

To the list of *errata* on p. 379 might be added Schmitt instead of Schmidt, p. 288. *Il.*, XVIII, 606 might be added with the same proviso to the one example cited on p. 324 of the genitive absolute with subject omitted. Chantraine's treatment (p. 265) of *Od.*, XV, 393-4, concerns only an ellipsis but it involves in principle the theory of temporal clauses: οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ, πρὶν ὥρῃ, καταλέχθαι. Gildersleeve in his article on *πρὶν* in the seventh and eighth editions of *L&S* gave the ellipsis as ἐστί. But in his *S. C. G.*, 86, it appears as ἔη. My notes from the syntactical seminar at Johns Hopkins record, however, that Professor Miller stated that Gildersleeve had detected the error in ἔη. More recently, in the sadly mutilated article in the latest edition of *L&S*, Gildersleeve's ἐστί has been changed to γένηται, and Chantraine now offers ἦ or γένηται. The ellipsis, I believe, is ἐστί. *πρὶν ἐστὶ* is causal or semi-causal, as *ὥς ἐστὶ* is (*A. J. P.*, IV, p. 417, note), and is equivalent to οὐ γάρ πώ ἐστι. But this kind of criticism is of the minuscule order and is somewhat out of place when one is congratulating a scholar on the happy completion of such a work as the *Grammaire homérique*, a work which is sure to be canonized.

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MICHEL RAMBAUD. *L'art de la déformation historique dans les Commentaires de César*. Paris, Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1953. Pp. 410. (*Annales de l'Université de Lyon*.)

Doubts concerning Caesar's veracity have been expressed from the time that his *Commentaries* first appeared. Asinius Pollio's stricture (*apud* Suetonius, *Divus Iulius*, 56, 4) is well known: *Pollio Asinius parum diligenter parumque integra veritate compositos* [*Commentarios Caesaris*] *putat cum Caesar pleraque et quae per alios erant gesta temere crediderit, et quae per se vel consulto vel etiam memoria lapsus perperam ediderit; existimatque rescripturum et correcturum fuisse*. And modern scholars, of course, have not been exactly reluctant to undertake the twin tasks of (a) demonstrating that Caesar's *Commentaries*, especially the *Bellum Civile*, contain their share of propaganda, and (b) attempting to sift what is trustworthy from what is misleading. *A priori* considerations have led virtually everyone to the conclusion that Caesar's writings are slanted in such a way as to justify the ways of the dictator to men; he who extorted a "palinode" from Cicero, who created the first public library in Rome, and who began the practice of publishing the proceedings of Senate and Assembly obviously understood the value and uses of propaganda. However, if today virtually no one will dispute the proposition that Caesar was guilty of distorting the facts in his own favour, there is no doubt lots of room for argument concerning the degree of distortion. Exactly how much of Caesar's work is propaganda? Rambaud has a pat and ready answer: all of it. "*Les Commentaires sont les mémoires servant à une propagande de forme historique*" (p. 19). He has subjected the Caesarian *Commentaries* to the most minute and searching examination that an obviously acute Latin brain can bring to bear; and, as he is equipped with the bibliographical knowledge that one has come to expect of André Piganiol's countrymen, the result is a book that is scholarly as well as exciting. One may not agree with all that Rambaud suggests, but one must consider it seriously: no student of Caesar henceforth will be able to ignore him.

It is manifest that the question of Caesar's trustworthiness is not unconnected with his method of composition and publication: if he produced, say, one book a year during the time that he was in Gaul, his propaganda tricks and the general impression produced in the reader are likely to differ from what they would have been had the work been brought out as a whole immediately before the outbreak of the Civil War with Pompey. Rambaud, of course, sees this, and accordingly he begins his work with a painstaking and interesting attempt to discover exactly how Caesar, the author, proceeded to his task. He concludes that the raw material for the *Commentaries* would be supplied by the despatches and letters which, to judge from the recorded practice of Roman promagistrates abroad (Cicero in Cilicia being a noteworthy and more or less controllable instance), he sent back to acquaintances and to the Senate in Rome. Only a few of these have survived, mixed up with Cicero's corre-

spondence, but Caesar assuredly kept copies of them all. These letters and despatches, many of them designed to prove that supplications should be decreed in Caesar's name, were licked into commentary shape by Caesar's secretaries, above all Hirtius, were given a final revision by Caesar himself (except in the case of the posthumous publications such as the *Bellum Alexandrinum*), and were then published. This process resembled a production line: it was going on continuously, so that one could say that actually Caesar was composing something annually, which, as Rambaud says (p. 61), is not the same thing as saying that he published one book per year. And if Caesar had a regular and systematic method for getting his *Commentaries* before the public, it is no less true Rambaud believes (and he devotes the remainder and larger part of his book to a demonstration of it) that Caesar likewise had a regular and systematic method of falsifying the picture which he presents to his readers. The *Commentaries* seem simple, straightforward, precise. This is due to their origin from military despatches. The apparent artlessness, however, is extremely cunning. Caesar employs all the tricks of a modern ministry of propaganda and public enlightenment. To give a few examples: the achievements of his own *legati* are subtly belittled; events are sometimes related out of their strict chronological order where the latter might prove embarrassing; the usefulness of anachronisms is fully realized; names of individuals and nations are deliberately left vague; topographical details are confused or, where it suits Caesar's interest, omitted; Caesar's failures are touched on so lightly, if at all, that they pass unrecognized; the cross reference formula, *ut demonstravimus*, etc., is a particularly useful device for misleading; figures, as might have been expected, are adroitly manipulated; whether direct or indirect discourse is used depends on the degree to which the general credibility of the narrative at any point needs reinforcing; contrast, comparison, repetition, exaggeration, in fact anything calculated to promote a *suppressio veri* or a *suggestio falsi*, are all employed with telling effect. The really alert reader, however, can pierce the curtain of dissimulation and deceit and, when he does so, he is led to some startling conclusions: Caesar grossly exceeded his authority in moving, unprovoked, against the Helvetii; his behaviour towards the Haedui was so maladroit, if indeed some more sinister word should not be used, that he converted them from the friends into the bitter enemies of Rome; his expedition to Britain was a failure; in his dealings with Usipetes and Tencteri he was guilty of the crime which today would be labelled genocide; his accounts of Ambiorix and Vercingetorix come close to being caricatures; he had carefully premeditated and prepared his assault on Italy in 49; at the siege of Marseilles he suffered a sharp setback; his famed *clementia* is a myth, he being in fact a vengeful and murderous monster. And so on: Caesar's *Commentaries* are one long tissue of prevarication. Caesar's motive in all this was, first and foremost, a desire for self-glorification that bordered on the pathological (p. 243: "l'arrière-pensée fondamentale, c'est la glorification de César comme chef de guerre"; cf., too, p. 366). He was concerned particularly to demonstrate that he possessed in the very fullest measure those

qualities of generalship which, to judge from Cicero's *De Imperio Gnaei Pompei*, the Romans chiefly valued: *scientia rei militaris*, *labor*, *fortitudo*, *industria*, *celeritas*, *consilium*, *virtus*, *auctoritas*, *felicitas* (p. 246). Such a demonstration would especially recommend him to his legionaries; and his legionaries were all potential voters in the *comitia* and as such could by their enthusiastic endorsement legitimize any *coup d'état* upon which he chose to embark (p. 283). The *Commentaries* may be a specimen of military writing, but their political purpose is certain.

So far as the reviewer is aware, no previous critic of Caesar has been so sweeping or so whole-hearted. As Rambaud himself puts it (p. 363): "ceux même qui ont dénoncé le mensonge de César n'ont jamais pu le convaincre d'insincérité totale." And it seems probable that even now few scholars will give total assent to all of Rambaud's speculations (he himself as good as admits on p. 323 that some of his remarks on the Haedui border on the fanciful, while on p. 371 he comes perilously close to advocating scepticism for its own sake); and perhaps even fewer will agree with his devil's advocacy that Caesar's falsifications are carried through with such skilful and consummate art that even an exigent reader will derive full aesthetic satisfaction from a perusal of them (p. 369). But no one will deny that Rambaud has made a most important and valuable contribution to Caesarian studies.

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EMANUELE CASTORINA. *L'atticismo nell' evoluzione del pensiero di Cicerone*. Catania, Niccolò Giannotta, 1952. Pp. 302. 1000 lire.

Castorina sees three stages in the development of Cicero's rhetorical thought. Before the trip to Greece in 79 Cicero was a theoretical Atticist, but in practice was unable to restrain his personal exuberance. In his middle period he abandoned theory for political expediency and adopted a full-blown Asian style. In the last few years of his life this elaborate political oratory grew distasteful to him, and he returned to a liberal Atticism, mellowed by his own experience. The first period is seen most clearly in the *De Inventione*, the second in the *De Oratore*, the third in the *Brutus* and *Orator*. This development, Castorina believes, results from an always present conflict in the mind of Cicero between a restrained, philosophical, Greek nature and an exuberant, practical, Roman genius. The work under review is to be the first in a series which will examine and interpret Cicero's writings in terms of this psychological conflict.

Castorina's study has a number of minor virtues. The theses of Cicero's rhetorical development are clearly and consistently set forth. The author's practice of quoting pertinent Latin passages in parentheses following his Italian translations is reassuring. The references which I checked were accurate.

The book seems to me to suffer from three basic weaknesses. First, the author does not adequately compare, contrast, or connect the three phases which he distinguishes in Cicero's development with the general rhetorical currents of the first century B. C. Admittedly, our non-Ciceronian sources are somewhat limited, but what we have corresponds closely to Cicero's own work. Castorina acknowledges the similarity between the *De Inventione* and the *Rhetorica Ad Herennium* and also Cicero's debt in his middle period to Hortensius. He might, I think, have found signs of a slight increase in Asian sympathies among Greek rhetoricians of the middle of the century; Gorgias of Athens would be the best known example. Similarly, Cicero's final period of liberally defined Atticism corresponds roughly to the theories of the Theodorean and of slightly later critics like Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Such correspondences tend to show that Cicero was influenced as much by contemporary theory as by his own inner conflicts, though the latter may have existed. Where Castorina does attempt a close association of Cicero with contemporary rhetoric—in his discussion of the oratory of Brutus and Calvus—he goes astray, as we shall see, but for other reasons.

The second basic weakness of the book is Castorina's apparent ignorance of at least two or three important bibliographical items. Certainly the most important book ever written on the ancient theory of style is J. Stroux' *De Theophrasti Virtutibus Dicendi* (Leipzig, 1912). Stroux showed, among other things, the great dependence of the organization of the rhetorical *praecepta* of the third book of the *De Oratore* on Theophrastus. This is surely a remarkable fact, for in the case of all the other rhetorical works of Cicero the organization seems to be that of the contemporary rhetoricians. But Castorina never mentions Stroux nor the state of the rhetorical theory in the *De Oratore*. The fact that Cicero here turns, contrary to all custom, to a source book written two hundred and fifty years before, a source which represents a highly philosophical tradition, needs some interpretation to accord with Castorina's belief that the *De Oratore* is non-philosophical.

A second work to which some reference would be expected is the article of Edward J. Filbey entitled "Concerning the Oratory of Brutus" (*C. P.*, VI [1911], pp. 325-33). Filbey collected the information on the style of Brutus and contrasted it with the treatment of Brutus in Cicero's treatise of that name, concluding that Cicero had misrepresented Brutus' position. G. L. Hendrickson made use of this article in his study of "Cicero's Correspondence with Brutus and Calvus on Oratorical Style" (*A. J. P.*, XLVII [1926], pp. 234-58) which is still authoritative and which is also ignored by Castorina. Yet he surely needs to refute both of these articles in order to maintain the view, set forth in the third part of the work, that Cicero was in general agreement on stylistic matters with Brutus and Calvus.

The third basic weakness is the use of the term "Atticism." This is less serious than it might be since Castorina generally uses the word in a broad sense without any geographical or temporal signification. It causes the most trouble in the last part of the book where Castorina tries to show a return of Ciceronian theory to Atticism

and fails to recognize that it is rather Cicero's definition of Atticism than Cicero's theory of style which has changed in the years between the *De Oratore*, where "Attic" is a geographical term (cf. II, 217), and the *Orator*, where it is stylistic. The organization of the material in the *De Oratore* and the *Orator* differs somewhat as a result of the differing purposes of the two works, but the actual teachings, as seen, for example, in the theory of figures, differ hardly at all. Cicero's use of "Attic" in the *Brutus* and *Orator* is parallel to the development among the Greek rhetoricians where it comes to include two opposing camps, while "Asianism" becomes less and less important as a descriptive term.

So much for general criticism. If the work is examined more specifically, the first and longest section appears the least unsuccessful. Castorina shows Cicero's early concern with literary restraint or, as he calls it, Atticism from a large number of passages in Cicero's own works and from the *Rhetorica Ad Herennium*. The original source of the "Attic" material is certainly Stoic (cf. Diog. Laert., VII, 1, 41 ff.) as Castorina argues (pp. 15 ff.), but perhaps the rhetorical system found in the *De Inventione* should only be described as the theory taught in the philosophical rather than in the rhetorical schools, and not as specifically Stoic. Four pieces of supporting evidence may be cited. First, at the beginning of the *De Inventione* (I, 7-9) Cicero seems to prefer Aristotle over Hermagoras. Second, the *Partitiones Oratoriae* contains many of the same so-called "Stoic" elements (e.g. concern with dialectic, the *status* doctrine of Hermagoras, the "virtue" of brevity) and Cicero himself (cf. § 139) describes the contents of that work as the teachings of the Academy. Third, Friedrich Marx (*Ad C. Herennium Libri IV* [Leipzig, 1894], pp. 83 f.) saw an inclination toward Epicureanism in the *Ad Herennium*, which work, as Castorina recognizes (pp. 43 ff.), is closely akin to the *De Inventione* and may be used cautiously as an indication of what Cicero might have said if he had completed his handbook. Fourth, Cicero also seems to contrast (*Brutus*, 309; cf. Castorina, pp. 20 f.) his study of dialectic under Diodotus and his exercises in rhetoric. If this evidence is accepted, the *De Inventione* must be taken to represent the standard theory of the early first century which Cicero has written out as a kind of exercise with no particular personal conviction, and the *redundantia practica* of the *Pro Quintio* and *Pro Roscio* (cf. Castorina, p. 86, n. 35) is not so surprising.

In the final chapter of the first section Castorina introduces as decisive proof of Cicero's early Atticism the remarks of Aper in Tacitus' *Dialogus* (18) on the correspondence of Calvus and Brutus with Cicero. Cicero's style is there said to have been criticized by certain *obtrectatores* for being *parum Atticus*, by Calvus as *solutus* and *enervis*, and by Brutus as *fractus* and *elumbis*. Cicero in turn is said to have criticized Calvus as *exsanguis* and *aridus* and Brutus as *otiosus* and *diunctus*. Aper comments: "omnes mihi videntur verum dixisse." Castorina sees a contradiction in these terms unless one admits a change in Cicero's rhetorical theory. Such a change would result in his being doubly disliked by the strict Atticists—first for betraying them, and second for joining the Asianists (p.



140). The major objection to the theory seems to be a chronological one. Would Calvus and Brutus be particularly concerned with a change in Cicero's rhetorical theories which took place shortly after their births thirty or more years before? And if they did mention it, would Tacitus have reported the whole without noting the chronology? It seems unlikely, especially since *solutus*, *enervis*, *fractus*, *elumbis*, and *parum Atticus* seem perfectly consistent with a strict Atticist's view of Cicero. Quintilian in XII, 10, 13 (cf. Castorina, p. 138), by the use of the perfect tense (*male audire potuit*), clearly indicates that Cicero was criticized in Cicero's time as too Asian, but that in Quintilian's time (note the present *habetur*) there were some who regarded him as *ieiunus* and *aridus*.

The middle section of the book is the shortest and least unusual. It suffers somewhat from the emphasis on the expedient in practical politics as the source of Cicero's Asianism, but must be regarded as inadequate rather than wrong. The circumstances of Cicero's awakened political consciousness were already discussed by Castorina in chapter five (pp. 101 ff.), but it seems likely that some of the credit for the change should be attributed to his studies with the Academic Antiochus in Athens. Antiochus is probably the source for much of the philosophical material in the *De Oratore* (cf. W. Kroll, "Studien ueber Ciceros Schrift De Oratore," *Rh. Mus.*, LVIII [1903], pp. 552 ff.).

In the third section Castorina sets forth the following theory: Cicero is an advocate of oratory which imitates Attic Greek models, but distinguishes two kinds of Atticists among his contemporaries, the better and the worse. "Sappiamo infatti che i *meliores* son criticati da Cicerone non perchè non imitino Demosthene, ma perchè lo imitano meno di Iperide e soprattutto di Lisia: essi dunque imitavano *plura genera Atticorum*. I *peiores*, invece, sono stati finora biasimati perchè imitavano il solo Thucidide, o comunque un altro storico del suo *genus*, come Senofonte o Filisto" (p. 241). Among the *meliores* and in general agreement with Cicero Castorina places Calvus and Brutus (pp. 211 ff.), while the Thucydideans are imagined to be the major objects of criticism in the *Brutus* and *Orator*.

This seems to be considerably overstated. Cicero is openly critical of Calvus (cf. *Brutus*, 284: "et ipse errabat et alios etiam errare cogebat," a passage which Castorina mitigates [p. 208] by misinterpreting *devorabatur* at the end of § 283). As for Brutus, he is, as Filbey showed, misrepresented in the *Brutus*, and that work cannot, therefore, be used as evidence. Second, the fact that the *Orator* is addressed to Brutus shows that in Cicero's opinion Brutus did not understand the nature of the perfect orator. Third, at the end of the *Orator* (§ 237) Cicero clearly shows that he and Brutus disagreed, but politely asserts as usual (cf. *Nat. D.*, III, 95) that his goal is verisimilitude, rather than absolute truth. Castorina's interpretation of this passage seems only to take advantage of Cicero's desire to convert rather than to condemn Brutus.

Castorina also understates Cicero's admiration for Demosthenes. To support the belief that the qualities which Cicero admired in Demosthenes were the Lysianic the author quotes (p. 239, n. 10)



*Orator* 110 f. thus: "nihil Lysiae subtilitate cedit, nihil argutiis et acumine Hyperidi . . . Multae sunt eius totae orationes subtiles, ut contra Leptinem . . ." But a far better understanding of the sources of Cicero's admiration of Demosthenes will be achieved if Castorina's blanks are filled in, the first with "nihil levitate Aeschini et splendore verborum," the second with "multae totae graves ut quaedam Philippicae, multae variae ut contra Aeschinem falsae legationis, ut contra eundem pro causa Ctesiphontis." It is the diversity, not the elegance, of Demosthenes that Cicero admires. On the other hand, Cicero admits Lysias as a model of imitation grudgingly and only in contrast to Thucydides (cf. *Orator*, 30).

If, then, Cicero is known to have been in strong disagreement with Brutus on style, and if the purpose of the *Orator* is to convert Brutus, it is unlikely that Castorina is justified in regarding the unknown and unnamed imitators of Thucydides as the major antagonists of Cicero in his later rhetorical works. Cicero does indeed disapprove of them (cf. *Brutus*, 287 f. and *Orator*, 30 ff.), but they are only the extreme manifestation of misdirected imitation. With them must be classed the imitators of Charisius and Demochares (cf. *Brutus*, 286) and among the less misguided, but still mistaken, must go Calvus and Brutus and the others who do not recognize the supreme excellence of Demosthenes.

In conclusion, Castorina does not seem to me to have upset the traditional view of Cicero's rhetorical works. Cicero in practice was always inclined to an expansive, rhythmical, highly colored rhetoric. In his youth, under the influence of his teachers, he produced the *De Inventione* which reflects the rhetoric of the philosophical schools of the time and which is in no way original with Cicero. His middle period contains his most sincere expressions on oratory as on politics. In the last few years of his life he sought to redefine Atticism to include his own conception of great oratory and thus presages the classicism of the Augustan rhetoricians.

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ROBERT M. GRANT. *Miracle and Natural Law in Graeco-Roman and Early Christian Thought*. Amsterdam, North-Holland Publishing Co., 1952. Pp. viii + 293. \$4.50.

Frequently the statement has been made that the problem of miracles, as understood in antiquity, has never been sufficiently studied, at least in detail. The amazingly acute, and almost forgotten, eighteenth-century Herder long ago begged for such a dispassionate and detailed study; E. and L. Edelstein in their recent (1945) study, *Asclepius*, remark, not without warrant: "Most books dealing with the questions involved are satisfied with stating that the ancients believed in miracles and that ancient and modern concepts differ in this respect."

Professor Grant's volume is a definite, and very useful, attempt

to meet this longfelt lack. It is divided into two sections: "Science" and "Christianity." In the former he plots out what the ancient world thought about nature and its workings. This section comprises eight chapters: Nature, Laws of Nature, Matter and Motion, Credibility, Credulity, Education, Science in Hellenistic Judaism and Christianity, and Science in Christianity. Then in the second part he treats more specifically the biblical miracles, their many pagan parallels—one of the most convenient treatments in the volume—and their attempted defense by early Christians and their successors, the theologians and near-theologians. In this latter section the material falls substantially under three main heads: creation, biblical nature miracles, and resurrection—all in consequence of the all-important central confidence: God's omnipotence, which was much more vigorously and literally held by Christians than it was or had been in the Greek world, despite occasional words in Homer and elsewhere which might be so construed.

It is an ambitious attempt and has obviously involved an immense amount of reading and excerpting. The mere (briefly annotated) list of ancient writers considered fills eight pages (pp. 281-9). This little section of the extremely useful indices is, in passing, of definite value as a guide in the thicket of quotations and references in the pages of the study itself. Not only has Grant read the ancient authors themselves, both pagan and patristic, but he has apparently read every volume and monograph about them! Scarcely a single sentence remains unsupported by a footnote. Rare is the page which does not have from two to eight lines of such material—at once the evidence of the author's toil and erudition and a great convenience for the scholarly reader, who is not above using with gratitude such fruits of another's toil.

It may be confessed without apology that this is not an easy book to read. This is no adverse criticism. The material is always interesting, at times fascinatingly so, and the author's competence and scholarly common sense unquestioned. His knowledge of the Christian Fathers is both profound and exact, a competence unfortunately far from common in these days of streamlined scholarship. In addition, his judgment and sobriety are such as to arouse confidence. In a word, Grant has done a very difficult task amazingly well, and his volume will long remain of real value. Nonetheless it is not easy reading. The welter of authors cited; the intriguing selection of curiosities and absurdities which they seriously and at times ponderously wrote; the fact that the same men were frequently a combination of very real skepticism and amazing credulity—all this, together with the fact that chapter headings are far from being fixed bounds, for the same authors appear again and again in quite different contexts, makes it a book to be studied (with notebook and pencil always at hand), rather than one to be hastily read for pleasure or otherwise.

To attempt a review in any detail in any reasonable space appears quite impossible; anything short would be manifestly misleading, not to say unfair. As I examine my twenty pages of highly abbreviated notes I do not know where to begin. Accordingly I prefer not to attempt it but simply to indicate a very few of his major

emphases which appear to me essentially solid. Science, as we understand the word, was for the most part unknown in the ancient world and exerted no influence on the ordinary man. Actually the direct influence of ancient scientists—the physicians are a partial exception—was very slight. It was not so much a question as to what scientists observed or discovered about nature as it was what philosophers and other writers taught. And here generalizations and rhetoric were the increasing order of the day. The conspicuous weakness of the ancient world—Greek as well as Roman—was the preference for argument rather than observation; for deduction rather than induction. And how this preference flourished!

Against this increasingly sterile background Christian, that is, biblical miracle stories and their reception—creation and the increasing insistence that said creation was severely *ex nihilo*, the several nature miracles, especially those of birth from a virgin mother and resurrection, both of the Lord and of all believers—are cast. Perhaps Grant's most original and provocative contribution is his insistence that the clue to any understanding of the real place of the miraculous in early Christian—as it had been in later Jewish—thinking is to be found in "the atmosphere of apocalyptic eschatology." It was against that background of perfervid expectation, and with the Semitic confidence that in the most literal sense God was all-powerful, that these stories are to be viewed. None of them is unique. All of them have their parallels in the larger world. And while the treatment of them, that is, the attempt to establish their credibility, by Christian protagonists were many, actually there were but two basic or fundamental positions, the one championed by Tertullian, the other by Origen. For the former the approved method was to take them literally and to proclaim them vociferously and without compromise. Their very strangeness proves they came from God. So the physical resurrection is "certain because it is impossible." God could do anything, but did not do everything: the final answer to what he has, what he has not done, is not to be found in philosophic cogitations—all philosophy is from the devil—but in his revelation, that is, in the Scripture. Its inerrancy and completeness provide all that need or should be known. So the doughty African could advance far beyond Socrates: "To know nothing—contrary to the rule of faith—is to know everything." For Origen on the other hand, good Platonist that he was, the meaning, significance, purpose of the miracle was the important thing, far more important, indeed, than the story itself. At times, as a good theologian should be, Origen is definitely inconsistent. At times it would even seem that he accepted a particular story very literally, as a factual occurrence in severe history, but his more fundamental emphasis is upon the greater truth therein revealed or hinted; in a word, "the spiritual truth in the bodily falsehood."

But it is unfair to pick out tiny elements. This is a book which every student of patristics will find of first importance. It should prove of almost equal value to all interested in the world of day before yesterday, Christian and pagan alike.

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L'originalité de l'Égypte dans le monde gréco-romain. Basel, Benno Schwabe & Co., 1953. Pp. 129-280. Swiss fr. 12. (*Museum Helveticum*, X, fasc. 3/4.)

In this issue of *Museum Helveticum* there are published, promptly and in attractive form, the principal papers presented at the Seventh International Congress of Papyrology, which met in Geneva in September, 1952. The committee in charge had arranged that a most impressive group of distinguished scholars should discuss aspects of a single problem. There are differences, inevitably, in the approaches of the individual speakers to their common theme, in the attention paid to it, and even in its relevance to particular topics. But its importance and interest are obvious. For one thing, we have from Egypt materials and information of a kind often almost completely lacking elsewhere, and the question constantly arises to what extent we can use evidence from Egypt in attempting to understand conditions and institutions in other areas. On the whole, most of the present papers tend to stress the resemblances between at least the Greco-Roman stratum in Egypt and in the rest of the ancient world.

It would be impossible to discuss adequately the individual papers within a reasonable space. Each of them is itself a summary and condensed treatment of a large and difficult topic. I will attempt simply to give some idea of their rich and varied content.

A graceful and lucid discourse by the veteran Victor Martin, entitled "Autonomie et dépendance de la papyrologie," opened the Congress.

The first paper devoted to the Congress' theme deserves its place not simply because, as Martin observes, paleography is the foundation of papyrology. In "Paléographie des papyrus d'Égypte et des inscriptions du monde romain" Jean Mallon examines some Latin inscriptions from Spain which either have cursive elements or were copied from a cursive original, and after considering materials from other areas, concludes that the same hands were used universally throughout the empire. His conclusion and the implications of this uniformity clearly are important for anyone interested in the cultural history of the Greco-Roman world. Mallon urges that paleographers must go beyond the medieval hands to those of antiquity in constructing their systems, that Greek and Latin hands must be studied together, and that all "monuments graphiques," whatever the material, must be considered. Mallon himself, Medea Norsa, R. Marichal, and others, have made some of these views familiar, but the present article is a particularly stimulating statement of them. There can be little doubt about the fruitfulness and promise of Mallon's work, whatever refinements and modifications may be found necessary. It is to be hoped that C. B. Welles will soon publish his paleographical study of the Dura papyri, which furnish the largest body of comparative material from outside Egypt.

Three papers deal with the state and administration: H. Bengtson, "Die ptolemäische Staatsverwaltung im Rahmen der hellenistischen Administration"; B. A. van Groningen, "Population et administra-

tion"; and A. Piganiol, "Le Statut Augustéen de l'Égypte et sa destruction."

In the first Bengtson analyzes the Persian and Greek elements common to Hellenistic administration in general and finds the chief peculiarity of Ptolemaic Egypt to be the close control exercised over the population and especially its economic life. This control, he concludes, is to be explained by Egypt's geography, population, and past.

Van Groningen, who covers government in both the Ptolemaic and Roman periods, discusses with admirable clarity some of the implications and assumptions involved in the Congress' theme. He would emphasize less the variations and peculiarities in Egypt, e.g. the general absence of *poleis* and a comparatively strong native reaction, than the similarities to other regions in the Near East.

Piganiol, on the other hand, places more stress on the unique status of Roman Egypt and her isolation from the rest of the Empire under the Augustan settlement. It is perhaps significant in several ways that some of these peculiarities are better known to modern scholars than they were to Roman senators (Pliny, *Ep.*, X, 6, quoted by Piganiol, p. 197). In considering the influence of Egypt on the Empire as a whole, Piganiol might have mentioned the equestrian officials who spent part of their career in that province (p. 202).

In an eloquent paper, in several respects the central paper of the Congress, Claire Préaux discusses "Les raisons de l'originalité de l'Égypte." The basic problem to be considered, as she states, is why the Egyptian countryside remained largely isolated and alien from the urban civilization of the Greeks. Rejecting geographical determinism and at least subordinating materialistic factors, she argues that the essential reason was the desire and will of men, of the dominant Greeks and Romans on the one hand, relaxed and modified under Diocletian and the Christian Empire, and of the native Egyptians on the other.

F. M. Heichelheim prints only a one page digest of his paper "Autonomous Price Trends in Egypt from Alexander the Great to Heraclius I." The summary presents a comparison of grain prices in Egypt and in the free world market during the third and second centuries B. C., with emphasis on divergences and on the failure of the Ptolemaic planned economy.

Sir Harold I. Bell's "Graeco-Egyptian Religion" has all the clarity and mastery of materials that one expects from him. He studies the process of religious syncretism in Egypt and analyzes the peculiarly Egyptian elements in the mixture: magic, gnosticism, and, later, Christian monasticism.

In "Les documents du droit romain" the eminent Romanist Vincenzo Arangio-Ruiz emphasizes the value of these documents, which he has himself so often demonstrated in the past. He then discusses three texts *P. Mich.*, 434 and 442 and *P. Rylands*. 612 and considers the legal character and validity of certain acts of sale and purchase and of *chirographa*.

S. G. Kapsomenos in "Das Griechische in Ägypten" is agreeably precise: the Greek of the papyri may be regarded as typical of the



*koine* as a whole, neither being a strongly marked local dialect nor showing any Egyptian influence of importance. The different forms of modern Greek go back to the *koine*.

In "Literature and Society in the Papyri" C. H. Roberts attempts to determine whether the literary papyri, representing what was written and read in Egypt (as distinct from Alexandria), reflect political events, institutions, and social policies. A study of this kind is difficult even when the evidence is more adequate, but Roberts' conclusions will be read with interest.

Quite apart from the very substantial merits and interest of the individual papers, this is a welcome example of fruitful international collaboration among scholars. It is also a most stimulating summary of the achievements and the promise of various papyrological studies. The speakers and the organizing committee are alike to be congratulated.

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J. ANDRÉ. Étude sur les termes de couleur dans la langue latine. Paris, Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1949. Pp. 427. (*Études et Commentaires*, VII.)

The late Benjamin Whorf has been widely acclaimed for urging, on the basis of American Indian studies, that a close connection exists between the linguistic categories of a given language and the *Weltanschauung* of its speakers. The same conclusion could be tacitly drawn from André's closely reasoned treatise on the color names in Latin. It is a basic principle that peoples differ radically among themselves in their perception of color, and that their speech habits attest to these differences. André has brought sound philological method to bear on many questions of Latin terminology and style, and he has easily demonstrated that the Romans did not look out upon the same chromatic world which we perceive. Where we call the clouds white or grey, they described them (p. 335) mainly as black or dark blue or even dark yellow (*fulvus*). Again, the pale, dusty green color of the olive tree is almost invariably described in classical Latin as a grey (p. 65)—André has found only two examples in which the olive tree is qualified as green (*viridis*). There are even indications (pp. 170-1), variously interpreted by scholars, that the Romans now and again did not make a sharp distinction between certain intermediate shades of green and blue; Ennius, *Ann.*, frg. 516 uses the words *per caerulea laetaque prata*, and the same curious adjective is applied to the cucumber in *Copa*, 22.

Without wishing to re-open old and profitless discussions, one may wonder in some cases whether a particular view of the physical world is exemplified in the nuances of the color names or, vice versa, if the existence of a particular inherited vocabulary induced the Romans to see their world as colored in a particular way. In *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man*, Stephen Dedalus, who incarnates the young James Joyce, admits that because of his defective eyesight he



is really not interested in the colors of the sunset, but rather sees the sunset through the medium of the beautiful language used to describe it. More prosaically, Heinrich Kuen, in a footnote to his German translation of Sextil Pușcariu's *Limba română* (*Die Rumänische Sprache* [Leipzig, 1943], pp. 191-2), suggests that a Rumanian sees another color spectrum than that of a German merely because of the extraneous fact that Rumanian possesses two separate words for "blue"—*albastru* and *vânăt*—in contrast to German *blau* which defines both hues.

In this connection, the Latin poets not infrequently used a terminology, taken over from Greek, which seems to have thoroughly falsified their original color values, unless this technique was purely artificial and decorative. A good example is offered by the Latin translations of Greek *χλωρός* (pp. 373-4) which had two basic meanings: "pale" (a non-chromatic use confined to epic) and "yellow" or "green." In prose, the distinction between the two meanings was rendered by separate terms such as *pallens* and *viridis*. But Hellenizing poets tended to blur the distinction: the Sophoclean *χλωρόν αἶμα* (*Trach.*, 1055) comes out as *viridis* in Seneca (*Oed.*, 297).

André calls attention to another wide-spread phenomenon, the influence of the crafts, especially the dye-industry, upon nomenclature. He suggests (p. 182) that *aerius*, a word occurring in Late Latin texts in the sense of "light blue" and possibly to be assumed as existing also in the classical period (compare Ovid, *Ars Am.*, III, 173-4), was "imaginé sans doute par les teinturiers." This would be an ancient example of a word-coinage now multiplied at will in our day by the infinitely greater possibilities both of color variation and of techniques: compare our *baby's-breath blue* and *shocking pink*.

Even in ancient times there existed a specialized vocabulary of chromatic terms mostly confined to women (pp. 292-3) and applying to "les produits de beauté." By way of comment on these and on the special terms used for sundry objects of clothing, André has furnished much illustrative material in the sound *Wörter und Sachen* tradition. His remarks on the ancient extraction of purple dye, woad, saffron, and other colors are particularly judicious.

André's book is divided into three sections. The first section is a semantic study which attempts to determine the precise shades denoted by the Latin color-names. There follows a section concerned with the formation of the various color words and their grouping in convenient categories (adjectives of comparison, diminutives, Greek borrowings, etc.). In the final section, André initiates a stylistic analysis of these words, dealing with such topics as the color usages peculiar to each literary genre or to a given technique; periphrases used to replace the usual color words; the epithets employed with greatest frequency to describe certain phenomena, some of which became virtually clichés (*atra nox*, *fulvus leo*). André remarks very acutely that these formulae are often chromatically inexplicable (p. 365): snow is almost never *candida nix*, much as we should expect *a priori* to find this combination.

One minor blemish may be pointed out in this work. André has chosen to cite etymologies for many of his color names. This is not essential to his argument in most cases, since etymology is notoriously an uncertain guide to meaning. He has preferred, however,

to reply entirely upon Ernout-Meillet without ever quoting Walde-Hofmann; as is evident, these two excellent works supplement each other since each is grounded upon different principles. By confining himself to the conservative Ernout-Meillet, André must disregard numerous fairly plausible etymologies which are heaped high in Walde-Hofmann but purposely excluded by Ernout-Meillet (*s. v. ater, niger*, for example). In one case André proves even more fastidious than Ernout-Meillet (*s. v. liveo*); he boldly asserts that *lividus* is "sans étymologie connue" and disputes the interpretation of a line of Ovid (*Met.*, XIII, 817) where the word is used to describe plums, in order to argue against any connection between *lividus* and OBulg. *sliva* 'plum.' Here a reference to Walde-Hofmann would have pointed to the other cognates (especially Slov. *sliv* 'bluish') which make wholly reasonable the assumption of an IE \*(s)li-uo-.

Other very minor points include: misspelling of part of an English title (p. 36, n. 1); *caerimonia* (p. 164, n. 1) not listed in index; William Dwight Whitney's name misspelled (p. 186); the Greek etyma for *glaucus* and *cyaneus* are reversed (p. 233); *rubore* is inadvertently repeated (p. 366, fifth line from bottom).

A work of this nature necessarily includes some rather tedious compilations of material and many repetitions of the same examples from various points of view. It is all to André's credit that, despite this handicap, his book remains entirely readable. He has enlivened his discussions with many pertinent illustrations from French literature, and the result is clearly the fruit of an eminently sound scholarship.

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PIERRE GRIMAL. *Le siècle des Scipions; Rome et l'hellénisme au temps des guerres puniques*. Paris, Aubier, 1953. Pp. 229. 525 fr.

Professor Grimal of the Sorbonne aims in this book to give the historical background of the century of the Punic wars and to discuss against the background the influence of Hellenism on Rome with especial attention to certain facts and relations which, he believes, have not been sufficiently regarded. He makes it plain that he does not regard the Romans as mere copyists of the Greeks, giving a brisk defense of "the Roman spirit." He believes that with "the generation of 160" the appropriation of the essentials of Hellenism was complete.

This age of transition is a fascinating one for the historian, since it represents a movement toward making Roman society more open, although one could hardly call that society strictly closed when the movement began nor completely open when the movement ended. We tend to think of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia when we think of the problem of the open and the closed society, but the process in Rome may more profitably be compared to the process which is before our eyes now in the United States. There are many

signs that people are unconsciously finding our society uncomfortably open and are moving back a little in various ways in the direction of the closed society.

Grimal does not put the question in these terms, however, but in the terms which were in use a generation or two ago. Naturally he does not give the history in great detail, since for his purpose it is background, with the influence of Hellenism in the foreground. He uses the conventional symbolism of the opposition between the thought of Cato and the thought of Scipio, producing some elegant generalizations about the two men which do not take us to the heart of the matter. He does avoid leaning too heavily on the thought of the conservatives of Cato's school who viewed the tendency toward an opening of the society as a disintegration of primary and fixed values.

He reasonably asserts that before his period there must have been a great deal of Hellenic influence on Rome which we cannot hope to trace in detail, since it was exerted by innumerable minor contacts of the living and contemporary Greek civilization upon the Romans. This influence of the Greeks went on steadily and more and more visibly to us until the Second Punic War, when there was a revulsion against the Greeks caused by defections in South Italy, events in Sicily, and the hostile activities of Macedonia. At the same time there grew up a conscious and more cultured interest in the Greece of the great past (which might not be intelligible to the non-specialist unless described in more detail). With the prolonged Roman contact with Greece and the East in the second century the two divergent currents of attitude came together, until with the circle of the younger Scipio the Romans had really grasped the Greek way, as Cicero seems to recognize by his interest in that circle.

Although he deals carefully with the Greek influence on religion and art and architecture, Grimal gives most space, naturally enough, to the analysis of that influence which discloses itself in the literary remains. Here one wonders about his acquaintance with American work, notably Duckworth's book on comedy. His treatment has the advantages and the disadvantages which inhere in an attempt to treat the subject as a whole. He has seen some neglected facts and relations, as he said, and has offered some very neat points, such as his explanation of Cato's interest in Ennius, but he has also yielded to the temptation to believe that he understands exactly what every author was about at all times and to arrange all his material in neat and coherent schemes.

Although there is no startling novelty in the book, it is to be commended to the thinking of all classical scholars. The book is recommended for those who teach ancient history or a survey of Latin literature as a means of reviewing and improving their view of this age in its relation to Hellenism.

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KURT LATTE. *Hesychii Alexandrini Lexicon*, Vol. I, A-Δ. Hauniae, Ejnar Munksgaard, 1953. Pp. lviii + 510.

In his prefatory letter to his friend Eulogius (Latte, pp. 1-2), Hesychius says that he has based his work on the general lexicon of Diogenianus, by far the fullest available in his day. To this collection he added glosses (*lexeis*) drawn from such special lexica as he could secure. He then equipped the whole, so he claims, with the names of the authors and the titles of the works from which the lemmata were drawn, sketched in backgrounds for the proverbs quoted, and distinguished carefully among the various meanings of a given word. All this he did, copying out his sources with his own hand, in the object of providing needy students with all the helps necessary to their reading.

Since that time—more likely the sixth century than the fifth (Latte, pp. vii-viii)—the art of lexicography has made some progress and the apparatus of classical scholarship has been much improved. Even if the lexicon of Hesychius had been preserved to us in its original form, the modern student of Greek literature would hardly be well advised to turn to it for help in his general reading.

For the specialist, however, such a lexicon promises much that is valuable. (1) Sometimes the comments still preserve both the name of an author and an illustrative quotation that is otherwise unknown or but scantily known. Thus they are useful to editors of the fragments of particular authors or of fragmentary texts, e. g. on papyri, that are otherwise unidentifiable. (2) Sometimes the form of a lemma or of an enclosed quotation preserves a better text of a known work than more direct sources, helping editors to emend the received text or to solve problems in its transmission. Latte notes by the way (p. xlv, n. 3) an impressive number of glosses which offer valuable testimony to the tradition of the Scriptures, though they seem to have been overlooked by Biblical scholars. (3) Not infrequently an entry is annotated as being dialectal (*Αἰολεῖς*, *Ταραντῖνοι*, *κτλ.*) and is thus of great interest to comparative philologists. (4) Still other lemmata or explanations are extremely valuable to students of antiquities, e. g. of Greek religion or law, helping to establish new words or special locutions in the various technical vocabularies. (5) Even after centuries of exploitation (*editio princeps* by Musurus in 1514) there still remain hundreds of puzzling entries to challenge the learning and ingenuity of any scholar who has time to study them: they may yet yield something of importance.

But the lexicon of Hesychius has not come down to us in the form in which it left his hand. The single manuscript (Marcianus Gr. 622) which preserves it, along with the identifying prefatory letter, is of the fifteenth century. Though thoroughly alphabetized, the entries are written solid, straight across the page, whereas the work of Diogenianus was alphabetized only for the first three or four letters of the entries, and probably put the entries in columnar arrangement like the modern editions. Besides ordinary surface corruptions, dictionaries were especially subject to two other sources of error in successive recopyings. Glosses were often separated and rearranged, so that the old materials took on a new form, seldom better

than the old. On the other hand, owners of dictionaries have always felt free to add new materials in the margins, and the work of Hesychius was systematically interpolated, especially with glosses drawn from the collection of Cyrillus, an Egyptian Christian of the fifth century (Latte, pp. xlv f.), whose work has survived in various medieval recensions (almost all of them unpublished). Glosses from Cyrillus, in fact, make up almost a third of the entries in Hesychius. In turn, some of the Cyrillian manuscripts seem to have been interpolated from Hesychius.

In these circumstances, the cardinal rule for the users of Hesychius, as it is for his editors (Latte, p. xxxiii), is that the unsupported word of Hesychius (i. e. of the Codex Marcianus) must be treated with extreme caution. In establishing the text all possible testimonia must be used, Cyrillus and many others. The same testimonia are needed in order to distinguish the stratum to which each lemma is to be assigned—whether from Diogenianus, Cyrillus, or special lexica—which of course has a bearing on the authority of the entry. Identification of the probable source of a lemma in recorded literature is a necessary check on the credibility of the meanings assigned. The authenticity of forms and meanings which cannot be so controlled must be established by other entries of similar form and meaning in other sources or in Hesychius himself. An accurate knowledge of dialectic morphology is necessary at all times in order to distinguish between what is possible and what is not possible.

The many faults of the last previous edition of Hesychius (Schmidt, 1857-68) have long been recognized. The present editor, falling heir as a brilliant young scholar to the materials gathered by Reitzenstein and Drachmann, and beginning his own collections as early as 1914, has at last been able to bring out his first volume, with the generous support of the Rask-Ørsted Fund.

It is a magnificent achievement. An ingenious arrangement of text with critical symbols and marginal ascriptions and with two apparatus critici reveals at a glance all that the user needs to know, while a *Mantissa Adnotationis* (pp. 493-505) on selected questions atones for the severity of the second apparatus. *Addenda* and *Corrigenda* (pp. 505-9) draw upon materials published as late as 1950, especially Leeumann's *Homerische Wörter*. Following Schmidt's example, the entries are numbered, but according to the order in which they stand in M, not to some fancy as to how they once stood. Indeed, the greatest (and most praiseworthy) concern of the editor seems to have been to avoid for himself and forestall for others the errors of interpretation which rest on, or lead to, misrepresentation of the text and which are abundantly pilloried in the *Prolegomena*. Latte is the undoubted master of all his intricate and widely dispersed materials. His judgment is conservative and thoroughly sound, yet his apparatus and the *Mantissa* contain many constructive and brilliant suggestions. All scholars of Greek literature will await with impatience the completion of his task and the promised indices.

The work is beautifully printed on excellent paper and with very distinctive Greek types. Unfortunately the proofreading is not impeccable, especially in the *Prolegomena* and *Mantissa*, and especially of numerals in cross references. None of these will offer great



trouble to the reader (except for the passage noted below), but in one who is so caustic about the errors of his predecessors, both medieval and modern, a sentence like the following is unfortunate (p. xxxi, 4-6): Quam neglegenter (diasceuaasta) rem administraverit, docet gl. a 2912 quae post 2313 demum intellegitur, similiter a 4279 ὁ αὐτός ad 4281 respicit. I hasten to add that a check of some 300 references in the text itself to the *Iliad*, Euripides, and the NT turned up only a very few errors: a 2054 αἶπος (for Phoen. 581 read Phoen. 851), a 2331 ἀκέραιον, ἀνεπίπληκτον (for Tr. 922 read Or. 922), a 2534 ἀκραιφνές (for Her. 537 read Hec. 537), a 3904 ἀμφανγεί (for Or. 1529 read Or. 1519), a 7514 ἄρτιον (for 1. Tim. 3, 17 read 2. Tim. 3, 17).

But an incomprehensible passage in the Prolegomena suffers from more than faulty proofreading. In the course of debating Schmidt's assumption of an archetype containing 16 glosses to the page, Latte says (p. xxxii, 1-4): Neque quidquam inde efficitur, quod a 270-294 omissis sedecim glossis post 252 leguntur. Hic enim 24 glossas sedem mutasse facilius explicatur, si totam columnam scriba dormitans perscripsit—and concludes, after presenting further evidence, for columns of 24-26 glosses each. What this should say, in order to accord with the facts, is (I think): . . . quod a 277-294 (ἀγαθόν . . . ἀγαλακτοσύνη), omissis 25 glossis (scil. 252 ἀγαλμα Ἑκάτης . . . 276 ἀγαλματοφόρος), post 251 (ἀγαθοεργοί) legi debent. Hic enim 25 glossas, etc. Or perhaps: quod, a 277-294 praeteritis, 25 glossae extra ordinem post 251 leguntur. Schmidt had correctly counted the series involved as consisting of 18 and 25 glosses respectively. One would like to speculate on the successive steps of Latte's strange aberration, but it would be unprofitable, and his final conclusion is not affected. However, one's confidence in Latte's arithmetic is not increased by the statement in the footnote just below that 132 glosses would compose about 6 columns of 26 entries each (where 5 columns would be more difficult to account for).

Such mechanical faults in the performance of an endless task demanding—and demonstrating—encyclopedic knowledge of the Greek language and uncanny powers of combination and divination are, of course, utter trifles, only showing that the editor is, after all, human. Scholars for generations to come will acknowledge their indebtedness to him.

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Fontes ad topographiam veteris urbis Romae pertinentes colligendos atque edendos curavit IOSEPHUS LUGLI. Vol. I (Libri I-IV), II (Libri V-VII). Rome, Bardi, 1952-1953. Pp. XVI + 251; tab. IV; pp. 231, tab. VIII.

As the title of this work indicates, it is a collection of sources bearing upon the topography of Ancient Rome. One associates such a *corpus* mainly with literary sources and they rightly form the bulk of the material, but Lugli offers more than he promises by including an exhaustive collection of epigraphical evidence, selected numismatic evidence, and in some cases such information as can be gained from the topographical backgrounds of Roman historical reliefs and the *Forma Urbis*.

Whoever has worked in the field of the historical topography of Ancient Rome knows the fundamental work of Jordan and Huelsen, *Topographie der Stadt Rom im Alterthum*, begun in 1871 and ended in 1907. It is a current historical text in the form of a handbook where the footnotes, at least in Huelsen's part, have a tendency to outgrow the text. These precious footnotes contain the literary and other evidence, mostly in the form of references to ancient authors or excavation reports. The source material is in other words scattered; it is held together by the context and the cross references only, and by Huelsen's admirable indices. In 1929, Thomas Ashby published his *Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome*, partly based on the preparatory work of S. B. Platner. Its lexicographical disposition of the monuments in alphabetical order rendered the subject at once easily surveyable, and made the book what it still is: an indispensable source of knowledge to all workers in the field. The ancient sources are, however, only rarely quoted in full, and it can only be used as a basic reference book and a starting point for further literary checking.

Lugli's own work, *I monumenti antichi di Roma* (Vols. I-III; Supplemento, 1930-1940) combined Huelsen's method of presentation with that of a learned guide comprising detailed descriptions of the monuments of Rome.

*Roma Antica: il centro monumentale* (1946) by the same author is a revised and enlarged edition of the first volume of the *Monumenti*, and is now the standard work on the subject. In later years there has likewise appeared the *Codice topografico della Città di Roma* (4 vols., 1940-53), compiled and edited by R. Valentini and G. Zucchetti. It contains rare texts from Late Antique and Medieval times which bear upon the topography of Rome, critically edited as current reading without too much of an archaeological commentary.

With these works—and many more, not mentioned here—at the disposal of the topographer of Ancient Rome, one may ask if a new collection of the source material is necessary or wanted. After having perused the two volumes here presented, one is ready to admit without hesitation that any such question is idle.

Lugli's grasp of the material is entirely new. The sources are given in full quotations and in their own contexts. They are organ-

ized in such a way that they speak for themselves and form coherent chapters grouped around the different problems involved. Book I contains source material of general and multiple content; II deals with the Pomerium; III with the fortifications of Regal and Republican date; IV with the Aurelian wall and its gates; V with the Tiber, bridges and sewers; VI with the Tiber Island; and VII with the aqueducts. Within these groups the material is subdivided topographically and chronologically, in such a way that the history of every monument can be read in an unbroken sequence directly out of the Greek and Latin sources. A cursory reading of the two volumes ties the different monuments together and forms a coherent story which now and then is fascinating reading. It is rare, indeed, that one feels entitled to use that adjective of a contemporary scholarly work written exclusively in Greek and Latin.

The scientific value of the work lies not merely in the comprehensive vision of the topic, which is the reader's first reward, but is ultimately vested in the completeness of the collection and the correctness of the quotations. In both cases the editor discharges himself honorably of his duties.

Lugli and his able assistants at the Institute for Roman Topography at the University of Rome have for years dedicated themselves to a systematic reading of the ancient literature pertinent to the subject. Among the helpers should be mentioned the co-editors of the two first volumes, F. Castagnoli, G. Bregna, L. Cozza, G. Cressedi, G. Berruti, and L. M. Torti. Medieval literature is included, comprising the *Liber Pontificalis*, *Acta* and *Regesta Pontificum*, and, occasionally, the *Mirabilia*. The excerpts from the sources were collected on 16,000 cards and the present two volumes are the beginning of a critical edition of this vast material. It is a laborious task which it needed much courage to undertake, but it has paid off extremely well. New or formerly neglected literary passages make up an average of 20% of the entries. Taking under consideration that the study of the literary sources of Roman topography dates back to the Renaissance, one can only state that Lugli's *Fontes* signify a decisive step toward the unreachable goal of completeness.

The edition is careful and accurate. For all Classical texts Teubner editions have been used when available. The Christian authors are quoted from the main *corpora*, and Migne is used only exceptionally. The reviewer does not pretend to have made a complete check of the quotations, but the frequent samples he has taken have left him completely satisfied. To the meagre list of *errata et corrigenda* at the end of the second volume he can only add two minor misprints on p. 24, title 89, obviously interdependent and incurred in the last proof reading (*tenuesunt* for *tenuerunt* and *fosrae* for *fossae*). Each volume has its own *Index topographicus*. Let us hope that the end of the last volume will produce a comprehensive one plus an *Index auctorum* and an *Index inscriptionum*.

The commendable speed at which the publishing proceeds gives us reason to hope that this standard work will soon be completed to the benefit of Roman studies.

ERIK SJÖQVIST.

MARIA CYTOWSKA. De Dionis Chrysostomi Rhythmo Oratorio. Warsaw, 1952. Pp. 54; 11 Tab. (*Auctarium Maeandrium*, II.)

HANNA SZELEST. De Pausaniae Clausulis. Pp. 40; 8 Tab. Warsaw, 1953. (*Auctarium Maeandrium*, III.)

These monographs are detailed studies of the clausula rhythm of Dio Chrysostom and Pausanias which inspire respect and gratitude for the care and thoroughness they represent. Perhaps in each case the most valuable contribution lies in the convincing proof which is offered by the use of comparative statistics that clausulae have been deliberately sought by Dio and Pausanias. Miss Cytowska established convincingly Dio's marked preference for  $- \cup - \cup$ , the ditrochaic pattern, and Miss Szelest shows that the interest of Pausanias lies rather in the typically Hellenistic clausulae,  $- \cup - - \cup$ ,  $- \cup - \cup - \cup$ , and  $- \cup - \cup - \cup$ , with the cretic foot predominating. Both scholars also agree that favored clausulae were used by Dio and Pausanias at the ends not only of sentences but of important thought divisions within the sentence, and with little or no distinction between the usage in these two positions.

Each admits the necessity of comparing the clausula practice of the author in question with some kind of norm for prose not consciously metrical. To meet this requirement statistics are offered by both scholars of a second writer indubitably of the unmetrical group, and the figures for Dio and Pausanias are compared with the new percentages and with Shewring's figures (*C. Q.*, XXV, p. 13) derived from de Groot's basic equation, but derived for only a limited number of selected clausulae. It is of interest and importance that the two new sets of percentages, resulting from these studies and presenting evidence for the chance occurrence of clausulae in so-called "normal" prose, correspond closely with the norms established by de Groot's formula. Such agreement would suggest that the availability of these norms (de Groot, *A Handbook of Antique Prose Rhythm*, and for a restatement and further development of his formula, Goggin, *The Rhythm of Favorinus* [*Yale Classical Studies*, XII], pp. 158 ff.) renders unnecessary the effort involved in making each time new studies of an unmetrical author. One misses in both works any use of the sigma sub p formula for testing the significance of variations from a norm. Had this test been applied, two clausulae,  $- - - \cup$  and  $- \cup - \cup$ , which Miss Cytowska believes were sought by Dio in addition to the ditrochaic rhythm, would have been shown to have variations too slight for any statistical significance.

Miss Cytowska's study of Dio would seem to show also the superiority of de Groot's method for determining the beginning of the clausula, for it is possible to compare her description (table XI) of the favored clausulae in the Corinthian oration, once considered a work of Dio, with other recent figures for that same piece now generally accepted as belonging to Dio's student, Favorinus. According to the older method the patterns of clausulae are established through study of the ancient treatises on this subject, whereas de Groot, although by no means ignoring these works, lays down as

his first principle in this important matter: "the clausula ends (working backwards, that is) with the syllable of indifferent quantity" (*op. cit.*, p. 38). Following the older method, Miss Cytowska does not discover the presence in the Corinthiae of the clausula, - - - - -, yet there is strong evidence that in this highly metrical oration, among the five clausulae with observance percentages of "high" statistical significance, the pattern most favored is - - - - - (The Rhythm of Favorinus, p. 179).

Finally, as a secondary result of her study Miss Cytowska submits that the proof is conclusive not only for taking the Corinthiae oration (37) from Dio, but also orations 63 and 64. The evidence which she presents in the case of 37, evidence both affirmative and negative, is stronger than for the two other pieces where there is negative proof only. I would agree that for the Corinthiae the case is conclusive, and for the other works strong; indeed for 64 it becomes almost conclusive, because one may point to additional proof in the marked resemblance between its clausula rhythm and that of the rhythm of Favorinus (*Goggin, op. cit.*, pp. 149 ff.).

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### BOOKS RECEIVED.

(It is impossible to review all books submitted to the JOURNAL, but all pertaining to the classical field are listed under BOOKS RECEIVED. Contributions sent for review or notice are not returnable.)

Barbotin (Edmond). *La théorie aristotélicienne de l'intellect d'après Théophraste*. Louvain, 1954. Pp. 311.

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